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Abstract
We consider three problems in stochastic control and differential game theory, arising
from practical situations in mathematical finance and energy markets.
First, we address the problem of optimally exercising swing contracts in energy
markets. Our main result consists in characterizing the value function as the unique
viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The case of contracts with
penalties is straightforward. Conversely, the case of contracts with strict constraints
gives rise to stochastic control problems where a non-standard integral constraint is
present: we get the anticipated characterization by considering a suitable sequence
of unconstrained problems. The approximation result is proved for a general class
of problems with an integral constraint on the controls.
Then, we consider a retailer who has to decide when and how to intervene and
adjust the price of the energy he sells, in order to maximize his earnings. The
intervention costs can be either fixed or depending on the market share. In the first
case, we get a standard impulsive control problem and we characterize the value
function and the optimal price policy. In the second case, classical theory cannot
be applied, due to the singularities of the penalty function; we then outline an
approximation argument and we finally consider stronger conditions on the controls
to characterize the optimal policy.
Finally, we focus on a general class of non-zero-sum stochastic differential games
with impulse controls. After defining a rigorous framework for such problems, we
prove a verification theorem: if a couple of functions is regular enough and satisfies
a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities, it coincides with the value func-
tions of the problem and a characterization of the Nash equilibria is possible. We
conclude by a detailed example: we investigate the existence of equilibria in the case
where two countries, with different goals, can affect the exchange rate between the
corresponding currencies.
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Riassunto
In questa tesi vengono considerati tre problemi relativi alla teoria del controllo
stocastico e dei giochi differenziali; tali problemi sono legati a situazioni concrete
nell’ambito della finanza matematica e, piu` precisamente, dei mercati dell’energia.
Innanzitutto, affrontiamo il problema dell’esercizio ottimale di opzioni swing nel
mercato dell’energia. Il risultato principale consiste nel caratterizzare la funzione
valore come unica soluzione di viscosita` di un’opportuna equazione di Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman. Il caso relativo ai contratti con penalita` puo` essere trattato in
modo standard. Al contrario, il caso relativo ai contratti con vincoli stretti porta
a problemi di controllo stocastico in cui e` presente un vincolo non standard sui
controlli: la suddetta caratterizzazione e` allora ottenuta considerando un’opportuna
successione di problemi non vincolati. Tale approssimazione viene dimostrata per
una classe generale di problemi con vincolo integrale sui controlli.
Successivamente, consideriamo un fornitore di energia che deve decidere quando
e come intervenire per cambiare il prezzo che chiede ai suoi clienti, al fine di mas-
simizzare il suo guadagno. I costi di intervento possono essere fissi o dipendere dalla
quota di mercato del fornitore. Nel primo caso, otteniamo un problema standard di
controllo stocastico impulsivo, in cui caratterizziamo la funzione valore e la politica
ottimale di gestione del prezzo. Nel secondo caso, la teoria classica non puo` essere
applicata a causa delle singolarita` nella funzione che definisce le penalita`. Delineiamo
quindi una procedura di approssimazione e consideriamo infine condizioni piu` forti
sui controlli, cos`ı da caratterizzare, anche in questo caso, il controllo ottimale.
Infine, studiamo una classe generale di giochi differenziali a somma non nulla e
con controlli di tipo impulsivo. Dopo aver definito rigorosamente tali problemi, forni-
amo la dimostrazione di un teorema di verifica: se una coppia di funzioni e` sufficien-
temente regolare e soddisfa un opportuno sistema di disequazioni quasi-variazionali,
essa coincide con le funzioni valore del problema ed e` possibile caratterizzare gli
equilibri di Nash. Concludiamo con un esempio dettagliato: indaghiamo l’esistenza
di equilibri nel caso in cui due nazioni, con obiettivi differenti, possono condizionare
il tasso di cambio tra le rispettive valute.
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Introduction
Due to recent liberalizations, in the last years many new operators entered the
market of energy. As a consequence, the competition is fierce and new financial
products appeared. Hence, there is the need to refine the existing pricing techniques
in order to adapt them to a continuously evolving framework and to design new
models to address the recent issues of the market: for a researcher in mathematical
finance, energy markets represent a fruitful source of new and stimulating problems.
Of course, it is not possible to briefly describe the active research areas in energy
finance, so we now just outline a couple of examples to provide a flavour of the
problems one can deal with. First, consider a contract which gives the holder the
right to buy energy at a fixed price, but with some local and global constraints; the
seller of such contract wants to estimate the arbitrage-free price, whereas the buyer is
interested in the optimal exercise policy: both these issues correspond to a stochastic
control problem with some constraints on the controls. As another example, we can
consider an energy retailer who has to decide when and how to intervene to adjust
the final price he asks to his customers; we still deal with an optimization problem,
but only a discrete number of interventions is here possible, so that impulse controls
represent the best model in this case. Finally, as the market is highly competitive,
in order to bring the models closer to reality one may also consider the presence of
other players; consequently, we no longer deal with one-player control problems and
we rather consider two-player stochastic games.
From a mathematical point of view, as anticipated in the previous examples, we
often deal with topics in stochastic control and differential game theory. However,
due to the particular constraints of the problems, the classical theory sometimes
does not apply and suitable adaptations (or, if not possible, different procedures)
are needed. In particular, in this thesis we focus on three problems, which we now
briefly introduce.
Chapter 1: optimal exercise of swing contracts. To hedge against the
risk of sudden rises in the price of energy, swing options are traded in the market:
these contracts fix the price of energy and allow a certain amount of flexibility to
the buyer, but they also give the seller the guarantee of a minimal purchase.
More in detail, the holder of a swing contract with penalties has the right, for
each s ∈ [0, T ], to buy energy at a fixed unitary price K; however, the instantaneous
purchase intensity us has to belong to a fixed interval [0, u¯] and a penalty must be
paid if the total bought quantity ZT =
∫ T
0 usds does not belong to a fixed range
[m,M ]. The penalty usually depends on ZT and PT , where P is a continuous-
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time process which models the market price of energy. The problem of pricing such
contracts, as well as the problem of optimally exercising them, relies in the following
continuous-time stochastic control problem:
sup
u∈A
E
[∫ T
0
e−rs(Ps −K)us ds− e−rT Φ˜(PT , ZT )
]
, (0.1)
where A is the set of [0, u¯]-valued progressively measurable processes u = {us}s∈[0,T ].
Classical theory - see, for example, [20] - here applies and we can characterize the
value function as the unique viscosity solution with quadratic growth of the corre-
sponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, with suitable boundary condi-
tions. Moreover, some regularity and monotonicity results can also be proved.
A slightly different version of the option in (0.1) is also present in the market:
swing contracts with strict constraints are similar to the previous ones, but now
the holder is forced to respect the global condition ZT ∈ [m,M ]. In this case, the
optimization problem reads
sup
u∈Aadm
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−rs(Ps −K)us ds
]
, (0.2)
where Aadm is the set of controls satisfying the final condition ZT ∈ [m,M ]. Unlike
the case in (0.1), here classical theory does not apply, due to the non-standard
integral constraint on the controls. Indeed, even if problems with an upper bound
on the integral of the controls have been studied in the literature, we here have both
an upper and a lower bound: to the best of our knowledge, such double constraint
has never been considered before.
This led us to consider a general class of integral-constrained stochastic control
problems in the form
sup
u∈Aadm
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−rsL(s, Ps, Zs, us)ds+ e−rTΦ(PT , ZT )
]
, (0.3)
where Zs =
∫ s
0 g(r, ur)dr and Aadm is the set of controls u such that ZT ∈ [m,M ].
Since a simply adaptation of classical proofs is not possible, we use a penalty method:
the problem in (0.3) is the limit of appropriate unconstrained problems, where the
constraint has been substituted by a penalization in the objective functional. We
finally apply these general results to the problem in (0.2) and characterize the value
function as the unique solution of the HJB equation with quadratic growth.
Chapter 2: optimal price management in retail energy markets. We
consider a retailer who buys energy in the wholesale market and re-sells it to final
consumers. While the wholesale price can be modelled as a continuous-time process,
the final price is a piecewise constant process, due to binding clauses in the contracts.
Hence, the retailer has to decide when to intervene in order to change the price he
asks to his customers and how to set the new price.
Denote by Xt the retailer’s unitary income form the sale of energy at time t,
i.e. the spread between the retail price and the wholesale price. In our model Xt
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is a Brownian motion with drift and the retailer’s market share is given by Φ(Xt),
where Φ ∈ [0, 1] is a truncated linear function: for every x ∈ R we set
Φ(x) = min
{
1, max{0, −1/∆(x−∆)}},
with ∆ > 0 a fixed parameter. When setting his price management policy, the
retailer has to consider several elements: the profit by the sale of energy (corre-
sponding to XtΦ(Xt)), the operational costs (which we assume to be a quadratic
function of the market share) and the intervention penalties (here assumed to consist
in a fixed part and in a variable part, directly proportional to the market share).
If u = {(τk, δk)}k≥1 denotes the retailer’s policy, i.e. the intervention times and
the corresponding shifts in the price process, we deal with the following stochastic
impulsive control problem, where b, c, λ are non-negative parameters:
sup
u
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
XtΦ(Xt)− b
2
Φ(Xt)
2
)
dt−
∑
k≥1
e−ρτk
(
c+ λΦ
(
X(τk)−
))]
.
In the case λ = 0, classical results - see, for example, [32] - can be applied.
More precisely, we show that the standard formulation of the verification theorem
can here be used: we start from the classical quasi-variational inequalities for the
value function V , we define a candidate V˜ for V and we finally show that V˜ actually
corresponds to the value function, provided that a solution to a system of algebraic
equations exists. In the case where Xt is modelled by a (scaled) Brownian motion,
we show that a solution to such system actually exists and we prove some properties
for the limit case c → 0+. In particular, this is the first time, to our knowledge,
that an asymptotic estimate for the continuation region is provided in the case of
impulse control problems.
The previous procedure does not apply in the case λ > 0: the candidate value
function presents some singularities, so that the standard verification theorem, which
requires functions of class C1(R), cannot be used. Hence, we try to approximate the
value function by a sequence of problems with smooth coefficients. However, even
if the approximation procedure is possible, this is still an open problem, due to the
concavity of the market share function in a singular point. Nevertheless, we finally
outline a way to circumvent the problem, provided that stronger conditions on the
controls are required.
Chapter 3: non-zero-sum stochastic differential games with impulsive
controls. Let us come back, for a moment, to the problem in Chapter 2. As energy
markets are highly competitive, we introduce a second retailer in our model and
assume that the market share of each player depends on the difference between the
final prices they ask. In so doing, we now consider a two-player stochastic game.
More precisely, let Xi denote the unitary income of player i ∈ {1, 2} from the sale
of energy. Then, player i wants to maximize
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
XitΦ
(
Xit−Xjt
)− bi
2
Φ
(
Xit−Xjt
)2)
dt−
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
i
k
(
ci+λiΦ
(
Xi(τ ik)−
−Xj
(τ ik)
−
))]
,
(0.4)
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where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i and {τ ik}k are the intervention times of player i. Hence,
we deal with a non-zero-sum game with impulse controls.
Even if control problems and differential games have been widely studied in the
last decades, the case of non-zero-sum impulsive games has never been considered,
to the best of our knowledge. Indeed, related former works only address zero-sum
stopping games [21], the corresponding non-zero-sum problems [4] (with only one,
very recent, explicit example in [13]) and zero-sum impulsive games [14]. Hence,
motivated by the example above and the corresponding lack in the literature, we
here consider the non-zero-sum impulsive case: we provide a rigorous framework,
introduce Nash equilibria and prove a verification theorem for this class of problems.
More in detail, we consider a problem where two players can affect a continuous-
time stochastic process X by discrete-time interventions which consist in shifting
X to a new state (when none of the players intervenes, we assume X to diffuse
according to a standard SDE). Each intervention corresponds to a cost for the in-
tervening player and to a gain for the opponent. The strategy of player i ∈ {1, 2}
is determined by a couple ϕi = (Ai, ξi), where Ai is a fixed subset of Rd and ξi is
a continuous function: player i intervenes if and only if the process X exits form
Ai and, when this happens, he shifts the process from state x to state ξi(x). Once
the strategies ϕi = (Ai, ξi) and a starting point x have been chosen, a couple of
impulse controls ui(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) = {(τi,k, δi,k)}1≤k≤Mi is uniquely defined: τi,k is the
k-th intervention time of player i and δi,k is the corresponding impulse. Each player
aims at maximizing his payoff, defined as follows: for every x ∈ S ⊆ Rn and every
couple of strategies (ϕ1, ϕ2) we set
J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds+
∑
1≤k≤Mi : τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,kφi
(
X(τi,k)− , δi,k
)
+
∑
1≤k≤Mj : τj,k<τS
e−ρiτj,kψi
(
X(τj,k)− , δj,k
)
+ e−ρiτShi
(
X(τS)−
)
1{τS<+∞}
]
, (0.5)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j and τS is the exit time from S. The couple (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) is a
Nash equilibrium if J1(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2) and J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ≥ J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ2),
for every strategies ϕ1, ϕ2.
Let us consider the following quasi-variational inequalities (QVI), where i, j ∈
{1, 2} with j 6= i and Mi,Hi are suitable operators:
Vi = hi, in ∂S,
MjVj − Vj ≤ 0, in S,
HiVi − Vi = 0, in {MjVj − Vj = 0},
max
{AVi − ρiVi + fi,MiVi − Vi} = 0, in {MjVj − Vj < 0}.
(0.6)
The main result of this chapter is the Verification Theorem 3.8: if two functions
Vi, with i ∈ {1, 2}, are a solution to (0.6), have polynomial growth and satisfy the
regularity condition
Vi ∈ C2(Dj \ ∂Di) ∩ C1(Dj) ∩ C(S), (0.7)
where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i and Dj = {MjVj −Vj < 0}, then they coincide with the
value functions of the game and a characterization of the Nash strategy is possible.
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We remark the importance of (0.7). When imposing the regularity conditions,
one usually needs to solve a system of algebraic equations, as the candidate solutions
to the QVI problem are piecewise defined. In general, if the regularity conditions are
too strong, the system may have more equations than parameters, with no possibility
to apply the verification theorem. This is the main weakness of [4]: indeed, the only
application of [4] is [13], where relaxed conditions are needed. In our case, the system
is formally solvable (same number of equations and parameters, as we will see): an
important contribution in this chapter consists in providing regularity conditions
which allow to practically apply the verification theorem.
In the final part of the chapter we apply the verification theorem in a detailed
example. The problem in (0.4) presents, as a matter of fact, a complicated structure
and is currently subject of ongoing research. So, we here provide a simpler one-
dimensional example. More precisely, we consider two countries which can affect
the exchange rate between their currencies: the countries have different goals and
we investigate the existence of Nash equilibria for this problem.
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Chapter 1
Optimal exercise of swing
contracts in energy markets
Based on [3]: M. Basei, A. Cesaroni, T. Vargiolu, Optimal exercise of swing
contracts in energy markets: an integral constrained stochastic optimal control prob-
lem, SIAM J. Finan. Math. 5 (2014), no 1, 581–608.
Abstract. We characterize the value of swing contracts in continuous time
as the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with
suitable boundary conditions. The case of contracts with penalties is straight-
forward, and in that case only a terminal condition is needed. Conversely, the
case of contracts with strict constraints gives rise to a stochastic control problem
with a nonstandard state constraint. We approach this problem by a penalty
method: we consider a general constrained problem and approximate the value
function with a sequence of value functions of appropriate unconstrained prob-
lems with a penalization term in the objective functional. Coming back to the
case of swing contracts with strict constraints, we finally characterize the value
function as the unique viscosity solution with polynomial growth of the HJB
equation subject to appropriate boundary conditions.
Keywords: swing contracts, energy markets, stochastic control, state constraints,
penalty methods, dynamic programming, HJB equation, viscosity solutions.
1.1 Introduction
Energy is traded in financial markets, in its various forms (electricity, coal, gas, oil,
etc.), mainly through two types of contracts, namely forwards and swings. Forward
contracts are obligations between two parts to exchange some amount of energy, in a
specified form (electricity or some fuel) and for a prespecified amount of money: once
settled, this contract is strictly binding for both the parts, giving no flexibility to
them. Conversely, swing contracts give a certain amount of flexibility to the buyer,
while also giving the seller a certain guarantee that a minimum quantity of energy
will be bought. This is due to the fact that energy storage is costly in the case of
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fuels and almost impossible in the case of electricity; moreover, energy markets are
influenced by many elements (peaks in consumes related to sudden weather changes,
breakdowns in power plants, financial crises, etc.). As a consequence, the price of
energy is subject to remarkable fluctuations, so that flexibility is much welcomed by
contract buyers.
The flexibility in swing contracts is implemented in this way (we here follow the
approach in [5] and model the contract in continuous time): for a fixed contract
maturity T (usually one or several years), the buyer can choose, at each time s ∈
[0, T ], to buy a marginal amount of energy u(s) ∈ [0, u¯] at a prespecified strike price
K, thus realizing a marginal profit (or loss) equal to (P (s)−K)u(s), where P (s) is
the spot price of that kind of energy. This gives to the buyer the potential profit (or
loss) ∫ T
0
e−rs(P (s)−K)u(s) ds,
with r > 0 the risk-free interest rate.
However, the energy seller usually wants the total amount of energy Z(T ) =∫ T
0 u(s) ds to lie between a minimum and a maximum quantity, that is Z(T ) ∈
[m,M ]. This is implemented in two main ways. The first way is to impose penalties
when Z(T ) /∈ [m,M ], i.e. to make the buyer pay a penalty Φ˜(P (T ), Z(T )), where
Φ˜(p, z) is a contractually fixed function, null for z ∈ [m,M ] and convex in z. The
second way is to impose the constraint Z(T ) ∈ [m,M ] to be satisfied strictly, i.e. to
force the buyer to withdraw the minimum cumulative amount of energy m and to
stop giving the energy when the maximum M has been reached.
We are interested in the problem of optimally exercising a swing contract in both
the cases. This problem can be modelled as a continuous time stochastic control
problem: our aim is to study the corresponding value function and to characterize
it as the unique viscosity solution of the related Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation. Swing contracts are treated either in discrete time [1, 2, 17, 24] via the
dynamic programming principle and Bellman equations or in continuous time [5, 19]
only by reporting a verification theorem for a smooth solution of the HJB equation,
without reporting existence or uniqueness results for that. Besides, we also extend
the approach in [5, 19], which only treat the case m = 0, to the case when m > 0,
which is the most relevant case in practical applications (in fact, [28] reports that
typically m ∈ [0.8M,M ]). We also refer to [12], where swing contracts in continuous
time are treated in continuous time with multiple stopping techniques, and [6],
where swings are priced using a discrete-time backward scheme for solving BSDEs
with jumps.
In the case of swing contracts with penalties, we get a standard stochastic control
problem, as the maximization of the final expected payoff for a buyer entering in
the contract at a generic time t ∈ [0, T ] is given by
V˜ (t, p, z) = sup
u∈At
Etpz
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(P (s)−K)u(s) ds− e−r(T−t)Φ˜(P (T ), Z(T ))
]
,
(1.1)
with (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R2, whereAt is the set of [0, u¯]-valued progressively measurable
processes u = {u(s)}s∈[t,T ]. Thus, in this case classical theory (see [16, 18, 20]) can
be applied: see Section 1.2.
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Conversely, swing contracts with strict constraints give rise to a stochastic control
problem with integral constraints in the control:
V (t, p, z) = sup
u∈Aadmtz
Etpz
[ ∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(P (s)−K)u(s) ds
]
, (1.2)
with (t, p, z) in a suitable domain D ⊆ [0, T ]×R2, where Aadmtz is the set of processes
u ∈ At such that Ptpz-a.s. Zt,z;u(T ) = z+
∫ T
t u(s) ds ∈ [m,M ]. Due to the presence
of the constraint on Zt,z;u(T ), here classical theory does not apply.
This motivates us to consider in Section 1.3 a more general class of integral
constrained stochastic problems in the form
V (t, p, z)= sup
u∈Aadmtz
Etpz
[ ∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)L(s, P (s), Z(s), u(s))ds+e−r(T−t)Φ(P (T ), Z(T ))
]
.
(1.3)
with (t, p, z) in a suitable domain D ⊆ [0, T ] × Rn × R, where Aadmtz is the set of
processes u ∈ At such that, Ptpz-a.s., Z(T ) = z +
∫ T
t g(s, u(s)) ds ∈ [m,M ].
Control problems with integral constraints are classical in control theory, for
instance they naturally arise in applications: e.g. control problems with bounded Lp
norm of the controls, control problems with prescribed bounded total variation or
total energy of the trajectories, control systems with design uncertainties. However,
the dynamic programming approach presents several technical difficulties. The main
one relies on the fact that the dynamic programming principle is not satisfied directly
by the value function and the problem has to be attacked differently. As for the case
of deterministic systems, we refer to [30, 34] and references therein. As for the case
of stochastic controls, the upper bound Z(T ) ≤M is analogous to the constraint of
the so-called finite fuel problems, which are optimal control problems with an upper
bound on the integral of the absolute value of the controls (see e.g. [20, Chapter
VIII] for an introduction to the problem, [29] and references therein). Instead, the
lower bound Z(T ) ≥ m is nonstandard. In the particular case of Equation (1.2), and
only with m = 0, such a bound has been studied (treated in [5] and generalized in
[19], still with m = 0). However, we already said that this case is quite unrealistic,
as the seller wants to be sure to sell some amount of energy, so typically m > 0.
Note that the control problem in (1.3) can be interpreted as a state constraint
control problem in the following way. First of all, the integral constraint on the
control can be written as a terminal constraint on the state variables (P (s), Z(s)):
they have to satisfy a.s. (P (T ), Z(T )) ∈ G, where G is a closed set in Rn+1. In our
case G = Rn× [m,M ]. Then, we introduce the set of points such that G is reachable
from (t, p, z), i.e.
D = {(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R : Aadmtz 6= ∅}.
Thus, we can rewrite the value function as
V (t, p, z)= sup
u∈Aadmtz
Etpz
[ ∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)L(s, P (s), Z(s), u(s))ds+e−r(T−t)Φ(P (T ), Z(T ))
]
,
with the constraints that (P (s), Z(s)) ∈ D a.s. for all s ∈ [t, T ].
18 Optimal exercise of swing contracts
Note that here D is not given explicitly, but it is defined by a stochastic target
problem. In [8], a similar stochastic control problem has been considered, with
G = {(p, z) ∈ Rn × R | g(p, z) ≥ 0} and g(p, ·) increasing and right continuous.
In this case, though, differently from our case, the set D can be described as the
epigraph of a continuous function, that is D = {(t, p, z) | w(t, p) ≥ z}. We also refer
to [7] where reachable sets for state-constrained controlled stochastic systems have
been studied.
To study our problem, we adopt a classical penalization method. We introduce
the set D˜ ⊆ D (which is the set of points such that the interior of G is reachable
from (t, p, z), for precise definition we refer to Section 1.3.1) and we show that in D˜
the function V in Equation (1.3) is the limit of the value functions V c of suitable un-
constrained problems, where the constraint has been substituted by an appropriate
penalization in the objective functional. This convergence result is obtained under
a technical assumption, see Assumption 1.9, ensuring that, roughly speaking, given
a control in Aadmtz we can modify it in order to steer the trajectory in the interior
of G, not paying too much in the cost functional. This result is contained in The-
orem 1.11 and Corollary 1.12. In Propositions 1.15 and 1.16 we prove that, under
suitable assumptions, the function V (t, ·, z) is Lipschitz continuous and a.e. twice
differentiable. In Section 1.3.4 we show that Assumption 1.9 is satisfied in the cases
g(s, v) = v and g(s, v) = |v|p (p ≥ 1), if f and σ satisfy appropriate conditions.
In Section 1.4 we apply these general results to the problem in (1.2). In this case
stronger results will be achieved, since it can be proved directly that the value func-
tion is continuous not only in D˜ ( D but in the whole domain D (Proposition 1.19
and 1.21). Thus, V can be characterized as the unique continuous viscosity solution
with polynomial growth of the HJB equation under suitable boundary conditions
(Theorem 1.22). As for the regularity of the value function, besides the above cited
general results about the variable p (Proposition 1.23), we prove that V (t, p, ·) is
concave and study its monotonicity (Proposition 1.24).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1.2 the evaluation problem
for a swing contract with penalty is studied. Section 1.3 deals with a general class of
constrained control problems, as in Equation (1.3). Finally, in Section 1.4 we deeply
analyze the problem, outlined in (1.2), of the optimal exercise of swing contracts
with strict constraints.
Notations. By ‖ · ‖∞ we denote the sup-norm. If B ∈Mij(R) (i.e. a real i× j
matrix), Bt denotes the transpose of B and tr(B) denotes its trace. By B(x,R) we
mean the closed ball in Rn with center x and radius R. If O ⊆ Rn and k ∈ N, we
denote by Ckb (O) (resp. C
k
p (O)) the set of functions of class C
k(O) whose derivatives
up to order k are bounded (resp. are polynomially growing). If ψ is a function from
(t, p, z) ∈ A ⊆ R×Rn×R to R, by ψt, ψz we mean the derivatives with respect to t
and z and by Dpψ,D
2
pψ we mean the Jacobian and the Hessian matrix with respect
to the variable p.
1.2 Swing contracts with penalties
In this section we consider the problem of the optimal exercise of swing contracts with
penalties described in the Introduction: to this purpose, we formalize a continuous
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time model to which we apply classical results in stochastic control.
Let T > 0 and fix a filtered probability space (Ω, FT , {Fs}s∈[0,T ], P) and a real
{Fs}s-adapted Brownian motion W = {W (s)}s∈[0,T ]. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and p ≥ 0. We
model the price of energy through a stochastic process {P t,p(s)}s∈[t,T ] which satisfies
the SDE
dP t,p(s) = f(s, P t,p(s))ds+ σ(s, P t,p(s))dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ], (1.4)
with initial condition P t,p(t) = p. We assume
f, σ ∈ C([0, T ]× R;R),
|f(t, p)− f(t, q)|+ |σ(t, p)− σ(t, q)| ≤ Cˆ|p− q| ∀p, q ∈ R, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (1.5)
where Cˆ > 0 is a constant.
In each s ∈ [t, T ], the holder can buy energy at a fixed unitary price K > 0
and with purchase intensity u(s) ∈ [0, u¯], where u¯ > 0 is a constant: this gives
a net instantaneous profit (or loss) of (P t,p(s) − K)u(s). Let At be the set of all
[0, u¯]-valued progressively measurable processes u = {u(s)}s∈[t,T ] (i.e. all the possible
usage strategies of the contract). Let z be the amount of energy purchased until
time t and let u ∈ At be an exercise strategy from time t on; for each s ∈ [t, T ] we
denote by Zt,z;u(s) the energy bought up to time s:
Zt,z;u(s) = z +
∫ s
t
u(τ)dτ, s ∈ [t, T ].
If the globally purchased energy Zt,z;u(T ) does not fall within a fixed range
[m,M ] (m,M ∈ R, withm ≤M), the holder must pay a penalty Φ˜(P t,p(T ), Zt,z;u(T )),
where Φ˜ is a function from R2 to R. In the typical case (see, for example, [1, 2, 18])
the penalty is directly proportional to P t,p(T )+ and to the entity of the overrunning
or underrunning: this is obtained by setting
Φ˜(p, z) = −Ap+(z −M)+ −Bp+(m− z)+,
for all (p, z) ∈ R2, where A,B > 0 are suitable constants. In several practical cases,
A = B. However, other kind of penalties are possible (see e.g. [24]): typically p+,
representing the spot price at the end T of the contract, is replaced either by an
arithmetic mean of spot prices (thus requiring another state variable in the problem)
or by a fixed (high) penalty. In the light of the above discussion, we assume that,
for all p ∈ R,
Φ˜(p, z) = 0, ∀z ∈ [m,M ],
Φ˜(p, ·) is concave,
|Φ˜(p+ h, z)− Φ˜(p, z)| ≤ Ch(1 + |z|), ∀z ∈ R, h > 0,
|Φ˜(p, z + h)− Φ˜(p, z)| ≤ Ch(1 + |p|), ∀z ∈ R, h > 0,
(1.6)
where C > 0 is a constant.
Let r ≥ 0 be the risk-free rate. We get a stochastic optimal control problem,
with the following value function:
V˜ (t, p, z) = sup
u∈At
J˜(t, p, z;u), (1.7)
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for each (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2, where
J˜(t, p, z;u) = Etpz
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(P t,p(s)−K)u(s)ds+ e−r(T−t)Φ˜(P t,p(T ), Zt,z;u(T ))
]
and by Etpz we denote the mean value with respect to the probability P (subscripts
recall initial conditions).
Problem (1.7) belongs to a widely studied class of control problems: by well-
known classical results, summarized in Theorem 1.1, the value function is the unique
viscosity solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation subject
to appropriate conditions (we refer to [15] for the definition of viscosity solutions).
Theorem 1.1. Under assumptions (1.5) and (1.6), the function V˜ is the unique
viscosity solution of
− V˜t(t, p, z) + rV˜ (t, p, z)− f(t, p)V˜p(t, p, z)− 1
2
σ2(t, p)V˜pp(t, p, z)
+ min
v∈[0,u¯]
[−v(V˜z(t, p, z) + p−K)] = 0, ∀(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T [×R2, (1.8)
with final condition
V˜ (T, p, z) = Φ˜(p, z), ∀(p, z) ∈ R2, (1.9)
and such that
|V˜ (t, p, z)| ≤ Cˇ(1 + |p|2 + |z|2), ∀(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2,
for some constant Cˇ > 0.
Proof. See Theorem 1.10, of which this theorem is a particular case.
We now list some properties of the function V˜ with respect to the variables p
and z. Let us start by proving regularity results with respect to the variable p.
Proposition 1.2. Under assumptions (1.5) and (1.6), for each (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R the
function V˜ (t, ·, z) is Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in t. Moreover, the derivative
V˜p(t, p, z) exists for a.e. (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R2 and we have |V˜p(t, p, z)| ≤M1(1 + |z|),
for some constant M1 > 0 depending only on u¯, T , C and on the constants in (1.18)
and (1.21).
Proof. Let (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R2, h > 0 and u ∈ At. By estimate (D.8) in [20,
Appendix D] we have
|J˜(t, p+ h, z;u)− J˜(t, p, z;u)|
≤ Etpz
[∫ T
t
|P t,p+h(s)− P t,p(s)| |u(s)|ds+ C|P t,p+h(T )− P t,p(T )| (1 + |Zt,z;u(T )|)
]
≤ T u¯Etpz[‖P t,p+h(·)− P t,p(·)‖∞] + CEtpz[‖P t,p+h(·)− P t,p(·)‖∞](1 + |z|+ u¯T )
≤M1(1 + |z|)h, (1.10)
where M1 > 0 is a constant. Since (1.10) holds for each u ∈ At, we get
|V˜ (t, p+ h, z)− V˜ (t, p, z)| ≤M1(1 + |z|)h. (1.11)
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The function V˜ (t, ·, z) is therefore Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in t, and then
a.e. differentiable by the Rademacher theorem (see [23]). By standard arguments
(see [23]) it is possible to prove that the set of points where V˜p(t, p, z) does not exist
is measurable in [0, T ]×R2, then by Fubini theorem it follows that V˜p(t, p, z) exists
for a.e. (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R2. The estimate on the derivative immediately follows by
(1.11).
In the following proposition we collect some results about smoothness and mono-
tonicity of the function V˜ with respect to z.
Proposition 1.3. Under assumptions (1.5) and (1.6), for each (t, p) ∈ [0, T ] × R
the function V˜ (t, p, ·) is
- Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in t. Moreover, the derivative V˜z(t, p, z) exists
for a.e. (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R2 and we have |V˜z(t, p, z)| ≤M2(1 + |p|), for some
constant M2 > 0 depending only on u¯, T , C and on the constants in (1.18)
and (1.21).
- concave and a.e. twice differentiable;
- non-decreasing in ] − ∞,M − (T − t)u¯] and non-increasing in [m,+∞[. In
particular, if M − (T − t)u¯ ≥ m then the function V˜ (t, p, ·) is constant in
[m,M − (T − t)u¯] (they all are maximum points).
Proof. Item 1. Let (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R2, h > 0 and u ∈ At. Recall the following
estimate from [20, Appendix D]: for each k ≥ 0 there exists a constant Bk ≥ 0,
depending only on u¯, T , C and on the constants in (1.18) and (1.21), such that
Etpz
[‖P t,p;u(·)‖k∞] ≤ Bk(1 + |p|k). (1.12)
By this and the Lipschitzianity of Φ˜(P t,p(T ), ·) we have
|J˜(t, p, z + h;u)− J˜(t, p, z;u)| ≤ CEtpz[(1 + |P t,p(T )|) |Zt,z+h;u(T )− Zt,z;u(T )|]
≤ Ch(1 + Etpz[|P t,p(T )|]) ≤M2(1 + |p|)h,
where M2 > 0 is a constant. Then argue as in Proposition 1.2.
Item 2. Let (t, p) ∈ [0, T ] × R, z1, z2 ∈ R and u1, u2 ∈ At. Notice that (u1 +
u2)/2 ∈ At and that
Zt,
z1+z2
2
;
u1+u2
2 (T ) =
Zt,z1;u1(T ) + Zt,z2;u2(T )
2
. (1.13)
By the concavity of the function Φ˜(P t,p(T ), ·) and by (1.13) we have
J˜(t, p, z1;u1) + J˜(t, p, z2;u2)
2
≤ J˜
(
t, p,
z1 + z2
2
;
u1 + u2
2
)
≤ V
(
t, p,
z1 + z2
2
)
.
(1.14)
Since (1.14) holds for each u1, u2 ∈ At, we get
V˜ (t, p, z1) + V˜ (t, p, z2)
2
≤ V˜
(
t, p,
z1 + z2
2
)
,
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and then the concavity of the function V˜ (t, p, ·). The a.e. existence of the second
derivative follows from the Alexandrov theorem.
Item 3. Let (t, p) ∈ [0, T ]× R, z1 ≤ z2 ≤M − (T − t)u¯ (the case m ≤ z1 ≤ z2 is
similar) and u ∈ At. Since
Zt,z1;u(T ) ≤ Zt,z2;u(T ) = z2 +
∫ T
t
u(s)ds ≤ z2 + (T − t)u¯ ≤M
and since the function Φ˜(P t,p(T ), ·) is non-decreasing in ]−∞,M ] (as it is concave
and null in [m,M ]), we have that
J˜(t, p, z1;u) ≤ J˜(t, p, z2;u). (1.15)
As inequality (1.15) holds for each u ∈ At, we get
V˜ (t, p, z1) ≤ V˜ (t, p, z2).
The second part immediately follows, since ]−∞,M−(T −t)u¯]∩ [m,+∞[= [m,M−
(T − t)u¯].
The monotonicity result in Proposition 1.3 is described in Figure 1.1.
M
m
T
z
t0
M - ūT
     non-increasing
             V(t, p, ∙) 
non-decreasing
V(t, p, ∙)
 const.
V(t, p, ∙)
 
Figure 1.1: monotonicity of V˜ (t, p, ·)
The third part of Proposition 1.3 implies in particular that for suitable t and for
all p, the function V (t, p, ·) is constant in an interval. As a matter of fact, this was
foreseeable: it is easy to check that if M−(T−t)u¯ ≥ m and z ∈ [m,M−(T−t)u¯] then
Zt,z;u(T ) ∈ [m,M ] for each u ∈ At, so that the penalization term in the objective
functional vanishes and the initial value z does not influence the value function.
Remark 1.4. As observed in [5, Equation (3.9)], by (1.8) a candidate optimal
control policy is
u(t, p, z) =
{
u¯ if V˜z(t, p, z) ≥ p−K,
0 if V˜z(t, p, z) < p−K.
(1.16)
Notice that by Proposition 1.3 the candidate in (1.16) is a.e. well-defined. Moreover,
since V˜ is concave in z, for each fixed (t, p) there exists z¯(t, p) ∈ [−∞,+∞] such
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that V˜z(t, p, z) < p − K if and only if z > z¯(t, p): for t fixed, the function z¯(t, ·)
(which in [5] is called exercise curve) can be used to write u as
u(t, p, z) =
{
u¯ if z ≤ z¯(t, p),
0 if z > z¯(t, p).
(1.17)
1.3 Integral constrained stochastic optimal control
Let us now consider the problem, outlined in the Introduction, of optimally exercis-
ing swing contracts with strict constraints. Due to the presence of the constraint,
in this case it is not possible to argue as in Section 1.2 and use classical results in
control theory. This motivates us to study a more general class of stochastic opti-
mal control problems with integral constraints, of which swing contracts with strict
constraints will be a particular case.
1.3.1 Formulation of the problem
Let d, l, n ∈ N, r ≥ 0, T > 0 and m,M ∈ R with m < M . Let U ⊆ Rl be nonempty
and f, σ, g, L,Φ be functions satisfying the following assumptions:
Assumption 1.5. i) U is a compact subset of Rl;
ii) f ∈ C([0, T ] × Rn × U ;Rn), σ ∈ C([0, T ] × Rn × U ;Mnd(R)) and there exists
a constant C > 0 such that
|f(t, p, v)− f(t, q, v)| ≤ C|p− q|, ∀p, q ∈ Rn, ∀(t, v) ∈ [0, T ]× U,
|σ(t, p, v)− σ(t, q, v)| ≤ C|p− q|, ∀p, q ∈ Rn, ∀(t, v) ∈ [0, T ]× U ; (1.18)
iii) g ∈ C([0, T ]× U ;R);
iv) L ∈ C([0, T ] × Rn × R × U ;R), Φ ∈ C(Rn × R;R) and there exist constants
C˜, k > 1 such that
|L(t, p, z, v)| ≤ C˜(1 + |p|k + |z|k), ∀(t, p, z, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R× U,
|Φ(p, z)| ≤ C˜(1 + |p|k + |z|k), ∀(p, z) ∈ Rn × R.
(1.19)
Moreover, for each compact subset A ⊆ Rn+1 there exists a modulus of conti-
nuity ωA such that
|L(t, p, z, v)− L(t, q, y, v)| ≤ ωR(|p− q|+ |z − y|), (1.20)
for all (t, v) ∈ [0, T ]× U and for all (p, z), (q, y) ∈ A.
Notice that conditions (1.18) implies that
|f(t, p, v)| ≤ Cˆ(1 + |p|), ∀(t, p, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × U,
|σ(t, p, v)| ≤ Cˆ(1 + |p|), ∀(t, p, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × U,
(1.21)
where Cˆ > 0 is a constant.
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Let (Ω,FT , {Fs}s∈[0,T ],P,W ) be a fixed filtered probability space where a d-
dimensional {Fs}s-adapted Brownian motion W = {W (s)}s∈[0,T ] is defined. If
t ∈ [0, T ], let At denote the set of all U -valued progressively measurable processes
u = {u(s)}s∈[t,T ] (controls) such that for each p ∈ Rn the n-dimensional stochastic
differential equation.
dP t,p;u(s) = f(s, P t,p;u(s), u(s))ds+ σ(s, P t,p;u(s), u(s))dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
(1.22)
with initial condition
P t,p;u(t) = p, (1.23)
has a pathwise unique strong solution.
Let t ∈ [0, T ], z ∈ R, u ∈ At and let
Zt,z;u(s) = z +
∫ s
t
g(τ, u(τ))dτ, s ∈ [t, T ]. (1.24)
A control u ∈ At is called admissible if the process Zt,z;u a.s. reaches the interval
[m,M ] at the final time T :
Aadmtz =
{
u ∈ At : Zt,z;u(T ) ∈ [m,M ] Ptpz-a.s.
}
.
We will often write P u and Zu, in order to shorten the notations.
Given (t, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R and A ⊆ R, we say that A is reachable from (t, z) if
there exists a Borel measurable function u from [t, T ] to U (notice that then u ∈ At)
such that Zt,z;u(T ) ∈ A. Let D, D˜,Dρ (for 0 < ρ < (M −m)/2) denote the subsets
of [0, T ]× Rn × R defined by
D = {(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R : [m,M ] is reachable from (t, z)} ,
D˜ = {(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R : ]m,M [ is reachable from (t, z)} ,
Dρ = {(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R : [m+ ρ,M − ρ] is reachable from (t, z)} .
Notice that
⋃
ρDρ = D˜ ⊆ D. It is easy to prove that these sets are nonempty.
Lemma 1.6. The sets D, D˜,Dρ are nonempty.
Proof. Let 0 < ρ < (M −m)/2. As Dρ ⊆ D˜ ⊆ D, it suffices to show that Dρ 6= ∅.
Since g([0, T ]×U) = [ξ1, ξ2], for suitable (t˜, z˜) ∈ [0, T ]×R we have that Z t˜,z˜,u(T ) ∈
[z˜ + ξ1(T − t˜), z˜ + ξ2(T − t˜)] ⊆ [m+ ρ,M − ρ] for each Borel measurable function u
from [t˜, T ] to U , and thus (t˜, p˜, z˜) ∈ Dρ (arbitrary p˜ ∈ R).
If (t, p, z) ∈ D, by Etpz we denote the mean value with respect to the probability
Ptpz = P (subscripts recall initial data). We can now define the value function.
Definition 1.7. We set
V (t, p, z) = sup
u∈Aadmtz
J(t, p, z;u), (1.25)
for each (t, p, z) ∈ D, where
J(t, p, z;u) = Etpz
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)L(s, P t,p;u(s), Zt,z;u(s), u(s))ds
+ e−r(T−t)Φ(P t,p;u(T ), Zt,z;u(T ))
]
.
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Let us prove that the value function (1.25) is well defined.
Lemma 1.8. The expectations in (1.25) are well posed, V (t, p, z) <∞ and
|V (t, p, z)| ≤ Γ(1 + |p|k + |z|k), (1.26)
for each (t, p, z) ∈ D, where k is as in (1.19) and Γ ≥ 0 is a constant depending only
on U , T , C, C˜, Cˆ and max g. Moreover, D is the maximal set in which expression
(1.25) makes sense.
Proof. First of all, notice that Aadmtz 6= ∅ if and only if (t, p, z) ∈ D for each p ∈ Rn.
Recall estimate (1.12): it can be shown that Bk depends only on the set U and on
constants T , C, Cˆ (see [20, Appendix D]. By (1.19) and (1.12) we have
Etpz
[ ∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)L(s, P t,p;u(s), Zt,z;u(s), u(s))ds+ e−r(T−t)Φ(P t,p;u(T ), Zt,z;u(T ))
∣∣∣∣ ]
≤ C˜Etpz
[ ∫ T
t
(1 + |P t,p;u(s)|k + |Zt,z;u(s)|k)ds+ (1 + |P t,p;u(T )|k + |Zt,z;u(T )|k)
]
≤ C1Etpz[1 + ‖P t,p;u(·)‖k + ‖Zt,z;u(·)‖k]
≤ C2(1 + |p|k + |z|k), (1.27)
for suitable constants C1, C2 > 0.
We also require the following assumption to hold.
Assumption 1.9. Given 0 < ρ < (M − m)/2 and a compact subset A ⊆ Dρ,
there exist ε¯ > 0 and a function 0 < η ≤ (M − m)/2, both depending only on
ρ, A, T and U , with the following property: for each 0 < ε < ε¯, (t, p, z) ∈ A,
u ∈ Aadmtz there exists u˜ ∈ At such that |J(t, p, z;u) − J(t, p, z; u˜)| ≤ ε and that
a.s. Zt,z;u˜(T ) ∈ [m+ η(ε),M − η(ε)].
In Section 1.3.4 we will give two examples of wide classes of problems satisfying
Assumption 1.9.
1.3.2 Approximating problems
We would like to obtain for the problems of Section 1.3.1 the standard results in
unconstrained control theory: continuity of the value function and characterization
of the value function by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. A straight-
forward approach is not possible, since condition u ∈ Aadmtz prevents from simply
adapting classical proofs.
The idea is then the following: to define suitable unconstrained problems which
approximate our constrained problem and then to obtain the properties of the value
function (1.25) through a limiting procedure. The construction of the approximating
problems is based on the idea of penalizing the case Zt,z;u(T ) /∈ [m,M ] by adding a
suitable term in the objective functional. In particular, we need, as a key point in
the proof of Theorem 1.11, that limc Φ
c(m) = limc Φ
c(M) = −∞ and that definitely
Φc(z) = 0 for each z ∈]m,M [; for this reason we choose the following penalization
functions.
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Given c > 0, let Φc be the function from R to R defined by
Φc(z) = −c
[(
z −
(
M − 1√
c
))+
+
((
m+
1√
c
)
− z
)+]
, (1.28)
for each z ∈ R. Let the assumptions of Section 1.3.1 hold and consider the following
unconstrained problem:
V c(t, p, z) = sup
u∈At
Jc(t, p, z;u), (1.29)
where (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R,
Jc(t, p, z;u) = Etpz
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)L(s, P t,p;u(s), Zt,z;u(s), u(s))ds
+ e−r(T−t)Φ(P t,p;u(T ), Zt,z;u(T )) + e−r(T−t)Φc(Zt,z;u(T ))
]
and this time the maximization is performed over the set At of all controls.
Problem (1.29) is a classical unconstrained stochastic control problem; therefore,
by classical results, the function V c is characterized by the HJB equation. Here is
the precise statement.
Theorem 1.10. Let the assumptions of Section 1.3.1 hold and let c > 0 and k as
in (1.19). Then V c is the unique continuous viscosity solution of
− V ct (t, p, z) + rV c(t, p, z) + min
v∈U
[
−f(t, p, v) ·DpV c(t, p, z)− g(t, v)V cz (t, p, z)
−1
2
tr
(
σ(t, p, v)σt(t, p, v)D2pV
c(t, p, z)
)−L(t, p, z, v)] = 0, ∀(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T [×Rn×R,
(1.30)
with final condition
V c(T, p, z) = Φ(p, z) + Φc(z), ∀(p, z) ∈ Rn+1, (1.31)
and such that
|V c(t, p, z)| ≤ Cˇ(1 + |p|k + |z|k), ∀(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R,
for some constant Cˇ > 0.
Proof. The value function is a viscosity solution of (1.30) by a standard result in
unconstrained control theory (the proof, for instance, can be achieved by slightly
modifying the arguments in [20, Chapter IV]). As for uniqueness, see [16, Thm. 3.1].
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1.3.3 Properties of the value function
We now prove the central result of this paper: the value functions V c in (1.29)
converge, uniformly on the compact subsets of each Dρ, to the value function V
in (1.25). On one hand, this results provides an approximation of V (recall the
characterization of the functions V c in Theorem 1.10); on the other hand, in such a
way V inherits continuity from the functions V c.
Theorem 1.11. Let the assumptions of Section 1.3.1 hold. Then, as c→ +∞, the
functions V c converge to V uniformly on compact subsets of Dρ, for each 0 < ρ <
(M −m)/2.
Proof. Let 0 < ρ < (M −m)/2, A be a compact subset of Dρ and R > 0 be such
that B(0, R) ⊇ A. For each ε > 0, we have to prove that there exists δ > 0 such
that ∣∣∣∣ sup
u∈At
Jc(t, p, z;u)− sup
u∈Aadmtz
J(t, p, z;u)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε, (1.32)
for each c ≥ δ and (t, p, z) ∈ A.
Step 1: lower bound for V c in A. By definition of Dρ, for each (t, p, z) ∈ A let
utpz be a Borel measurable function from [t, T ] to U such that Z
utpz(T ) ∈ [m +
ρ,M − ρ]. Since [m + ρ,M − ρ] ⊆ [m + c− 12 ,M − c− 12 ] for c ≥ ρ−2, notice that
Jc(t, p, z;utpz) ≡ Ktpz for a suitable constant Ktpz for all c ≥ ρ−2. By estimates as
in (1.27), it is easy to show that, for a constant C1 > 0 and for k ≥ 0 as in (1.19),
we have |Ktpz| ≤ C1(1 + |p|k + |z|k) ≤ C1(1 + 2Rk) for each (t, p, z) ∈ A, so that
K := inf(t,p,z)∈AKtpz ∈ R. Therefore,
V c(t, p, z) ≥ Jc(t, p, z;utpz) = Ktpz ≥ K, (1.33)
for each (t, p, z) ∈ A and c ≥ ρ−2.
Step 2: new formulation of (1.32). Let (t, p, z) ∈ A. For each n ∈ N we set
Btpzn =
{
u ∈ At : 1
n+ 1
< Ptpz(Zu(T ) /∈ [m,M ]) ≤ 1
n
}
.
Let c ≥ ρ−2, n ∈ N and u ∈ Btpzn . By noting that Φc ≤ 0 and that Φc(x) ≤ −√c for
x /∈ [m,M ] and by estimates as in (1.27), we have
Jc(t, p, z;u) = J(t, p, z;u) + Etpz
[
e−r(T−t)Φc(Zu(T ))
]
≤ J(t, p, z;u) + Etpz
[
e−r(T−t)Φc(Zu(T ))1{Zu(T )/∈[m,M ]}
]
≤ C2(1 + |p|k + |z|k)− e−rT
√
c Ptpz(Zu(T ) /∈ [m,M ])
< C2(1 + 2R
k)− e−rT
√
c
n+ 1
, (1.34)
for a suitable constant C2 > 0. By (1.34) it follows that for each n ∈ N there exists
c(n) ≥ ρ−2 such that
Jc(t, p, z;u) < K,
for each c ≥ c(n) and u ∈ Btpzn , with K as in Step 1. By (1.33) we thus get
sup
u∈At
Jc(t, p, z;u) = sup
u∈At\
⋃
{i∈N:c(i)≤c}B
tpz
i
Jc(t, p, z;u), (1.35)
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for each c ≥ ρ−2. The sequence {c(n)}n is obviously increasing; hence, there exists
a function m from [ρ−2,+∞[ to N such that {i ∈ N : c(i) ≤ c} = {1, . . . ,m(c)} for
each c ≥ ρ−2. As a consequence, we can rewrite (1.35) as follows:
sup
u∈At
Jc(t, p, z;u) = sup
u∈At\
⋃m(c)
i=1 B
tpz
i
Jc(t, p, z;u). (1.36)
Notice that m(·) is increasing and that m(c)→ +∞.
Let ε > 0. By (1.36), for c ≥ ρ−2 inequality (1.32) is equivalent to
− ε ≤ sup
u∈At\
⋃m(c)
i=1 B
tpz
i
Jc(t, p, z;u)− sup
u∈Aadmtz
J(t, p, z;u) ≤ ε. (1.37)
Therefore, we have to prove that there exists δ ≥ ρ−2 such that (1.37) holds for
each c ≥ δ and for each (t, p, z) ∈ A. In Step 3 we will prove the right inequality in
(1.37), while in Step 4 the left inequality will be proved, thus concluding the proof.
Step 3: right inequality in (1.37). Let us show that there exists δ1 ≥ ρ−2 inde-
pendent of (t, p, z) ∈ A such that
sup
u∈At\
⋃m(c)
i=1 B
tpz
i
J(t, p, z;u) ≤ sup
u∈Aadmtz
J(t, p, z;u) + ε, (1.38)
for each c ≥ δ1. Since Jc ≤ J , by (1.38) we get the right inequality in (1.37).
Let c ≥ ρ−2, (t, p, z) ∈ A, u ∈ At \
⋃m(c)
i=1 B
tpz
i . We set
Πu = {Zu(T ) /∈ [m,M ]};
notice that 0 ≤ Ptpz(Πu) ≤ 1/(m(c) + 1). Let u˜ be the process defined in the
following way: u˜ coincides in Πu with the process which assures the reachability of
[m+ρ,M −ρ] (see the definition of Dρ), and u˜ ≡ u in Ω\Πu. A simple check shows
that u˜ ∈ At and that
Z u˜(T ) ∈ [m,M ] Ptpz-a.s. (1.39)
By recalling that u˜ ≡ u in Ω\Πu, by the Ho¨lder inequality (twice) and by estimates
as in (1.27), we obtain that
∣∣J(t, p, z;u)− J(t, p, z; u˜)∣∣ ≤ C3(1 + |p|k + |z|k)Ptpz(Πu) 12 ≤ C3(1 + 2Rk)
(m(c) + 1)
1
2
, (1.40)
for some constant C3 > 0. Then, by (1.40) and (1.39) it follows that
J(t, p, z;u) ≤ J(t, p, z; u˜) + C3(1 + 2R
k)
(m(c) + 1)
1
2
≤ sup
u∈Aadmtz
J(t, p, z;u) +
C3(1 + 2R
k)
(m(c) + 1)
1
2
.
This inequality holds for each (t, p, z) ∈ A and u ∈ At \
⋃m(c)
i=1 B
tpz
i . Since m(c) →
+∞, for sufficiently large c (and this choice is independent of (t, p, z) and u), we
have that C3(1 + 2R
k)/(m(c) + 1)
1
2 ≤ ε, thus obtaining (1.38).
Step 4: left inequality in (1.37). We still have to prove the left inequality in
(1.37), i.e.
sup
u∈Aadmtz
J(t, p, z;u) ≤ sup
u∈At\
⋃m(c)
i=1 B
tpz
i
Jc(t, p, z;u) + ε, (1.41)
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for c ≥ δ2, with δ2 ≥ ρ−2 independent of (t, p, z) ∈ A.
Let c ≥ ρ−2, (t, p, z) ∈ A and u ∈ Aadmtz . By Assumption 1.9, let u˜ ∈ At be such
that
|J(t, p, z;u)− J(t, p, z; u˜)| ≤ ε (1.42)
and with the property
Z u˜(T ) ∈ [m+ η(ε),M − η(ε)] Ptpz-a.s. (1.43)
First of all notice that
u˜ ∈ Aadmtz ⊆ At \
⋃m(c)
i=1 B
tpz
i . (1.44)
By (1.42) we obtain that∣∣J(t, p, z;u)− Jc(t, p, z; u˜)∣∣
=
∣∣J(t, p, z;u)− J(t, p, z; u˜)−Etpz[e−r(T−t)Φc(Z u˜(T ))]∣∣ ≤ ε+Etpz[|Φc(Z u˜(T ))|].
Notice that by (1.43) the second term equals zero for c ≥ η(ε)−2 (in fact Φc ≡ 0 in
[m+ c−
1
2 ,M − c− 12 ]); by recalling (1.44), we therefore have that
J(t, p, z;u) ≤ Jc(t, p, z; u˜) + ε ≤ sup
u∈At\
⋃m(c)
i=1 B
tpz
i
Jc(t, p, z;u) + ε,
for each c ≥ max{η(ε)−2, ρ−2}. Since this inequality holds for each (t, p, z) ∈ A and
u ∈ Aadmtz , we get (1.41).
Corollary 1.12. Let the assumptions of Section 1.3.1 hold. Then the functions V c
converge pointwise to V in D˜ and V is continuous on D˜.
Proof. It follows immediately from Theorem 1.11 (recall that
⋃
ρDρ = D˜).
Corollary 1.13. Let the assumptions of Section 1.3.1 hold. Then the function V
is a viscosity solution of Equation (1.30) in D˜.
Proof. Due to Theorem 1.10, the functions V c are viscosity solutions of the same
equation, that is
− V ct (t, p, z) + rV c(t, p, z) + min
v∈U
[
−f(t, p, v) ·DpV c(t, p, z)− g(t, v)V cz (t, p, z)
−1
2
tr
(
σ(t, p, v)σt(t, p, v)D2pV
c(t, p, z)
)−L(t, p, z, v)] = 0, ∀(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T [×Rn×R.
(1.45)
Moreover by Theorem 1.11 for each 0 < ρ < (M − m)/2 the functions V c locally
uniformly converge in Dρ to the function V . So the conclusion follows by the stability
property of viscosity solutions with respect to the uniform convergence and the fact
that D˜ = ⋃ρDρ.
Remark 1.14. We have proved that the value function in the set D˜ is the locally
uniform limit of the functions V c. In some particular cases, stronger conclusions
can be achieved: the value function is characterized in its whole domain D by the
HJB equation. See Section 1.4.
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We now face the problem of the regularity of the function V . In control theory,
regularity results are usually achieved by passing to the supremum in estimates on
quantities such as |J(t, p′, z;u)−J(t, p′′, z;u)| or |J(t, p, z′;u)−J(t, p, z′′;u)|, so as to
obtain the corresponding inequality for V . In the case of constrained problems, this
approach cannot be applied to V (t, p, ·). In fact, consider |J(t, p, z′;u)−J(t, p, z′′;u)|:
on one hand such a quantity is defined only for u ∈ Aadmtz′ ∩ Aadmtz′′ , on the other
hand the supremum should be with respect to different sets (precisely, Aadmtz′ and
Aadmtz′′ ). Of course, in particular cases some regularity results can be achieved also
for V (t, p, ·), see Section 1.4. The only case when that approach still works regards
estimates on V (t, ·, z), given that, fixed t and z, the set of admissible controls does
not depend on p. Hence, as for V (t, ·, z) we can follow this approach.
Proposition 1.15. Let the assumptions of Section 1.3.1 hold. Assume that there
exists a constant C¯ > 0 such that
|L(t, p, z, v)− L(t, q, z, v)| ≤ C¯|p− q|, |Φ(p, z)− Φ(q, z)| ≤ C¯|p− q|, (1.46)
for each p, q ∈ Rn, t ∈ [0, T ], v ∈ U and z ∈ R. Then the function V (t, ·, z) is
Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in (t, z). Moreover, the gradient DpV (t, p, z) exists
for a.e. (t, p, z) ∈ D and we have |DpV (t, p, z)| ≤ M1 for some constant M1 > 0
depending only on U , T , C¯ and on the constants in (1.18) and (1.21).
Proof. Let (t, p, z) ∈ D, h > 0, ξ ∈ Rn with |ξ| = 1 and u ∈ At. In order to avoid
ambiguity, we will omit the subscripts in the notation of the mean value (initial data
are different, but the probability is obviously the same). By (1.46) and estimates
(D.8) in [20, Appendix D] we have
|J(t, p, z;u)− J(t, p+ hξ, z;u)|
≤ C¯E
[∫ T
t
∣∣P t,p;u(s)− P t,p+hξ;u(s)∣∣ds+ ∣∣P t,p;u(T )− P t,p+hξ;u(T )∣∣]
≤ C¯(T − t+ 1)E[‖P t,p;u(·)− P t,p+hξ;u(·)‖∞]
≤ C1C¯(T + 1)|p− (p+ hξ)|
= C1C¯(T + 1)h, (1.47)
for some constant C1 > 0. Estimate (1.47) holds for each u ∈ At; thus, it follows
that
|V (t, p, z)− V (t, p+ hξ, z)| ≤M0h, (1.48)
where M0 := C1C¯(T + 1). The function V (t, ·, z) is therefore Lipschitz continuous,
uniformly in (t, z), and then a.e. differentiable by the Rademacher theorem. By
classical results it follows that DpV (t, p, z) exists for a.e. (t, p, z) ∈ D. Finally, if
the gradient exists and ei ∈ Rn is a vector of the canonical basis (i = 1, . . . , n), by
(1.48) we get
|(DpV (t, p, z))i| = lim
h→0+
|V (t, p, z)− V (t, p+ hei, z)|
h
≤M0,
and then the estimate on the gradient immediately follows.
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Proposition 1.16. Let the assumptions of Section 1.3.1 hold. Assume that Φ ∈
C2(Rn+1), that the functions f(t, ·, v), σ(t, ·, v), L(t, ·, ·, v) are of class C2 for each
(t, v) ∈ [0, T ]× U and that there exist constants C¯ ≥ 0, j ∈ N such that
|Dpf(t, p, v)|+ |D2pf(t, p, v)|+ |Dpσ(t, p, v)|+ |D2pσ(t, p, v)| ≤ C¯,
|D(p,z)L(t, p, z, v)|+ |D2(p,z)L(t, p, z, v)| ≤ C¯(1 + |p|j + |z|j),
|D(p,z)Φ(p, z)|+ |D2(p,z)Φ(p, z)| ≤ C¯(1 + |p|j + |z|j),
for each p ∈ Rn, t ∈ [0, T ], v ∈ U and z ∈ R. The function V (t, ·, z) is then locally
semiconvex, uniformly in t, and a.e. twice differentiable.
Proof. Since Φ ∈ C2p(Rn+1), it is possible to rewrite the problem so that Φ ≡ 0 (see
[20, Remark IV.6.1]). By arguing as in the proof of [20, Lemma IV.9.1] (with minor
modifications: the assumptions are slightly different), we get
V (t, p+ hξ, z) + V (t, p− hξ, z)− 2V (t, p, z) ≥ −M2(1 + |p|j)h2,
for each (t, p, z) ∈ D, h > 0 and ξ ∈ Rn with |ξ| = 1, where M2 > 0 is a constant.
The function V (t, ·, z) is therefore locally semiconvex, uniformly in (t, z), and then
a.e. twice differentiable by the Alexandrov theorem.
1.3.4 Examples
We now show two wide classes of problems satisfying Assumption 1.9. We first
consider problems where U is a compact interval of R and g(s, v) = v, so that the
constraint is z +
∫ T
t u(s) ∈ [m,M ].
Proposition 1.17. Let a, b ∈ R, with a < b. Let the assumptions of Section 1.3.1
hold, with U = [a, b] and g(s, v) = v. Moreover, assume that there exist Γ, l > 0
such that for ξ = f, σ the following condition holds:
|ξ(s, p, v′)− ξ(s, p, v′′)| ≤ Γ(1 + |p|)|v′ − v′′|l, ∀(s, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, ∀v′, v′′ ∈ U.
(1.49)
Then Assumption 1.9 is satisfied.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, in this proof we assume l = 1 (for the general case,
in the definition of u˜ it suffices to substitute δ2 by δi, where i > 1/l).
Let 0 < ρ < (M − m)/2, A be a compact subset of Dρ, R > 0 be such that
B(0, R) ⊇ A, ε > 0. Fix (t, p, z) ∈ A and u ∈ Aadmtz .
Let γ > 0 (it will be afterwards precisely defined). Since the functions L and Φ
are continuous, there exists δ = δ(ε, γ) > 0 such that
|L(s, p′, z′, v′)− L(s, p′′, z′′, v′′)| ≤ ε
4T
and |Φ(p′, z′)− Φ(p′′, z′′)| ≤ ε
4
, (1.50)
for each s ∈ [0, T ], for each p′, p′′ ∈ B(0, γ) with |p′−p′′| ≤ δ, for each z′, z′′ ∈ [m,M ]
with |z′ − z′′| ≤ Tδ and for each v′, v′′ ∈ U with |v′ − v′′| ≤ δ.
We now define, starting from u, a suitable process u˜. Let ΠM = {ω ∈ Ω :
Zu(T ) ∈]M − ρ/2,M ]} and in ΠM let u˜ be defined in the following way:
u˜(s) =
{
u(s)− δ2, if s ∈ E,
u(s), if s ∈ [t, T ] \ E,
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where E = E(ω) = {s ∈ [t, T ] : u(s)− δ2 ∈]a, b[} = {s ∈ [t, T ] : u(s) > a+ δ2}. Let
Πm = {ω ∈ Ω : Zu(T ) ∈ [m,m + ρ/2[} and in Πm let u˜ be defined in the following
way:
u˜(s) =
{
u(s) + δ2, if s ∈ F ,
u(s), if s ∈ [t, T ] \ F ,
where F = F (ω) = {s ∈ [t, T ] : u(s) + δ2 ∈]a, b[} = {s ∈ [t, T ] : u(s) < b − δ2}.
Finally, in Ω \ (ΠM ∪Πm) let
u˜ ≡ u.
We will show that such a process u˜ satisfies the required properties.
Step 1. We prove that
Zt,z;u˜(T ) ∈ [m+ η(ε),M − η(ε)] Ptpz-a.s., (1.51)
for a suitable function 0 < η ≤ (M −m)/2 depending only on ρ, T,R, a, b.
Consider the case ω ∈ ΠM , i.e.
Zu(T ) ∈]M − ρ/2,M ]. (1.52)
Let us first of all notice that
Z u˜(T ) = z +
∫ T
t
u˜(s)ds = z +
∫ T
t
u(s)ds− δ2µ(E) = Zu(T )− δ2µ(E), (1.53)
where µ denotes the Lebesgue measure in R. We now look for an estimate for µ(E).
By definition of E, we have∫ T
t
u(s)ds =
∫
E
u(s)ds+
∫
[t,T ]\E
u(s)ds ≤ bµ(E) + (a+ δ2)(T − t− µ(E))
and then
µ(E) ∈
[∫ T
t u(s)ds− (a+ δ2)(T − t)
b− a− δ2 , T − t
]
⊆
[
ρ/2− δT
b− a , T
]
, (1.54)
where the inclusion follows by z +
∫ T
t u(s)ds ≥ M − ρ/2 (since ω ∈ ΠM ) and
z ≤M − ρ−a(T − t) (since (t, p, z) ∈ Dρ). By possibly decreasing δ (and the choice
depends only on a, b, ρ, T ), we can assume that the lower bound in (1.54) is positive.
Recall (1.53): by (1.52) and (1.54) we get
Z u˜(T ) ∈
]
M − ρ
2
− δ2T,M − δ
2ρ/2− δ3T
b− a
]
⊆
]
m+
ρ
2
,M − δ
2ρ/2− δ3T
b− a
]
,
where the inclusion follows by M − ρ/2 > m + ρ/2 and by assuming δ sufficiently
small. This estimate holds for each ω ∈ ΠM ; by arguing in the same way, for each
ω ∈ Πm we get
Z u˜(T ) ∈
[
m+
δ2ρ/2− δ3 T
b− a ,M −
ρ
2
[
.
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Finally, in Ω\(ΠM ∪Πm) we have Z u˜ ∈ [m+ρ/2,M−ρ/2]. To summarize, condition
(1.51) is verified with
η(ε) = min
{
ρ
2
,
δ(ε, γ)2ρ/2− δ(ε, γ)3 T
b− a
}
.
Step 2. We still have to prove that
|J(t, p, z;u)− J(t, p, z; u˜)| ≤ ε. (1.55)
Let Π ⊆ Ω be defined by
Π = {‖P u(·)‖ ≤ γ, ‖P u˜(·)‖ ≤ γ, ‖P u(·)− P u˜(·)‖ ≤ δ};
first of all, we set for brevity
Γ(t, p, z;u, u˜) =
∫ T
t
|L(s, P u(s), Zu(s), u(s))− L(s, P u˜(s), Z u˜(s), u˜(s))|ds
+ |Φ(P u(T ), Zu(T ))− Φ(P u˜(T ), Z u˜(T ))|,
and notice that
|J(t, p, z;u)− J(t, p, z; u˜)| ≤ Etpz[Γ(t, p, z;u, u˜)1Π] + Etpz[Γ(t, p, z;u, u˜)1Πc ]. (1.56)
As for the first term in (1.56), for s ∈ [t, T ] we have
|Zu(s)− Z u˜(s)| ≤ (s− t)δ2 ≤ Tδ and |u(s)− u˜(s)| ≤ δ2 ≤ δ,
so that by (1.50) it follows that
Etpz[Γ(t, p, z;u, u˜)1Π] ≤
(∫ T
0
ε
4T
ds+
ε
4
)
Ptpz(Π) =
ε
2
Ptpz(Π) ≤ ε
2
. (1.57)
We now consider the second term in (1.56). By (D.8) in [20, Appendix D], by (1.49)
and (1.12) we get
Etpz[‖P u(·)− P u˜(·)‖] ≤ C1(1 + |p|)δ2, (1.58)
for a suitable constant C1 > 0. By the Markov inequality, (1.58) and (1.12) we then
get
Ptpz(Πc) ≤ Etpz[‖P u(·)‖∞]γ−1 + Etpz[‖P u˜(·)‖∞]γ−1 + Etpz[‖P u(·)− P u˜(·)‖∞]δ−1
≤ C2(1 + |p|)(γ−1 + δ), (1.59)
where C2 > 0 is a constant. By the Ho¨lder inequality (twice), estimates as in (1.27)
and (1.59), we obtain that
Etpz[Γ(t, p, z;u, u˜)1Πc ]2 ≤ Etpz[Γ(t, p, z;u, u˜)2]Ptpz(Πc)
≤ C3(1 + |p|2k + |z|2k)(1 + |p|)(γ−1 + δ(ε, γ))
≤ C4(1 +R2k+1)γ−1 + C4(1 +R2k+1)δ(ε, γ),
with C3, C4 > 0. First by choosing a suitable γ and then by possibly taking a less δ
(and these choices depends only on R and ε), we get
Etpz [Γ(t, p, z;u, u˜)1Πc ] ≤ ε
2
. (1.60)
Estimates (1.56), (1.57) e (1.60) imply (1.55), thus ending the proof.
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Let us now consider problems where U is a closed ball of Rl and g(s, v) = |v|p,
so that the constraint is z +
∫ T
t |u(s)|p ∈ [m,M ], with p ≥ 1.
Proposition 1.18. Let p ≥ 1 and b > 0. Let the assumptions of Section 1.3.1
and (1.49) hold, with U = B(0, b) ⊆ Rl and g(s, v) = |v|p. Assumption 1.9 is then
satisfied.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 1.17, with the following modi-
fications:
- In the definitions of E and F replace u(s) by |u(s)|. Process u˜ in E is now
u˜(s) = u(s)− δ2 u(s)|u(s)| .
Notice that |u˜(s)| = |u(s)| − δ2. Similarly in F .
- It is easy to check that
(ζ − δ2)p ≤ ζp − δ2p, for ζ ≥ δ2,
(ζ + δ2)p ≥ ζp + δ2p, for ζ ≥ 0.
By the first estimate, in ΠM we have that
Z u˜(T ) = z +
∫ T
t
|u˜(s)|pds
= z +
∫
E
(|u(s)| − δ2)pds+
∫
[t,T ]\E
|u(s)|pds
≤ z +
∫ T
t
|u(s)|pds− δ2pµ(E),
and then we can argue as in the proof of Proposition 1.17. As for Πm, use the
second estimate and the same argument.
1.4 Swing contracts with strict constraints
We now use the results of Section 1.3 to study the problem of optimally exercising
swing contracts with strict constraints (see the Introduction). In this case we will
obtain results stronger than the general ones proved in Section 1.3.3.
1.4.1 Formulation of the problem
Let T > 0, (Ω, FT , {Fs}s∈[0,T ], P), U , At, P t,p and Zt,z;u be as in Section 1.2. If
(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R2 and s ∈ [t, T ], recall, in particular, that P t,p(s) models the
price of energy at time s and that Zt,z;u(s) represents the energy bought up to time
s, where u ∈ At is the usage strategy from time t on.
Given m,M ≥ 0 with m < M , here we ask the following constraint to hold:
Zt,z;u(T ) ∈ [m,M ] Ptpz-a.s.
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The problem of the optimal exercise of this contract (i.e. to find a process u sat-
isfying all the conditions and providing the maximal expected earning) is clearly a
constrained stochastic optimal control problem as described in Section 1.3.1 (here
P does not depend on u), whose value function is
V (t, p, z) = sup
u∈Aadmtz
Etpz
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(P t,p(s)−K)u(s)ds
]
.
In this problem the sets D, D˜,Dρ are formed by all points (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R2
such that (t, z) belongs, respectively, to the marked surfaces in Figure 1.2.
M
mm
T
z
t0
m - ūT
M
m
T
z
t0
m - ūT
M
T
z
t
0
m - ūT
m - ūT + ρ
M - ρ
m + ρ
Figure 1.2: the sets D, D˜,Dρ
More in details, we have
D = {(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2 : m− u¯(T − t) ≤ z ≤M},
D˜ = {(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2 : m− u¯(T − t) < z < M},
Dρ = {(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2 : m+ ρ− u¯(T − t) ≤ z ≤M − ρ}.
Notice that these sets include initial data that are inconsistent with the practical
problem: in fact, our mathematical formulation admits negative starting values for
p and z.
The functions V c are here defined by
V c(t, p, z) = sup
u∈At
Etpz
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(P t,p(s)−K)u(s)ds+ e−r(T−t)Φc(Zt,z;u(T ))
]
,
for each c > 0 and (t, p, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R2, where Φc is defined in (1.28). This has also a
nice economical interpretation: in fact, here we are approximating a swing contract
with the strict constraint Z(T ) ∈ [m,M ] with a sequence of suitable contracts with
increasing penalties for Z(T ) /∈
[
m+ 1√
c
,M − 1√
c
]
.
The HJB equation for the function V c is
− V ct (t, p, z) + rV c(t, p, z)− f(t, p)V cp (t, p, z)−
1
2
σ2(t, p)V cpp(t, p, z)
+ min
v∈[0,u¯]
[−v(V cz (t, p, z) + p−K)] = 0, ∀(t, p, z) ∈ [0, T [×R2, (1.61)
with final condition
V c(T, p, z) = Φc(z), ∀(p, z) ∈ R2.
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1.4.2 Properties of the value function
The problem described in Section 1.4.1 belongs to the class treated in Proposition
1.17. Therefore Theorem 1.11, Corollary 1.12 and Corollary 1.13 hold, but it turns
out that in this case we can strengthen such results.
We set for brevity
α={(t, p, z)∈D : z=M}, β={(t, p, z)∈D : z+u¯(T−t)=m}, γ={T}×R× [m,M ],
so that D \ D˜ = α ∪ β.
Let us first consider Theorem 1.11 and adapt it to our problem, as here something
about D \ D˜ can also be said.
Proposition 1.19. Let the assumptions of Section 1.4.1 hold. The functions V c
converge to V uniformly on compact subsets of D˜ . Moreover, if (t, p, z) ∈ α we have
V (t, p, z) = 0. Finally, if (t, p, z) ∈ β we have
V (t, p, z) = u¯Etpz
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(P t,p(s)−K)ds
]
=: ξ(t, p). (1.62)
Proof. As for the first part, notice that each compact subset of D˜ is contained in
some Dρ and use Theorem 1.11. Second and third items: in α ∪ β there exists a
unique admissible control, respectively u ≡ 0 and u ≡ u¯.
Notice that the boundary condition ξ in (1.62) is continuous and can be computed
in many models used in practice (see [5]).
Corollary 1.12 assures continuity of V on D˜. We now prove that in this case a
stronger result holds, i.e. the value function is continuous on the whole domain D.
For this, we first need a technical lemma (see [20, Appendix D] or [27]), where we
give a bound for the mean distance between solutions of (1.4) starting from different
data.
Lemma 1.20. Let the assumptions of Section 1.4.1 hold. Let t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ] with
t1 < t2 and p1, p2 ∈ Rn. Then
E
[∣∣P t1,p1(s)− P t2,p2(s)∣∣] ≤M[|p2 − p1|+ (t2 − t1) 12 (1 + |p1|)],
for each s ∈ [t2, T ], where E denotes the mean value with respect to the probability
P and M > 0 is a constant depending only on T,U and on the constants in (1.18)
and (1.21).
Proposition 1.21. Let the assumptions of Section 1.4.1 hold. Then V is continuous
on D.
Proof. As Corollary 1.12 holds, we have to prove that V is continuous on D \ D˜ =
α ∪ β.
Step 1: continuity on α. Let (t˜, p˜, z˜) ∈ α. Since in this case the only admissible
control is u ≡ 0, we have to prove that
lim
(t,p,z)→(t˜,p˜,z˜)
(t,p,z)∈D
V (t, p, z) = V (t˜, p˜, z˜) = 0. (1.63)
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Let (t, p, z) ∈ D and u ∈ Aadmtz . Given arbitrary γ > 0, we first of all observe
that
Etpz
[(∫ T
t
|P t,p(s)−K|u(s)ds
)
1{‖P (·)‖≤γ}
]
≤ (γ +K)Etpz
[∫ T
t
u(s)ds
]
≤ (γ +K)(M − z), (1.64)
where in the last passage we have used condition Zu(T ) ≤ M . By the Ho¨lder
inequality (twice), estimates as in (1.27), the Markov inequality and (1.12) we get
Etpz
[(∫ T
t
|P t,p(s)−K|u(s)ds
)
1{‖P t,p(·)‖>γ}
]
≤ TEtpz
[∫ T
t
(P t,p(s)−K)2u(s)2ds
] 1
2
Ptpz(‖P t,p(·)‖ > γ) 12 ≤ C1(1 + |p|) 32γ− 12 ,
(1.65)
for some constant C1 > 0. By (1.64) and (1.65) it follows that
∣∣∣∣ sup
u∈Aadmtz
Etpz
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(P t,p(s)−K)u(s)ds
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ (γ+K)(M−z)+C1(1+|p|) 32γ− 12 .
(1.66)
Inequality (1.66) holds for each γ > 0 and for each (t, p, z) ∈ D. We get (1.63)
by passing to the limit first as (t, p, z) → (t˜, p˜, z˜) (recall that z˜ = M) and then as
γ →∞.
Step 2: continuity on β. Let (t˜, p˜, z˜) ∈ β. Since in β function V is as in (1.62),
we have to prove that
lim
(t,p,z)→(t˜,p˜,z˜)
(t,p,z)∈D
V (t, p, z) = V (t˜, p˜, z˜) = u¯Et˜p˜z˜
[∫ T
t˜
e−r(s−t˜)(P t˜,p˜(s)−K)ds
]
. (1.67)
From now on, we will omit the subscripts in the notation of the mean value (the
initial data are different, but the probability is clearly the same). Let (t, p, z) ∈ D
(notice that necessarily t ≤ t˜) and fix u ∈ Aadmtz ; for simplicity we will write P = P t,p
and P˜ = P t˜,p˜. Since for s ∈ [t˜, T ] we have
e−r(s−t)(P (s)−K)u(s)− e−r(s−t˜)(P˜ (s)−K)u¯
= e−r(s−t)(P (s)− P˜ (s))u(s)− e−r(s−t)(P˜ (s)−K)(u¯− u(s))
− (e−r(s−t˜) − e−r(s−t))(P˜ (s)−K)u¯,
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let us first of all observe that
E
[∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(P (s)−K)u(s)ds− u¯
∫ T
t˜
e−r(s−t˜)(P˜ (s)−K)ds
∣∣∣∣]
≤E
[ ∫ t˜
t
|P (s)−K|u(s)ds
]
+E
[ ∫ T
t˜
∣∣e−r(s−t)(P (s)−K)u(s)−e−r(s−t˜)(P˜ (s)−K)u¯∣∣ds]
≤E
[ ∫ t˜
t
|P (s)−K|u(s)ds
]
+E
[ ∫ T
t˜
|P (s)− P˜ (s)|u(s)ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
t˜
|P˜ (s)−K|(u¯− u(s))ds
]
+E
[ ∫ T
t˜
(
e−r(s−t˜) − e−r(s−t))|P˜ (s)−K|u¯ ds].
(1.68)
Consider the first term in (1.68). By estimates as in (1.27) we have that
E
[ ∫ t˜
t
|P (s)−K|u(s)ds
]
≤ C2(t˜− t)(1 + |p|), (1.69)
for some constant C2 > 0. As for the second term in (1.68), by the Fubini-Tonelli
theorem and Lemma 1.20 we get
E
[ ∫ T
t˜
|P (s)− P˜ (s)|u(s)ds
]
≤ C3
[|p− p˜|+ (t˜− t) 12 (1 + |p|)], (1.70)
where C3 > 0 is a constant. Let us now estimate the third term in (1.68). Given
arbitrary γ > 0, we observe that
E
[(∫ T
t˜
|P˜ (s)−K|(u¯− u(s))ds
)
1{‖P˜ (·)‖≤γ}
]
≤ (γ +K)E
[∫ T
t˜
(u¯− u(s))ds
]
= (γ +K)E
[
u¯(T − t)−
∫ T
t
u(s)ds
]
≤ (γ +K)(u¯(T − t)−m+ z), (1.71)
where in the last passage we have used condition Zu(T ) ≥ m. By arguing as in
(1.65), we get
E
[(∫ T
t˜
|P˜ (s)−K|(u¯− u(s))ds
)
1{‖P˜ (·)‖>γ}
]
≤ C4(1 + |p˜|) 32γ− 12 , (1.72)
for some constant C4 > 0. We finally consider the fourth term in (1.68). By local
Lipschitzianity of the exponential function and by estimates as in (1.27) we obtain
E
[ ∫ T
t˜
(
e−r(s−t˜) − e−r(s−t))|P˜ (s)−K|u¯ds] ≤ C5(t˜− t)(1 + |p˜|), (1.73)
where C5 > 0 is constant.
By estimates from (1.69) to (1.73), it follows from (1.68) that∣∣∣∣ sup
u∈Aadmtz
E
[ ∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(P (s)−K)u(s)ds
]
− u¯E
[ ∫ T
t˜
e−r(s−t˜)(P˜ (s)−K)ds
]∣∣∣∣
≤ C2(t˜− t)(1 + |p|) + C3
[|p− p˜|+ (t˜− t) 12 (1 + |p|)]+ C5(t˜− t)(1 + |p˜|)
+ (γ +K)
(
u¯(T − t)−m+ z)+ C4(1 + |p˜|) 32γ− 12 . (1.74)
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Estimate (1.74) holds for each γ > 0 and for each (t, p, z) ∈ D. We get (1.67) by
passing to the limit first as (t, p, z) → (t˜, p˜, z˜) (recall that z˜ + u¯(T − t˜) = m) and
then as γ →∞.
Let us now consider the HJB equation and prove a result which is stronger than
Corollary 1.13: in this case the value function is, in its whole domain D, the unique
viscosity solution of the HJB equation with polynomial growth and the boundary
conditions given below. Thus, we get another characterization of the value function,
in addition to the one of Proposition 1.19.
Theorem 1.22. Let the assumptions of Section 1.4.1 hold. Then the function V is
the unique continuous viscosity solution of Equation (1.61) in the domain D \ (α ∪
β ∪ γ), with boundary conditions
V (t, p, z) = 0, ∀(t, p, z) ∈ α,
V (t, p, z) = ξ(t, z), ∀(t, p, z) ∈ β, (1.75)
V (T, p, z) = 0, ∀(p, z) ∈ R× [m,M ],
such that
|V (t, p, z)| ≤ Cˇ(1 + |p|2 + |z|2), ∀(t, p, z) ∈ D, (1.76)
for some constant Cˇ > 0.
Proof. In this problem, k = 2 in (1.26). Thus, by (1.26), Corollary 1.13 and Propo-
sition 1.19, the function V is a viscosity solution of problem (1.61)-(1.75)-(1.76).
Moreover it satisfies in viscosity sense the boundary conditions (see [15]).
We now need a uniqueness result. By the following change of variables
t′ = t, p′ = p, z′ =
z −M
M −m+ u¯(T − t) + 1,
problem (1.61)-(1.75) becomes
− Vt′(t′, p′, z′)− u¯(z
′ − 1)
M −m+ u¯(T − t′)Vz′(t
′, p′, z′)
+ rV (t′, p′, z′)− f(t′, p′)Vp′(t′, p′, z′)− 1
2
σ2(t′, p′)Vp′p′(t′, p′, z′)
+ min
v∈[0,u¯]
[
−v
(
1
M −m+ u¯(T − t′)Vz′(t
′, p′, z′) + p′ −K
)]
= 0,
∀(t′, p′, z′) ∈ [0, T [×R×]0, 1[,
with boundary condition
V (T, p′, z′) = 0, ∀(p′, z′) ∈ R× [0, 1],
V (t′, p′, 1) = 0, ∀(t′, p′) ∈ [0, T ]× R,
V (t′, p′, 0) = ξ(t′, p′), ∀(t′, p′) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Moreover the polynomial growth (1.76) is preserved and the domain is [0, T [×R×]0, 1[.
We can adapt to the case of bounded domain the comparison principle stated in [16,
Thm. 2.1], which is based on the standard argument of doubling the variables in
viscosity solution theory. This argument is easily extended to deal with boundary
conditions in the viscosity sense. From this we get uniqueness of the solution.
40 Optimal exercise of swing contracts
The previous result generalizes an analogous result in [5], valid in the case m = 0.
We now turn to prove some properties of the value function with respect to the
variables p and z. As for V (t, ·, z), Propositions 1.15 and 1.16 hold.
Proposition 1.23. Let the assumptions of Section 1.4.1 hold. Let (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×R
be such that (t, p, z) ∈ D for each p ∈ R. Then
- the function V (t, ·, z) is Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in (t, z). Moreover,
the derivative Vp(t, p, z) exists for a.e. (t, p, z) ∈ D and we have |Vp(t, p, z)| ≤
M1, for some constant M1 > 0 depending only on T , u¯ and on the constants
in (1.18), (1.21) and (1.46).
- if f(s, ·), σ(s, ·) ∈ C2b (R), uniformly in s ∈ [0, T ], the function V (t, ·, z) is
locally semiconvex, uniformly in t, and a.e. twice differentiable.
Proof. The first part follows from Proposition 1.15 (notice that function p 7→ (p −
K)v is Lipschitz continuous). As for the second item, it suffices to rewrite Proposi-
tion 1.16 (notice that the function p 7→ (p −K)v is of class C∞(R), with bounded
derivatives).
Let us now consider the function V (t, p, ·). Recall that its domain is [m− u¯(T −
t),M ].
Proposition 1.24. Let the assumptions of Section 1.4.1 hold. For each (t, p) ∈
[0, T ]× R the function V (t, p, ·) is
- concave, Lipschitz continuous and a.e. twice differentiable;
- non-decreasing in [m− (T − t)u¯,M − (T − t)u¯] and non-increasing in [m,M ].
In particular, if M − (T − t)u¯ ≥ m then the function V (t, p, ·) is constant in
[m,M − (T − t)u¯] (they all are maximum points).
Proof. Item 1 (this is an adaptation of [5, Prop. 3.4], which takes into account only
an upper bound on Zt,z;u(T )). Let (t, p) ∈ [0, T ] × R, z1, z2 ∈ [m − u¯(T − t),M ],
u1 ∈ Aadmtz1 e u2 ∈ Aadmtz2 . By (1.13) the process (u1 + u2)/2 belongs to the set of
admissible controls for initial point (t, (z1 + z2)/2). By the linearity of the function
v 7→ (P t,p(s)−K)v we have
J(t, p, z1;u1) + J(t, p, z2;u2)
2
= J
(
t, p,
z1 + z2
2
;
u1 + u2
2
)
≤ V
(
t, p,
z1 + z2
2
)
.
(1.77)
Since (1.77) holds for each u1 ∈ Aadmtz1 and u2 ∈ Aadmtz2 , it follows that
V (t, p, z1) + V (t, p, z2)
2
≤ V
(
t, p,
z1 + z2
2
)
,
which implies the concavity of the function V (t, p, ·). Local Lipschitzianity is a well-
known property of concave functions (and here the domain is a compact set), while
the a.e. existence of the second derivative follows from the Alexandrov theorem.
Item 2. Let (t, p) ∈ [0, T ] × R. If m ≤ z1 ≤ z2 ≤ M , it is easy to check that
Aadmtz2 ⊆ Aadmtz1 , so that V (t, p, z1) ≥ V (t, p, z2). Similarly, if m − (T − t)u¯ ≤ z1 ≤
z2 ≤ M − (T − t)u¯, we have Aadmtz1 ⊆ Aadmtz2 and then V (t, p, z2) ≤ V (t, p, z1). The
second part immediately follows, since [m − (T − t)u¯,M − (T − t)u¯] ∩ [m,M ] =
[m,M − (T − t)u¯].
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The monotonicity result in Proposition 1.24 is described in Figure 1.3.
M
m
T
z
t0
m - ūT
M - ūT
     non-increasing
            V(t, p, ∙) 
    non-decr.
V(t, p, ∙)
 const.
V(t, p, ∙)
 
Figure 1.3: monotonicity of V (t, p, ·)
As in Section 1.2, it was foreseeable that the function V (t, p, ·) is constant in
an interval: if M − (T − t)u¯ ≥ m and z ∈ [m,M − (T − t)u¯] then Aadmtz = At
(i.e. all controls satisfies the constraint), which implies that the initial value z does
not influence the value function. This generalizes an intuitive result in [5, Lemma
3.2]: for (t, z) such that the volume constraint is de facto absent, the value function
V does not depend on z.
Finally, also in this case Remark 1.4 holds: by Proposition 1.24 the candidate in
(1.16-1.17) is well-defined.
1.5 Conclusions
We characterize the value of swing contracts in continuous time as the unique vis-
cosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with suitable boundary con-
ditions. More in details, swings can be divided in two broad contract classes, those
with penalties on the cumulated quantity of energy Z(T ) at the end T of the contract,
and those with strict constraints on the same quantity: usually these constraints and
penalties are meant to make Z(T ) belong to an interval [m,M ] with m > 0 (in real
contracts usually m > 0.8M , see [28]).
In Section 2 we treat the case of contracts with penalties, which results in a
straightforward application of classical optimal control theory, and in that case only
a terminal condition is needed. For swing contracts with penalties, we prove that
their value is the unique viscosity solution of the HJB equation (1.8), and that is
Lipschitz both in p (spot price of energy) as in z (current cumulated quantity), with
first weak derivatives with sublinear growth. We also prove that the value function
is also concave with respect to z, non-increasing for z ≤ M − (T − t)u¯, where t is
the current time and u¯ is the maximum marginal energy that can be purchased,
and non-decreasing for z ≥ m. In this, we extend and generalize previous results of
[5], which were proved only for swing contracts with strict penalties. These results
make the candidate optimal exercise policy in Equations (1.16–1.17) well defined.
Conversely, the case of contracts with strict constraints gives rise to a stochastic
control problem with a nonstandard state constraint in Z(T ). In Section 3 we
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approach a suitable generalization of this problem by a penalty method: we consider
a general constrained problem and approximate the value function with a sequence
of value functions of appropriate unconstrained problems with a penalization term
in the objective functional, showing that they converge uniformly on compact sets
to the value function of the constrained problem.
In Section 4 we come back to the case of swing contracts with strict constraints:
in this case the penalty functions used in Section 3 turn out to be penalties of
suitable swing contracts, so that we also have the economic interpretation that
a swing contract with strict constraints can be approximated by swing contracts
with suitable penalties. In this context we succeed in strengthening the results of
Section 3, by characterizing the value function as the unique viscosity solution with
polynomial growth of the HJB equation (1.8) subject to the boundary conditions
in Equation (1.75). As for the smoothness of the value function with respects to p
and z, we find exactly the same results as in Section 2, extending previous results
of [5] to the case m > 0. These results make the candidate optimal exercise policy
in Equations (1.16–1.17), i.e. the same as in Section 2, again well defined.
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Chapter 2
Optimal price management in
retail energy markets
2.1 Introduction
In energy markets, retailers first buy energy on the wholesale market and then
resell it to final consumers. The wholesale price is assumed to be a continuous-time
process, as energy is traded almost instantaneously. Conversely, it is reasonable to
model the final price by a piecewise-constant process, since all the customers have
to be informed before each price adjustment, due to specific clauses in the contracts.
The retailer has to decide when and how to intervene to change the price he asks, in
order to maximize his earnings; in this chapter we address this problem by means
of impulse control theory.
When setting the final price to ask to his customers, a retailer has to consider
several elements. For example, he has to decide if he prefers to set a high price, so
as to have high unitary incomes from a small market share, or to keep low prices, so
as to have many customers but low unitary incomes. Moreover, he has to consider
the operational costs, which are proportional to the market share and can be greater
than the incomes from selling energy, to the point that acquiring new customers may
correspond to a loss. Finally, if the retailer realizes that the price he is currently
asking is too low, he can clearly intervene and raise it, but this implies the payment
of a possibly high intervention cost, so that he has to carefully decide whether it is
actually worth intervening.
More in detail, we denote by Xt the spread between the final price and the
wholesale price of the commodity (i.e. the unitary income of the retailer when selling
energy) and we assume the market share to be a function of Xt, which we denote by
Φ = Φ(Xt). The retailer’s payoff consists in the income from the sale of energy and
in the operational cost to be paid, here assumed to be a quadratic function of Φ(Xt).
Moreover, we assume the intervention penalty to be the sum of a fixed part and a
variable part, the latter being directly proportional to the market share. Hence, if
u = {(τk, δk)}k≥1 denotes the retailer’s intervention policy (the intervention times
and the corresponding shifts in the price process), we deal with the following impulse
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control problem:
sup
u
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
XtΦ(Xt)− b
2
Φ(Xt)
2
)
dt−
∑
1≤k<M
e−ρτk
(
c+ λΦ
(
X(τk)−
)) ]
.
Our procedure to study this problem is the following one: we start from the
corresponding quasi-variational problem (classical results are here recalled in Section
2.2.2), we build a candidate and we finally apply the verification theorem: we give
a semi-explicit expression for the value function and we characterize the optimal
controls, provided that a solution to a system of algebraic equations actually exists.
In the particular case where the penalty is constant and the process is a scaled
Brownian motion, we can prove an existence result for the system and provide some
properties of the limit case c→ 0+. In particular, we prove an asymptotic estimate
for the continuation region; to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that
such an estimate is provided for an impulse control problem.
We separately consider the case with fixed penalty (i.e. λ = 0) and the case
with variable penalties (i.e. λ > 0). In the first case we can use standard results
to tackle the problem, whereas in the general case an approximation procedure will
be necessary, as the penalty function presents some singularities which prevent us
from applying the standard theorems. In the latter case the procedure still presents
some open problems and we present the current state of our work; however, we also
show how the problem can be circumvented by imposing stronger conditions on the
controls.
Impulsive problems represent quite a recent development in control theory. The
main advantage of impulse controls, which consist in discrete-time interventions
by the controller, is that they provide models which can be, in some cases, closer
to reality with respect to classical controls, which are based on continuous-time
interventions. A complete introduction to impulse control theory is [32, Chap. 6].
Classical examples of impulsive problems are [11], [22], [25], [26], [31] and [35]. More
recent papers are [9], [10] and [33].
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 we give a precise defi-
nition of the problem and recall the formulation of the classical verification theorem.
In Section 2.3 we study the problem in the case with constant penalty, whereas in
Section 2.4 we outline the open problem of adapting the procedure if a variable
penalty is also present.
2.2 The price management problem
We here describe the problem we are going to consider (Section 2.2.1) and recall the
classical verification theorem for impulsive control problems (Section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Formulation of the problem
Let us consider a retailer who buys energy (electricity, gas, gasoline) on the wholesale
market and resells it to final consumers. We address the problem of investigating the
retailer’s optimal strategy in setting the final price and we model it as an impulsive
stochastic control problem.
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As anticipated, the retailer buys the commodity in the wholesale market. We
assume that the continuous-time price of the commodity is modelled by a Brownian
motion with drift:
St = s+ µt+ σWt, (2.1)
for t ≥ 0, where s ∈ ]0,+∞[ is the initial price and µ ≥ 0, σ > 0 are fixed con-
stants. Notice that the retailer has no control on the wholesale price: in most of the
cases, i.e. when the company is not too big, this is a reasonable assumption. After
buying the energy, the retailer sells it to final consumers. According to the most
common contracts in energy markets, the retailer can change the price only after a
written communication to all his customers. Then, we model the final price by a
piecewise-constant process P . More precisely, we consider an initial price p > 0 and
a sequence {τk}k≥1 of non-negative random times, which correspond to the retailer’s
interventions to adjust the price and move P to a new state. If we denote by {δk}k≥1
the corresponding impulses, i.e. δk = Pτk − P(τk)− , we have
Pt = p+
∑
τk≤t
δk, (2.2)
for every t ≥ 0. Let us denote by X the difference between the final price and the
wholesale price. In other words, X represents the retailer’s unitary income when
selling energy (we do not consider, for the moment, the operational costs he faces).
By (2.1) and (2.2), we have
Xt = Pt − St = x− µt− σWt +
∑
τk≤t
δk, (2.3)
for every t ≥ 0, where we have set x = p− s. We remark that, when the player does
not intervene, the process X satisfies the following stochastic equation:
dXt = −µdt− σdWt. (2.4)
We assume that the retailer’s market share at time t ≥ 0 is a function of Xt,
which we denote by Φ = Φ(Xt). In our model, we set
Φ(x) =

1, x ≤ 0,
− 1∆(x−∆), 0 < x < ∆,
0, x ≥ ∆,
(2.5)
for every x ∈ R, where ∆ > 0 is a fixed constant. In other words, the market
share is a truncated linear function of Xt with two thresholds: if Xt ≤ 0 all the
customers buy energy from the retailer, whereas if Xt ≥ ∆ the retailer has lost all
his customers.
At each t ≥ 0, the retailer’s income from the sell of the energy is given by
XtΦ(Xt), but he also has to pay an operational cost, which we assume to be a
quadratic function of the market share Φ(Xt); hence, the instantaneous payoff is
given by
R(x) = xΦ(x)− b
2
Φ(x)2, (2.6)
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where x is the current state of the process. Moreover, there is a penalty to pay when
the retailer intervenes to adjust P . We are going to consider two situations: the
case when the penalty simply consists in a fixed cost c and the case where, besides
c, we also have a variable cost, directly proportional to the market share. To include
both the cases in the same notation, we set
K(x) = c+ λΦ(x), (2.7)
where x ∈ R is the state of the process before the intervention and c > 0, λ ≥ 0 are
fixed constants. Finally, let ρ > 0 be the discount rate.
To sum up, we here consider the following impulsive stochastic control problem.
Definition 2.1. Throughout the chapter, the following definitions hold.
- A control is a sequence u = {(τk, δk)}1≤k<M , where M ∈ R∪{+∞}, {τk}1≤k<M
are non-decreasing non-negative stopping times (the intervention times) and
{δk}1≤k<M are real random variables (the corresponding impulses).
- For each x ∈ R and u control, we denote by Xx;u the process defined in (2.3).
- Let x ∈ R and K as in (2.7); we say that a control u is admissible in x if
Ex
[ ∑
1≤k<M
e−ρτkK
(
Xx;u
(τk)−
)]
<∞ (2.8)
and we denote by Ux the set of the controls which are admissible in x.
Definition 2.2. The function V (value function) is defined, for each x ∈ R, by
V (x) = sup
u∈Ux
J(x;u),
where, for every u ∈ Ux, we have set
J(x;u) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtR(Xx;ut )dt−
∑
1≤k<M
e−ρτkK
(
Xx;u
(τk)−
)]
, (2.9)
where the functions R and K have been defined in (2.6) and (2.7). If there exists
u∗ ∈ Ux such that V (x) = J(x;u∗), we say that u∗ is an optimal control in x.
Notice that the functional J in (2.9) is well-defined, as the sum of the penalties
is integrable by (2.8). Since R is bounded, a corresponding integrability condition
on the payoff is not necessary. To shorten the notations, we will often omit the
dependence on the control and simply write X.
We conclude this section with some remarks about the payoff and the penalty
of our problem: these properties will be useful in the next sections.
• An explicit expression for the running cost R and the penalty K is
R(x) =

x− b/2, if x < 0,
f(x), if 0 ≤ x ≤ ∆,
0, if x > ∆,
K(x) =

λ+ c, if x < 0,
− λ∆x+ λ+ c, if 0 ≤ x ≤ ∆,
c, if x > ∆,
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for every x ∈ R, where we have set
f(x) = −αx2 +βx−γ, α = 1
∆
+
b
2∆2
, β = 1+
b
∆
, γ =
b
2
. (2.10)
In particular, we remark that we have R(x) ≥ f(x), for every x ∈ R.
• The function f in (2.10) is a concave parabola:
f(x) = −α(x− xv)2 + yv, (2.11)
where α is as in (2.10) and the vertex v = (xv, yv) has the following expression:
xv =
∆(∆ + b)
2∆ + b
, yv = f(xv) =
∆2
2(2∆ + b)
. (2.12)
From the retailer’s point of view, Equation (2.11) says that xv is the state
which maximizes the payoff R(x), the optimal income being yv. Notice that
the optimal share Φv = Φ(xv) is given by
Φv = Φ(xv) =
∆
2∆ + b
. (2.13)
In particular, if b = 0 the optimal share is 1/2.
• Moreover, we notice that
f(x) ≥ 0 if and only if x ∈ [xz,∆], where xz = b∆
2∆ + b
. (2.14)
Equivalently, the payoff R(Xt) is positive if and only if Xt ∈ [xz,∆]. In other
words, if we want the income from the sale of energy to be higher than the
operational costs, we need the spread between the wholesale price and the final
price to be greater than xz.
• Finally, if we consider xv, yv, xz,Φv as functions of b, we notice that
xv(b) ∈ [∆/2,∆[, xv(0) = ∆/2, xv(+∞) = ∆, x′v > 0,
yv(b) ∈ ]0,∆/4], yv(0) = ∆/4, yv(+∞) = 0, y′v < 0,
xz(b) ∈ ]0,∆[, xz(0) = 0, xz(+∞) = ∆, x′z > 0,
Φv(b) ∈ ]0, 1/2[, Φv(0) = 1/2, Φv(+∞) = 0, Φ′v < 0.
(2.15)
Some intuitive properties of the model are formalized in (2.15): as the opera-
tional costs increases, the optimal spread xv increases, the maximal instanta-
neous income yv decreases, the region where the payoff is positive gets smaller
and the optimal share decreases. In particular, we remark that Φv ∈]0, 1/2[:
for any value of b, it is never optimal to have a market share greater than 1/2.
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2.2.2 Classical verification theorem
In control theory, verification theorems provide sufficient conditions for the value
function by considering suitable differential problems. The main drawback of such
theorems is that they require strong regularity assumptions.
We now recall the statement, in our particular case, of the classical verification
theorem for impulsive stochastic control problems.
Definition 2.3. Let V be a function from R to R with supV ∈ R. The function
MV is defined, for every x ∈ R, by
MV (x) = sup
δ∈R
{V (x+ δ)− c− λΦ(x)} = supV − c− λΦ(x). (2.16)
Proposition 2.4 (Verification Theorem). Let the assumptions and notations
of Section 2.2.1 hold. Let V be a function from R to R satisfying the following
conditions:
- V is bounded and there exists x∗ ∈ R such that V (x∗) = maxx∈R V (x);
- D = {MV − V < 0} is a finite union of intervals;
- V ∈ C2(R \ ∂D) ∩ C1(R) and the second derivative of V is bounded near ∂D;
- V is a solution to
max{AV − ρV +R,MV − V } = 0, (2.17)
where AV = (σ2/2)V ′′ − µV ′ is the generator associated to Equation (2.4).
Let x ∈ R and let u∗(x) = {(τ∗k (x), δ∗k(x))}1≤k<∞, where the variables (τ∗k , δ∗k) (we
omit the dependence on x to shorten the notations) are recursively defined by
τ∗k = inf
{
t > τ∗k−1 : (MV − V )
(
X
x;u∗k
t
)
= 0
}
,
δ∗k = x
∗ −Xx;u∗kτ∗k ,
for k ≥ 1, where we have set τ∗0 = δ∗0 = 0 and u∗k(x) = {(τ∗j , δ∗j )}1≤j≤k. Assume that
u∗(x) ∈ Ux. Then,
u∗(x) is an optimal control in x and V (x) = J(x;u∗(x)).
Proof. See [32, Thm. 6.2].
Practically, when dealing with a control problem, one first guesses the form of the
continuation region and gets a candidate for the value function by solving Equation
(2.17); the final step consists in trying to actually apply the verification theorem to
such candidate.
Remark 2.5. If the parameter c is very high, the retailer may lose all his customers
without intervening, as the intervention cost would be higher than the loss he is
experiencing. However, such situation is clearly not practically admissible (if the
costs are too big, a retailer does not even enter the market). So, in order to keep the
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model close to reality, we will always require the continuation region to be a subset
of ]0,∆[:
{MV − V < 0} ⊆ ]0,∆[. (2.18)
As a consequence, when dealing with the continuation region, we can consider R|]0,∆[ =
f as the running cost of the problem (clearly, we cannot substitute R with f in (2.17),
as such equation must hold for each x ∈ R).
The key-stone of Proposition 2.4 is Equation (2.17), which implies
AV − ρV +R = 0, in {MV − V < 0}.
We now provide an explicit solution to such equation. By (2.18) we can replace R
with f ; hence, we are interested in solving
Aϕ− ρϕ+ f = σ
2
2
ϕ′′ − µϕ′ − ρϕ+ f = 0. (2.19)
The general solution to (2.19) is given by
ϕA1,A2(x) = A1e
m1x +A2e
m2x − k2x2 + k1x− k0, (2.20)
where A1, A2 ∈ R and we have set
m1,2 =
µ±
√
µ2 + 2ρσ2
σ2
,
k2 =
α
ρ
, k1 =
β
ρ
+
2αµ
ρ2
, k0 =
γ
ρ
+
βµ+ ασ2
ρ2
+
2αµ2
ρ3
,
(2.21)
with α, β, γ as in (2.10). Notice that, when µ = 0, we have
−k2x2 + k1x− k0 = f(x)
ρ
− ασ
2
ρ2
.
Hence, the polynomial part in (2.20) is, in this case, a concave parabola with vertex
in xv, with xv as in (2.12); as a consequence, by (2.11) we also have the following
representation:
ϕA1,A2(x) = A1e
θx +A2e
−θx − k2(x− xv)2 + k3, (2.22)
where, to shorten the notations, we have set
θ =
√
2ρ
σ2
, k3 =
f(xv)
ρ
− ασ
2
ρ2
=
f(xv)
ρ
− 2k2
θ2
. (2.23)
We underline that the representation in (2.22) holds only in the case µ = 0.
2.3 The case with fixed penalty
In this section we consider the problem in Section 2.2 in the case of fixed intervention
costs, i.e. with λ = 0. In particular, the problem now reads
V (x) = sup
u∈Ux
J(x;u) = sup
u∈Ux
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
XtΦ(Xt)− b
2
Φ(Xt)
2
)
dt− c
∑
k
e−ρτk
]
.
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We will show that the classical verification theorem (Proposition 2.4 above) can be
applied, so that a semi-explicit expression for the value function and the optimal
control is possible.
More in detail, in Section 2.3.1 we consider the case µ = 0 and build a candidate
V˜ for the value function V , whereas in Section 2.3.2 we apply Proposition 2.4 to
such candidate; finally, in Section 2.3.3 we consider the case with a non-zero µ.
2.3.1 Looking for a candidate for the value function
We here consider the following case:
λ = 0, µ = 0, c ≤ c¯, (2.24)
where c¯ will be specified later. Since our goal is to use the Verification Theorem 2.4,
we first try to find a solution to (2.17), in order to get a candidate V˜ for V .
It is reasonable to assume that the retailer’s continuation region (i.e. when he
does not intervene) is in the form C = ]
¯
x, x¯[ and included in ]0,∆[ by (2.18). As a
consequence, the real line is heuristically divided into:
R\]
¯
x, x¯[= {MV − V = 0}, where the retailer intervenes,
]
¯
x, x¯[= {MV − V < 0}, where the retailer does not intervene.
Then, the QVI problem in (2.17) suggests the following candidate for V :
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕ(x), if x ∈ ]
¯
x, x¯[,
MV˜ (x), if x ∈ R\]
¯
x, x¯[,
where ϕ is a solution to the equation (recall that ]
¯
x, x¯[⊆]0,∆[, where R = f)
Aϕ− ρϕ+ f = 0,
and the function MV˜ (see Definition 2.16) is given by
MV˜ (x) = sup
δ∈R
{V˜ (x+ δ)− c} = sup
y∈R
{V˜ (y)} − c.
Heuristically, it is reasonable to assume that the function V˜ has a unique maximum
point x∗, which belongs to the continuation region ]
¯
x, x¯[ (where V˜ = ϕ):
max
y∈R
{V˜ (y)}= max
y∈]
¯
x,x¯[
{ϕ(y)}=ϕ(x∗), where ϕ′(x∗)=0, ϕ′′(x∗)≤0,
¯
x<x∗<x¯.
We recall that an explicit formula for ϕ has been provided in Section 2.2.2: in
particular, since we are considering the case µ = 0, we can use the formula in (2.22).
Moreover, we recall that the parameters in V˜ must be chosen so as to satisfy the
regularity assumptions of the verification theorem: V˜ has to be continuous and
differentiable in
¯
x, x¯. To sum up, the candidate is as follows.
Definition 2.6. For every x ∈ R, we set
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕA1,A2(x), in ]¯
x, x¯[,
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c, in R\]
¯
x, x¯[,
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where ϕA1,A2 is as in (2.22) and the five parameters (A1, A2, ¯
x, x¯, x∗) satisfy
0 <
¯
x < x∗ < x¯ < ∆, (2.25)
and the following conditions:
ϕ′A1,A2(x
∗) = 0 and ϕ′′A1,A2(x
∗) < 0, (optimality of x∗)
ϕ′A1,A2(¯
x) = 0, (C1-pasting in
¯
x)
ϕ′A1,A2(x¯) = 0, (C
1-pasting in x¯)
ϕA1,A2(¯
x) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c, (C0-pasting in
¯
x)
ϕA1,A2(x¯) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c. (C0-pasting in x¯)
(2.26)
In order to have a well-posed definition, we first need to prove that a solution to
(2.26) actually exists.
Since the system cannot be solved directly, we try to make some guesses to
simplify it. Consider the structure of the problem: the running cost is symmetric
with respect to xv (see Section 2.2.1), the penalty is constant (as λ = 0 here), the
uncontrolled process is a scaled Brownian motion (recall that µ = 0). Then, we
expect the value function to be symmetric with respect to xv, which corresponds to
the choice A1e
θxv = A2e
−θxv . The same argument suggests to set (
¯
x + x¯)/2 = xv.
Finally, as a symmetry point is always a local maximum or minimum point, we
expect x∗ = xv. In short, our guess is
A1 = Ae
−θxv , A2 = Aeθxv , (
¯
x+ x¯)/2 = xv, x
∗ = xv, (2.27)
with A ∈ R. In particular, we now consider functions in the form
ϕA(x) = Ae
θ(x−xv) +Ae−θ(x−xv) − k2(x− xv)2 + k3,
where A ∈ R and the coefficients have been defined in (2.21) and (2.23).
Indeed, an easy check shows that x∗ = xv is a local maximum for ϕA (so that
the first condition in (2.26) is satisfied) if and only if A > 0. Then, under our guess
(2.27), we can equivalently rewrite (2.26) as{
ϕ′A(x¯) = 0,
ϕA(x¯) = ϕA(xv)− c,
with A > 0 and x¯ > xv. Explicitly, we have to solve{
Aθeθ(x¯−xv) −Aθe−θ(x¯−xv) − 2k2(x¯− xv) = 0,
Aeθ(x¯−xv) +Ae−θ(x¯−xv) − k2(x¯− xv)2 − 2A+ c = 0.
In order to simplify the notations, we operate a change of variable and set y¯ = x¯−xv.
We now deal with {
Aθeθy¯ −Aθe−θy¯ − 2k2y¯ = 0, (2.28a)
Aeθy¯ +Ae−θy¯ − k2y¯2 − 2A+ c = 0, (2.28b)
where A > 0 and y¯ > 0. Finally, recall the order condition (2.25), which now reads
y¯ < ∆− xv. (2.29)
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So, to prove that V˜ is well-defined it is enough to show that a solution to (2.28a)-
(2.28b)-(2.29) exists and is unique.
In Lemma 2.7 we focus on the first two conditions, whereas in Lemma 2.8 we
consider the third one.
Lemma 2.7. A solution (A, y¯) ∈ ]0,+∞[2 to (2.28a)-(2.28b) exists and is unique.
Proof. First step. Let us start by Equation (2.28a). For a fixed A > 0, we are
looking for the strictly positive zeros of the function hA defined by
hA(y) = Aθe
θy −Aθe−θy − 2k2y, (2.30)
for each y > 0. The derivative is
h′A(y) = Aθ
2eθy +Aθ2e−θy − 2k2 =
Aθ2
(
eθy
)2 − 2k2(eθy)+Aθ2
eθy
.
We need to consider two cases, according to the value of A. Let
A¯ =
k2
θ2
=
σ2(2∆ + b)
4ρ2∆2
. (2.31)
If A ≥ A¯ we have h′A > 0 in ]0,∞[; hence, since hA(0) = 0, Equation (2.28a) does
not have any solution in [0,+∞[. On the contrary, if A < A¯ we have h′A < 0 in
]0, y˜[ and h′A > 0 in ]y˜,∞[, for a suitable y˜ = y˜(A) > 0; hence, since hA(0) = 0 and
hA(+∞) = +∞, Equation (2.28a) has exactly one solution y¯ = y¯(A) > 0 (notice
that y¯(A) > y˜(A)). In short, we have proved that, for a fixed A > 0, Equation
(2.28a) admits a solution y¯ ∈]0,∞[ if and only if A ∈]0, A¯[; in this case the solution
is unique and we denote it by y¯ = y¯(A).
Finally, we remark that
lim
A→0+
y¯(A) = +∞, lim
A→A¯−
y¯(A) = 0. (2.32)
The first limit follows by y¯(A) > y˜(A) and limA→0+ y˜(A) = +∞ (this one by a direct
computation of y˜), whereas the second limit is immediate.
Second step. We now consider Equation (2.28b). For each A ∈]0, A¯[, we define
g(A) = −Aeθy¯(A) −Ae−θy¯(A) + k2y¯2(A) + 2A, (2.33)
where y¯(A) is well-defined by the first step. We are going to prove that
lim
A→0+
g(A) = +∞, lim
A→A¯−
g(A) = 0, g′ < 0. (2.34)
This concludes the proof: indeed, if we assume (2.34), it follows that the equation
g(A) = c, which is just a rewriting of (2.28b), has exactly one solution A ∈]0, A¯[. It
is then clear that the couple (A, y¯(A)) is a solution to (2.28a)-(2.28b) (the unique
one, since uniqueness holds for (2.28b)).
For the first claim in (2.34), by (2.28a) we can write A as a function of y¯,
A =
2k2
θ
y¯(A)
eθy¯(A) − e−θy¯(A) , (2.35)
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so that g also reads
g(A) = k2y¯
2(A)− 2k2
θ
eθy¯(A) + e−θy¯(A) − 2
eθy¯(A) − e−θy¯(A) y¯(A), (2.36)
which we rewrite as
g(A) = k2y¯
2(A)− 2k2
θ
(eθy¯(A) − 1)2
(eθy¯(A))2 − 1 y¯(A); (2.37)
then, by (2.32) we have
lim
A→0+
g(A) = lim
z→+∞
(
k2z
2 − 2k2
θ
(eθz − 1)2
(eθz)2 − 1z
)
= +∞.
As for the second claim in (2.34), it is immediate by the definition of g and by (2.32).
We finally show that the third claim in (2.34) holds. Notice that
g′(A) = −eθy¯(A) − e−θy¯(A) + 2−
(
Aθeθy¯ −Aθe−θy¯ − 2k2y¯
)
y¯′(A).
By (2.28a), the coefficient of y¯′(A) is zero; thus, we have
g′(A) = −eθy¯(A) − e−θy¯(A) + 2 = −(e
θy¯(A) − 1)2
eθy¯(A)
< 0, (2.38)
which concludes the proof.
We now focus on the order condition (2.29). As already noticed in (2.35), by
(2.28a) we can write A as a function of y¯: for every y¯ > 0 we have
A(y¯) =
2k2
θ
y¯
eθy¯ − e−θy¯ . (2.39)
We are going to consider the function ξ := g ◦A, where g has been defined in (2.33)
and A is as in (2.39). In (2.37) we have already computed an expression for ξ, which
we here recall: for every y¯ > 0 we have
ξ(y¯) = (g ◦A)(y¯) = k2y¯2 − 2k2
θ
(eθy¯ − 1)2
(eθy¯)2 − 1 y¯. (2.40)
Lemma 2.8. Let (A, y¯) be as in Lemma 2.7 and let c¯ = ξ(∆2/(2∆ + b)), with ξ as
in (2.40). Then, the condition in (2.29) is satisfied if and only if c ≤ c¯.
Proof. Let g be as in (2.33) and assume, for the moment, that the function A in
(2.39) is decreasing. Then, since g is decreasing by (2.34), we deduce that ξ = g◦A is
increasing. Hence, we have y¯ < ∆−xv if and only if ξ(y¯) < ξ(∆−xv). The conclusion
follows since ξ(y¯) = g(A(y¯)) = c by (2.28b) and since ∆ − xv = ∆2/(2∆ + b) by
(2.12).
So, we just need to prove that y¯ 7→ A(y¯) is decreasing. A direct differentiation
in (2.39) leads to an expression whose sign is not easy to estimate. Then, we write
A = A(y¯) in (2.28a) and differentiate with respect to y¯. We get
A′(y¯)θ
(
eθy¯ − e−θy¯)+A(y¯)θ2(eθy¯ + e−θy¯)− 2k2 = 0,
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so that, after rearranging, we have
A′(y¯) = − A(y¯)θ
2eθy¯ +A(y¯)θ2e−θy¯ − 2k2
θ(eθy¯ − e−θy¯) = −
h′A(y¯)(y¯)
θ(eθy¯ − e−θy¯) < 0, (2.41)
where in the numerator we have recognized h′A(y¯)(y¯), with hA(y¯) as in (2.30), and we
have h′A(y¯)(y¯) > 0 since hA(y¯) is increasing in [y˜,+∞[3 y¯ (see Lemma 2.7).
All the previous results are summarized in the next proposition: we have proved
that our candidate V˜ is well-defined.
Proposition 2.9. Assume c < c¯, with c¯ as in Lemma 2.8. Then, the function V˜ in
Definition 2.6 is well-defined. More precisely, there exists a solution
(A1, A2,
¯
x, x¯, x∗)
to System (2.26), which is given by
A1 = Ae
−θxv , A2 = Aeθxv ,
x∗ = xv,
¯
x = xv − y¯, x¯ = xv + y¯,
where xv is as in (2.12) and (A, y¯) is the unique solution to (2.28a)-(2.28b)-(2.29).
2.3.2 Application of the verification theorem
In this section we apply the verification theorem (Proposition 2.4) and show that
the candidate V˜ defined in the previous section actually corresponds to the value
function. Moreover, we characterize the the optimal price management policy: the
retailer has to intervene if and only if the process hits
¯
x or x¯ and, when this happens,
he has to shift X to the state x∗.
We emphasize the importance of carefully checking all the assumptions: this
passage is often omitted, but it can be no trivial at all, as we will see here and,
above all, in the next section.
Lemma 2.10. Let (2.24) hold and let V˜ be as in Definition 2.6. Then, for every
x ∈ R we have
MV˜ (x) = ϕA(x∗)− c.
In particular, we have
{MV˜ − V˜ < 0} = ]
¯
x, x¯[, {MV˜ − V˜ = 0} = R \ ]
¯
x, x¯[. (2.42)
Proof. First of all, recall that V˜ is symmetric with respect to x∗ and notice that:
- V˜ is strictly decreasing in ]x∗, x¯[ (since we have V˜ = ϕA by definition and
ϕ′A < 0 in ]x
∗, x¯[ by the proof of Lemma 2.7);
- V˜ is constant in [x¯,+∞[ by definition of V˜ , with V˜ ≡ ϕA(x∗)− c.
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Then, we deduce that
max
y∈R
V˜ (y) = V˜ (x∗) = ϕA(x∗), min
y∈R
V˜ (y) = ϕA(x
∗)− c. (2.43)
As a consequence, for every x ∈ R we have
MV˜ (x) = max
δ∈R
{V˜ (x+ δ)− c} = max
y∈R
V˜ (y)− c = ϕA(x∗)− c.
By the definition of V˜ , we have
MV˜ (x)− V˜ (x) = 0, in R\]
¯
x, x¯[.
Moreover, as ϕA(x¯) = ϕA(x
∗)− c by (2.26) and ϕA(x¯) = min[
¯
x,x¯] ϕA by the previous
arguments, we have
MV˜ (x)− V˜ (x) = ϕA(x∗)− c− ϕA(x) = ϕA(x¯)− ϕA(x) < 0, in ]
¯
x, x¯[,
which concludes the proof.
Proposition 2.11. Let (2.24) hold and let V˜ be as in Definition 2.6. For every
x ∈ R, an optimal control for the problem in Section 2.2 exists and is given by
u∗(x) = {(τ∗k , δ∗k)}1≤k<∞, where the variables (τ∗k , δ∗k) are recursively defined by
τ∗k = inf
{
t > τ∗k−1 : X
x;u∗k
t ∈ {¯x, x¯}
}
,
δ∗k = x
∗ −Xx;u∗kτ∗k ,
(2.44)
for k ≥ 1, where we have set τ∗0 = δ∗0 = 0 and u∗k = {(τ∗j , δ∗j )}1≤j≤k. Moreover, V˜
coincides with the value function: for every x ∈ R we have
V˜ (x) = V (x) = J(x;u∗(x)).
Proof. We have to check that the candidate V˜ satisfies all the assumptions of Propo-
sition 2.4. For the reader’s convenience, we briefly report the conditions we have to
check:
(i) V˜ is bounded and maxx∈R V˜ (x) exists;
(ii) V˜ ∈ C2(R \ {
¯
x, x¯}) ∩ C1(R);
(iii) V˜ satisfies max{AV˜ − ρV˜ +R,MV˜ − V˜ } = 0;
(iv) the optimal control is admissible, i.e. u∗(x) ∈ Ux for every x ∈ R.
Condition (i) and (ii). The first condition holds by (2.43), whereas the second
condition follows by the definition of V˜ .
Condition (iii). We have to prove that for every x ∈ R we have
max{AV˜ (x)− ρV˜ (x) +R(x),MV˜ (x)− V˜ (x)} = 0. (2.45)
In ]
¯
x, x¯[ the claim is true, as MV˜ − V˜ < 0 by (2.42) and AV˜ − ρV˜ + R = 0 by
definition (recall that here we have R = f and V˜ = ϕA, with AϕA − ρϕA + f = 0).
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As for R\]
¯
x, x¯[, we already know by (2.42) that MV˜ − V˜ = 0. Then, to conclude
we have to prove that
AV˜ (x)− ρV˜ (x) +R(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ R\]
¯
x, x¯[.
By symmetry, it is enough to prove the claim for x ∈ [x¯,+∞[. By the definition of
V˜ (x) and (2.26), in the interval [x¯,+∞[ we have V˜ ≡ ϕA(x∗) − c = ϕA(x¯); hence,
the inequality reads
−ρϕA(x¯) +R(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯,+∞[.
As R is decreasing in [xv,+∞[ ⊇ [x¯,+∞[, it is enough to prove the claim in x = x¯:
−ρϕA(x¯) +R(x¯) ≤ 0.
Since AϕA(x¯)− ρϕA(x¯) + f(x¯) = 0 and f(x¯) = R(x¯), we can rewrite as
−σ
2
2
ϕ′′A(x¯) ≤ 0,
which is true as x¯ is a local minimum of ϕA ∈ C∞(R), so that ϕ′′A(x¯) ≥ 0.
Condition (iv). Let x ∈ R; recall (2.8): we have to show that
Ex
[∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
k
]
<∞.
When acting according to the optimal control u∗, the retailer intervenes when the
process hits
¯
x or x¯ and shifts the process to x∗ ∈ ]
¯
x, x¯[. As a consequence, we can
decompose each variable τ∗k as a sum of suitable exit times from ]¯
x, x¯[. Given y ∈ R,
let ζy denote the exit time of the process y + σW , where W is a real Brownian
motion, from the interval ]
¯
x, x¯[; then, we have τ∗1 = ζx and
τ∗k = ζ
x +
k−1∑
l=1
ζx
∗
l ,
for every k ≥ 2, where the variables ζx∗l are independent and distributed as ζx
∗
. As
a consequence, we have
Ex
[∑
k≥2
e−ρτ
∗
k
]
= Ex
[∑
k≥2
e−ρ
(
ζx+
∑k−1
l=1 ζ
x∗
l
)]
= Ex
[
e−ρζ
x
∑
k≥2
∏
l=1,...,k−1
e−ρζ
x∗
l
]
.
By the Fubini-Tonelli theorem and the independence of the variables:
Ex
[
e−ρζ
x
∑
k≥2
∏
l=1,...,k−1
e−ρζ
x∗
l
]
= Ex
[
e−ρζ
x]∑
k≥2
∏
l=1,...,k−1
Ex
[
e−ρζ
x∗
l
]
.
As the variables ζx
∗
l are identically distributed with ζ
x∗
l ∼ ζx
∗
, we can conclude:∑
k≥2
∏
l=1,...,k−1
Ex
[
e−ρζ
x∗
l
]
=
∑
k≥2
Ex
[
e−ρζ
x∗]k−1
<∞,
which is a converging geometric series.
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The value function in Definition 2.6 clearly depends on the parameter c. Up to
now we have always assumed c to be a constant; we now consider V as a function
of c and investigate the limit case c → 0+. To stress the dependence on c, we will
write V c,
¯
x(c), x¯(c), u∗(x, c).
When the fixed cost c decreases, it is clear that the player intervenes more
frequently and that the continuation region ]
¯
x, x¯[ gets smaller. In the limit case
c = 0 (which corresponds to a problem with no intervention cost) we guess that
¯
x = x¯ = x∗ = xv: the continuation region collapses in the singleton {xv}. Hence, we
expect the value function to equal the value of the game in the static case (i.e. when
the process is constant), that is
V static = max
x∈R
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtR(x)dt
]
= max
x∈R
R(x)/ρ = f(xv)/ρ, (2.46)
where maxR = f(xv) by (2.11). Proposition 2.13 makes this guess rigorous.
We start by proving a stronger result: we provide an estimate for
¯
x(c), x¯(c) as
c→ 0+. To our knowledge, this is the first time that an asymptotic estimate for the
continuation region of an impulse control problem is provided.
Proposition 2.12. Let (2.24) hold and let
¯
x(c), x¯(c) be as in Definition 2.6, for
c > 0. The following asymptotic estimates hold:
¯
x(c) ∼c→0+ xv − C 4
√
c, x¯(c) ∼c→0+ xv + C 4
√
c, (2.47)
where we have set C = 4
√
6/(k2θ2).
Proof. Recall by Proposition 2.9 that for each c > 0 we have
¯
x(c) = xv − y¯(A(c)), x¯(c) = xv + y¯(A(c)), (2.48)
where the function y¯ has been defined in the proof of Lemma 2.7 and A(c) ∈ ]0, A¯[
is the unique solution to g(A) = c, with g as in (2.33) and A¯ as in (2.31). Hence,
we have to estimate y¯(A(c)) as c→ 0+.
Let us start by the expression of g in (2.36):
g(A) =
θk2y¯
2(A)
(
eθy¯(A) − e−θy¯(A))− 2k2y¯(A)(eθy¯(A) + e−θy¯(A) − 2)
θ
(
eθy¯(A) − e−θy¯(A)) ,
for every A ∈ ]0, A¯[. Recall by (2.32) that y¯(A) → 0 as A → A¯−; hence, by the
Taylor series we have
eθy¯(A) − e−θy¯(A) = 2(θy¯(A))+ 2
3!
(
θy¯(A)
)3
+ o
(
y¯(A)4
)
,
eθy¯(A) + e−θy¯(A) = 2 +
2
2!
(
θy¯(A)
)2
+ o
(
y¯(A)3
)
,
which leads to the following approximation:
g(A) ∼A→A¯−
θk2y¯
2(A)
(
2θy¯(A) + θ3y¯3(A)/3
)
− 2k2y¯(A)
(
θ2y¯2(A)
)
θ
(
2θy¯(A)
) ;
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after rearranging the terms, we get
g(A) ∼A→A¯−
k2θ
2
6
y¯4(A). (2.49)
Now, since A is the inverse function of g (as reminded above) and since g(A¯−) = 0
by (2.34), we deduce that
lim
c→0+
A(c) = A¯. (2.50)
Hence, by (2.49) we have
g(A(c)) ∼c→0+
k2θ
2
6
y¯4(A(c)).
But g(A(c)) ≡ c by the definition of A(c), so that we deduce that
y¯(A(c)) ∼c→0+ 4
√
6
k2θ2
4
√
c,
which concludes the proof.
Proposition 2.13. Let (2.24) hold and let V c be as in Definition 2.6, for c > 0.
Then, we have
¯
x′(c) < 0, x¯′(c) > 0, lim
c→0+ ¯
x(c) = lim
c→0+
x¯(c) = xv, (2.51)
for c > 0. As a consequence, the following punctual limits hold:
lim
c→0+
V c(x) = V static, lim
c→0+
X
x;u∗(x,c)
t = xv. (2.52)
for every x ∈ R and t ≥ 0, where V static is the constant defined in (2.46).
Proof. Let us start with (2.51). The limits immediately follow by Proposition 2.12;
moreover, by symmetry it is enough to prove that x¯′(c) > 0 for c > 0. By (2.48) we
have
x¯′(c) = y¯′
(
A(c)
)
A′(c), (2.53)
for every c > 0, where the functions y¯, A are as in Proposition 2.12. The function
A 7→ y¯(A) is the inverse function of A˜, with A˜ as in (2.39) (we have written A˜ instead
of A not to create confusion with the map c 7→ A(c) we have previously used). Since
A˜′ < 0 by (2.41), it follows that
y¯′
(
A(c)
)
=
1
A˜′
(
y¯(A(c))
) < 0, (2.54)
for every c > 0. Similarly, the function c 7→ A(c) is the inverse function of g, with g
as in (2.33). Since g′ < 0 by (2.34), it follows that
A′(c) =
1
g′(A(c))
< 0, (2.55)
for every c > 0. By (2.53), (2.54) and (2.55) we conclude that x¯′(c) > 0.
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Let us now consider (2.52). Recall that, thanks to Proposition 2.11, we have a
semi-explicit expression for V c; in the notations of this proof, it reads
V c(x) =
{
ϕA(c)(x), x ∈ ]¯x(c), x¯(c)[,
ϕA(c)(xv)− c, x ∈ R\]¯x(c), x¯(c)[,
(2.56)
for x ∈ R and a fixed c > 0. We now rewrite V c so as to focus on the parameter c.
Since we have proved that
¯
x(c), x¯(c) are monotone and converge to xv, by (2.56) it
follows that for every fixed x ∈ R \ {xv} we have
V c(x) =
{
ϕA(c)(xv)− c, c ∈ ]0, c˜(x)[,
ϕA(c)(x), c ∈ [c˜(x),+∞[,
(2.57)
where c˜ > 0 is a suitable function, while in the case x = xv we simply have
V c(xv) = ϕA(c)(xv), c ∈ ]0,+∞[. (2.58)
By (2.57) and (2.58) it follows that for every x ∈ R and c > 0 we have
lim
c→0+
V c(x) = lim
c→0+
ϕA(c)(xv) = ϕA¯(xv),
where A(0+) = A¯, as proved in (2.50). Recall now the expression of ϕA¯ in (2.22),
the definition of A¯ in (2.31) and the value of k3 in (2.23): we have
ϕA¯(xv) = 2A¯+ k3 =
2k2
θ2
+
f(xv)
ρ
− 2k2
θ2
=
f(xv)
ρ
,
which proves the first claim in (2.52).
Finally, as Xx;u
∗(x,c) lies by definition in the continuation region, i.e.
¯
x(c) < Xx;u
∗(x,c) < x¯(c),
the second claim in (2.52) immediately follows by passing to the limit as c→ 0+.
Clearly, even if the value function is well-defined in the case c = 0, an impulse
optimal policy does not exist in this case, as it would consist in continuous inter-
ventions by the player. Indeed, the situation would be as follows: at the beginning
of the game the process is immediately shifted (with no penalty, as c = 0) to the
optimal state xv and then the retailer instantaneously intervenes to keep the process
constant.
We now investigate the monotonicity of the value function with respect to c.
When the intervention cost decreases, the retailer can intervene more frequently
to shift the process to the optimal state xv, so that we expect a bigger value for
the problem. In other words, given a fixed x ∈ R, we expect V c(x) to increase as
c→ 0+, which is equivalent to (dV c/dc)(x) < 0 (since c approaches 0 from the right,
a maximal value in 0 corresponds to a decreasing function). In particular, the value
function should be always smaller than the static value of the game.
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Proposition 2.14. Let (2.24) hold and let V c be as in Definition 2.6, for c > 0.
For every x ∈ R and c > 0 we have
d
dc
V c(x) < 0; (2.59)
in particular, the value functions are always smaller than the static maximum:
V c(x) < V static, (2.60)
for every x ∈ R and c > 0, where V static is the constant defined in (2.46).
Proof. First of all, the inequality in (2.60) is an immediate consequence of (2.59)
and Proposition 2.13. Then, let us use the notations of Proposition 2.13 and focus
on (2.59). Recall the definition of ϕA(c):
ϕA(c)(x) = A(c)e
θ(x−xv) +A(c)e−θ(x−xv) − k2(x− xv)2 + k3,
for every c > 0 and x ∈ R. Then, by (2.57) and (2.58) we have
dV c
dc
(x) =
{
2A′(c)− 1, c ∈ ]0, c˜(x)[,
A′(c)
(
eθ(x−xv) + e−θ(x−xv)
)
, c ∈ [c˜(x),+∞[, (2.61)
for every x ∈ R \ {xv}, whereas in x = xv we have
dV c
dc
(xv) = 2A
′(c), c ∈ ]0,+∞[. (2.62)
The inequality in (2.59) follows since A′ < 0, as proved in (2.55).
Finally, we study the robustness of the value function with respect to c in a
(right) neighbourhood of zero. The problem is as follows: how sensitive is the value
function to small changes in c around zero? Clearly, we have to estimate (dV c/dc)(x)
as c→ 0+, with x ∈ R.
It has been shown that intervention costs in the form c+ λ˜|δ| often imply a value
function V c which is not robust with respect to c = 0, i.e. such that (dV c/dc)(x)
diverges as c → 0, for every x ∈ R. Practically, given a very small value of c, a
slight change in the intervention cost does not correspond to a proportionally slight
change in the value function: the difference explodes as c → 0+. Clearly, such a
behaviour is extremely problematic when performing numerical experiments. This
property has been first noticed in [31], in a specific case, and then generalized in
[33] for a class of problems with quadratic payoff and λ˜ > 0. Our problem does not
belong to the the class studied in [33], as we here have λ˜ = 0; however, we can prove
that such behaviour is present in our case as well.
Corollary 2.15. Let (2.24) hold and let V c be as in Definition 2.6, for c > 0. For
every x ∈ R, we have
lim
c→0+
dV c
dc
(x) = −∞.
Proof. By (2.61) and (2.62) we just have to prove that A′(0+) = −∞. As already
noticed in (2.55), for each c > 0 we have A′(c) = 1/g′(A(c)) < 0, with g as in (2.33);
by using the expression for g′ in (2.38), it is immediate to deduce that g′(A¯−) = 0,
so that A′(0+) = −∞.
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2.3.3 Extension to processes with non-zero drift
We now extend the results of the previous sections to the case where the process
has a non-zero drift term. Hence, we no longer assume µ = 0 and we consider the
problem in Section 2.2 with
λ = 0. (2.63)
By arguing as in Section 2.3.1, in this case the candidate for the value function
is as follows.
Definition 2.16. For every x ∈ R, we set
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕA1,A2(x), in ]¯
x, x¯[,
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c, in R\]
¯
x, x¯[,
where ϕA1,A2 is as in (2.20) and the five parameters (A1, A2, ¯
x, x¯, x∗) satisfy the
conditions (2.25)-(2.26).
The only difference with respect to Definition 2.6 relies in the function ϕA1,A2 :
as we now consider a generic value for µ, we can no longer use the expression in
(2.22) and we have to use the generic expression in (2.20).
In Section 2.3.1 we managed, by using a symmetry argument, to simplify the
conditions in (2.26) and to deduce an existence result for (2.25)-(2.26). This pro-
cedure cannot be replicated here, due to the presence of a drift: the process is no
longer symmetric, so that the value function cannot be symmetric either. Hence, it
is not possible to simplify (2.26) and a general existence result is not available for
this system. So, we have to assume that a solution actually exists.
Assumption 2.17. We assume that a solution to (2.25)-(2.26) exists. Moreover,
we assume that there exist x˜1, x˜2, with
¯
x < x˜1 < x
∗ < x˜2 < x¯, such that ϕ′′A1,A2 < 0
in ]x˜1, x˜2[ and ϕ
′′
A1,A2
> 0 in ]
¯
x, x˜1[∪ ]x˜2, x¯[.
We remark that the conditions on the second derivative are, heuristically, always
satisfied by a solution to (2.25)-(2.26): since x∗ is a local maximum and we need
a C1-pasting (with slope equal to zero) in
¯
x and x¯, we expect to have two changes
in the convexity of ϕA1,A2 . Moreover, we do not need to require uniqueness for the
solution: this is an immediate consequence of the verification theorem.
If a candidate solution actually exists, i.e. if Assumption 2.17 holds, the same
arguments as the ones in Proposition 2.11 show that it coincides with the value
function; moreover, we can characterize the optimal control.
Lemma 2.18. Let (2.63) and Assumption 2.17 hold and let V˜ be as in Definition
2.16. Then, for every x ∈ R we have
MV˜ (x) = ϕA1,A2(x∗)− c.
In particular, we have
{MV˜ − V˜ < 0} = ]
¯
x, x¯[, {MV˜ − V˜ = 0} = R \ ]
¯
x, x¯[.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 2.10. First of all, let us study the
monotonicity of V˜ :
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- V˜ is constant in ]−∞,
¯
x] and [x¯,+∞[ by definition, with V˜ ≡ ϕA1,A2(x∗)− c;
- V˜ is strictly increasing in ]
¯
x, x∗[ (by (2.26) we have ϕ′A1,A2(¯
x) = ϕ′A1,A2(x
∗) =
0 and by Assumption 2.17 the function ϕ′A1,A2 is first increasing and then
decreasing in ]
¯
x, x∗[, so that V˜ ′ = ϕ′A1,A2 > 0 in ]¯
x, x∗[) and strictly decreasing
in ]x∗, x¯[ (by similar arguments).
From now on, the proof is like in Lemma 2.10; for the reader’s convenience, we
briefly recall the arguments. By the previous arguments, we deduce that
max
y∈R
V˜ (y) = V˜ (x∗) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗), min
y∈R
V˜ (y) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c,
As a consequence, for every x ∈ R we have
MV˜ (x) = max
δ∈R
{V˜ (x+ δ)− c} = max
y∈R
V˜ (y)− c = ϕA1,A2(x∗)− c.
By the definition of V˜ , we have
MV˜ (x)− V˜ (x) = 0, in R\]
¯
x, x¯[.
Moreover, as ϕA1,A2(x¯) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗) − c by (2.26) and ϕA1,A2(x¯) = min[
¯
x,x¯] ϕA1,A2
by the previous arguments, we have
MV˜ (x)−V˜ (x) = ϕA1,A2(x∗)−c−ϕA1,A2(x) = ϕA1,A2(x¯)−ϕA1,A2(x) < 0, in ]¯x, x¯[,
which concludes the proof.
Proposition 2.19. Let (2.63) and Assumption 2.17 hold. Then, for every x ∈ R
an optimal control u∗(x) for the problem in Section 2.2 exists and is given by (2.44).
Moreover, V˜ coincides with the value function: for every x ∈ R we have
V˜ (x) = V (x) = J(x;u∗(x)).
Proof. The same as Proposition 2.11: adding a drift term does not change any
passage in the proof.
In short, if a drift term is present in the process, we no longer have an analytical
existence result for (2.26), so that we need to assume it. Under this further assump-
tion, we can argue as in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 and characterize the value function
and the optimal control.
2.4 The case with variable penalty
In Section 2.3 we have studied the case λ = 0. In this section we study the problem
in the case λ > 0, which means that, besides the fixed cost c, a variable intervention
penalty is also present.
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2.4.1 A generalization of the procedure
Exactly as we did in Section 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.3, let us start from the QVI
problem (2.17) to define a candidate for the value function. In this case, the function
V˜ has the following form:
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕA1,A2(x), if x ∈ ]¯x, x¯[,
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c− λΦ(x), if x ∈ R\]
¯
x, x¯[,
where ϕA1,A2 is a solution to (2.19) and the parameters satisfy the usual conditions,
which will be detailed later. First of all, we notice that in this case we face a
regularity problem: the function Φ, defined in (2.5), is not differentiable in {0,∆} ∈
R\]
¯
x, x¯[ (recall that 0 <
¯
x < x¯ < ∆), so that here we cannot apply Proposition 2.4
(recall that it requires the candidate V˜ to be everywhere differentiable).
Since classical results cannot be used in this case, we need another approach to
tackle the problem. The procedure we are going to use is as follows.
1. We approximate Φ by smooth functions Φn and we show that, by substituting
Φ with Φn in the penalty, we get value functions Vn which converge to the
original value function V (and such that classical results can now be applied);
2. We look for candidates V˜n for Vn and V˜ for V , with the property V˜n → V˜ ;
3. by using the classical verification theorem, we prove that actually V˜n = Vn and
we deduce that V˜ = V .
We now develop in detail these steps. We anticipate that this procedure presents,
at the moment, some open problems which are currently subject of ongoing study:
we here summarize the current state of the work.
First step. By a standard procedure, we can approximate the function Φ by
smooth functions Φn; consequently, we define a sequence of control problems with
smooth penalty functions.
Lemma 2.20. There exists a sequence {Φn}n∈N ⊆ C∞(R) such that
lim
n→∞ ‖Φn − Φ‖∞ = 0, (2.64)
Φn ≡ Φ in R \Kn, where Kn = [−1/n, 1/n] ∪ [∆− 1/n,∆ + 1/n]. (2.65)
Proof. Standard mollification theory. The convergence is uniform everywhere, not
only on compact subsets, as the functions Φn differ from Φ only in a bounded subset.
Moreover, by choosing symmetric mollifiers we have (2.65).
Definition 2.21. Let the constants c, λ be as in Section 2.2. For every n ∈ N and
x ∈ R we set
Kn(x) = c+ λΦn(x),
with the function Φn as in Lemma 2.20, and
Vn(x) = sup
u∈Ux
Jn(x;u) = sup
u∈Ux
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtR(Xt)dt−
∑
k
e−ρτkKn(Xτk)
]
,
with the set Ux, the constant ρ and the function R as in Section 2.2.
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Notice that in Vn the mollified function Φn has been used only in the penalty
function. Indeed, we have no need to use Φn also in the running cost R, as we have
seen that the regularity problem just relies in the singularities of the penalty K.
We now show that the functions Vn converge to V , as n→∞. The convergence
result is preceded by a technical lemma, where some estimates are proved.
Lemma 2.22. Let V as in Definition 2.2 and let Vn as in Definition 2.21, with
n ∈ N. The following estimates hold.
1. The functions Vn, V are bounded from below by a polynomial: for every n ∈ N
and x ∈ R we have
Vn(x), V (x) ≥ p(x), (2.66)
where p is a second-degree polynomial whose coefficients depend only on ∆, b, ρ.
2. For every n ∈ N, x ∈ R and every control u ∈ Ux, we have
|Jn(x;u)− J(x;u)| ≤ λ‖Φn − Φ‖∞Ex
[∑
k
e−ρτk
]
, (2.67)
where the expectation in the right-hand side is finite.
Proof. Estimate (2.66). Let x ∈ R and let u0 ∈ Ux be the control corresponding to
the policy with no interventions. By the definition of V and as R ≥ f , see Section
2.2.1, we have
V (x) ≥ J(x;u0) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtR(Xt)dt
]
≥ Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtf(Xt)dt
]
.
By the definition of f in (2.10) and the Fubini-Tonelli theorem, we have
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtf(Xt)dt
]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(−αEx[X2t ] + βEx[Xt]− γ)dt.
As Xt corresponds to the process with no interventions, we have
Xt = x− µt− σWt, Ex[Xt] = x− µt, Ex[X2t ] = (x− µt)2 + σ2t.
As a consequence, by integrating by parts it is immediate to see that∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(−αEx[X2t ] + βEx[Xt]− γ)dt = p(x),
where p is a second-degree polynomial. The result holds for Vn as well, since the
functions V and Vn differ only in the penalty part, which plays no role in this proof.
Estimate (2.67). Let n ∈ N, x ∈ R and u ∈ Ux. By definition, we have
|Jn(x;u)− J(x;u)| ≤ Ex
[∑
k
e−ρτk
∣∣Kn(X(τk)−)−K(X(τk)−)∣∣]
= λEx
[∑
k
e−ρτk
∣∣Φn(X(τk)−)− Φ(X(τk)−)∣∣] ≤ λ‖Φn − Φ‖∞Ex[∑
k
e−ρτk
]
.
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To conclude the proof we have to show that the expectation is finite. Since u is
admissible, by (2.8) we have
Ex
[∑
k
e−ρτk
(
λΦ
(
X(τk)−
)
+c
)]
= λEx
[∑
k
e−ρτkΦ
(
X(τk)−
)]
+cEx
[∑
k
e−ρτk
]
<∞,
so that both the terms in the right-hand side are finite.
Notice that the expectation in (2.67) depends on x and u: a key-point when deal-
ing with (2.67) is then to remove such dependence. We now prove the convergence
of the value functions Vn.
Proposition 2.23. Let V as in Definition 2.2 and let Vn as in Definition 2.21,
with n ∈ N. The functions Vn converge to V as n → ∞, uniformly on the compact
subsets.
Proof. Let x ∈ R. By the definition of V (x), for each ε > 0 there exists a control
uε = uε(x) ∈ Ux such that V (x) − ε < J(x, uε). Since the function R is bounded
from above and since K(·) > c, we first notice that
J(x, uε) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtR(Xt)dt−
∑
k
e−ρτkK(X(τk)−)
]
≤ C − cEx
[∑
k
e−ρτk
]
,
for a suitable constant C > 0. Then, by the definition of uε and by Estimate (2.66)
we have
Ex
[∑
k
e−ρτk
]
≤ 1
c
(C−J(x, uε)) ≤ 1
c
(C−V (x)+ε) ≤ 1
c
(C−p(x)+ε) = q(x)+ε/c,
where q(x) = (C−p(x))/c is a second-degree polynomial. Hence, by estimate (2.67)
we get
J(x, uε) ≤ Jn(x, uε)+λ‖Φn−Φ‖∞Ex
[∑
k
e−ρτk
]
≤ Vn(x)+λ‖Φn−Φ‖∞(q(x)+ε/c).
Finally, as ε→ 0+ we have
V (x) ≤ Vn(x) + λq(x)‖Φn − Φ‖∞. (2.68)
Let now n ∈ N. By arguing exactly as in the first step (we just switch Vn with V
and Jn with J), we get
Vn(x) ≤ V (x) + λq(x)‖Φn − Φ‖∞. (2.69)
As Estimates (2.68) and (2.69) hold for every x ∈ R, we finally get
‖Vn − V ‖∞ ≤ λq(x)‖Φn − Φ‖∞,
which concludes the proof.
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Second step. We now try to build candidates for V and Vn. As usual, the
starting point of this procedure is the QVI problem in (2.17).
A natural candidate for V is
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕ(x), in ]
¯
x, x¯[,
ϕ(x∗)− c− λΦ(x), in R\]
¯
x, x¯[,
where

ϕ′(x∗) = 0, ϕ′′(x∗) < 0,
ϕ′(
¯
x) = −λΦ′(
¯
x),
ϕ′(x¯) = −λΦ′(x¯),
ϕ(
¯
x) = ϕ(x∗)− c− λΦ(
¯
x),
ϕ(x¯) = ϕ(x∗)− c− λΦ(x¯),
(2.70)
where the function ϕ = ϕA1,A2 is as in (2.20) and we ask 0 < ¯
x < x∗ < x¯ < ∆.
Similarly, a natural candidate for Vn is
V˜n(x)=
{
ϕ(x), in ]
¯
xn, x¯n[,
ϕ(x∗)−c−λΦn(x), in R\]
¯
xn, x¯n[,
where

ϕ′(x∗n) = 0, ϕ′′(x∗n) < 0,
ϕ′(
¯
xn) = −λΦ′n(¯xn),
ϕ′(x¯n) = −λΦ′n(x¯n),
ϕ(
¯
xn)=ϕ(x
∗)−c−λΦn(
¯
xn),
ϕ(x¯n)=ϕ(x
∗)−c−λΦn(x¯n),
(2.71)
where the function ϕ = ϕAn1 ,An2 is as in (2.20) and we ask 0 < ¯
xn < x
∗
n < x¯n < ∆.
The conditions on the coefficients in (2.70) and (2.71) are very close to each
other. Indeed, since 0 <
¯
x < x∗ < x¯ < ∆, for n big enough (say n ≥ N) we have
¯
x, x∗, x¯ ∈ ]1/n,∆− 1/n[ ⊆ {y : Φ(y) = Φn(y)}.
It follows that, for n ≥ N , we have
Φ(y) = Φn(y) = −(y −∆)/∆, Φ′(y) = Φ′n(y) = −1/∆, y ∈ {¯x, x
∗, x¯}.
As a consequence, if the 5-uple (A1, A2, x
∗,
¯
x, x¯) is a solution to (2.70), then it is
also a solution to (2.71), for n ≥ N . In short, we have seen that, given a candidate
for V , we immediately have a candidate for Vn. We summarize these arguments in
the following definition.
Definition 2.24. For each n ∈ N and x ∈ R, we set
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕA1,A2(x), in ]¯
x, x¯[,
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c− λΦ(x), in R\]
¯
x, x¯[,
(2.72)
V˜n(x) =
{
ϕA1,A2(x), in ]¯
x, x¯[,
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c− λΦn(x), in R\]
¯
x, x¯[,
(2.73)
where ϕA1,A2 is as in (2.20) and the five parameters (A1, A2, ¯
x, x¯, x∗) satisfy
0 <
¯
x < x∗ < x¯ < ∆ (2.74)
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and the following conditions:
ϕ′A1,A2(x
∗) = 0 and ϕ′′A1,A2(x
∗) < 0, (optimality of x∗)
ϕ′A1,A2(¯
x) = λ/∆, (C1-pasting in
¯
x)
ϕ′A1,A2(x¯) = λ/∆, (C
1-pasting in x¯)
ϕA1,A2(¯
x) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c+ λ/∆(
¯
x−∆), (C0-pasting in
¯
x)
ϕA1,A2(x¯) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c+ λ/∆(x¯−∆). (C0-pasting in x¯)
(2.75)
Third step. As anticipated, the problems Vn have smooth penalty functions,
so that it seems plausible to use the classical verification theorem. Assume for
a moment that in this way one proves that V˜n actually corresponds to the value
function, i.e. that V˜n = Vn. Then, by passing to the limit, it immediately follows
that V˜ = V and we also know the optimal control, as shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 2.25. Assume that there exists n ∈ N such that V˜n = Vn for n ≥ N , with
Vn as in Definition 2.21. Then, the function V˜ is the value function of the non-
smooth problem: V˜ = V , with V as in Definition 2.2. Moreover, an optimal control
exists and is given by (2.44).
Proof. Since Vn → V by Proposition 2.23 and V˜n → V˜ by Definition 2.24, from the
assumption V˜n = Vn it immediately follows that V˜ = V .
As for the second part, let x ∈ R and let u∗(x) be defined as in (2.44). Since
Xx;u
∗(x) ∈ ]
¯
x, x¯[ by the definition of u∗(x) and since V = V˜ ∈ C∞(]
¯
x, x¯[), one can
apply Itoˆ’s formula and argue as in the standard verification theorem to prove that
u∗(x) is the optimal control. For the reader’s convenience, we here briefly report
such arguments. To shorten the notations, we write u∗ = u∗(x) and X = Xx;u∗(x);
by applying the Itoˆ formula, we get
V (x) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(AV − ρV )(Xt)dt+
∑
k
e−ρτ
∗
k
(
V (Xτ∗k )− V (X(τ∗k )−)
)]
.
By the definition of u∗ we have
(AV −ρV +f)(Xt) = 0 and V
(
X(τ∗k )−
)
=MV (X(τ∗k )−) = V (x∗)−c−λΦ(X(τ∗k )−).
Since Xτ∗k = x
∗ (the process has just been shifted to the optimal value), we finally
have
V (x) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtf(Xt)dt−
∑
k
e−ρτ
∗
k
(
c+ λΦ
(
X(τ∗k )−
))]
= J(x, u∗),
as R(Xt) = f(Xt) since X ∈]
¯
x, x¯[, which concludes the proof.
Finally, we just have to prove that V˜n = Vn by using the Verification Theorem
2.4. Unfortunately, this is still an open problem, as we explain in the next section.
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2.4.2 Penalty functions and concavity: an open problem
As anticipated, in this section we explain why the claim V˜n = Vn is, at the moment,
an open problem.
Proposition 2.26 (Tentative). There exists N ∈ N such that V˜n = Vn for n ≥ N .
Proof. (Tentative). As seen in Proposition 2.11, the key-point is to show that V˜n is
a solution to
max
{AV˜n − ρV˜n +R, MV˜n − V˜n} = 0.
Let us focus on the first term: we need to prove that
AV˜n(x)− ρV˜n(x) +R(x) = σ
2
2
V˜ ′′n (x)− µV˜ ′n(x)− ρV˜n(x) +R(x) ≤ 0,
for each x ∈ R. Let us consider, in particular, the case x ∈ [−1/n, 1/n]. For n big
enough, by definition here we have V˜n(x) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗) − c − λΦn(x), so that we
have to prove that
− λσ
2
2
Φ′′n(x) + λµΦ
′
n(x)− ρ
(
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c− λΦn(x)
)
+R(x) ≤ 0, (2.76)
for every x ∈ [−1/n, 1/n]. Now, the functions Φn have the following properties in
x = 0:
Φn(0) ∈ [1−∆/n, 1], Φ′n(0) ∈ [−1/∆, 0], limn Φ
′′
n(0) = −∞, (2.77)
where the first two properties are immediate and the third one follows by Φ′′n(0) < 0
(immediate, as Φ is concave in a neighbourhood of 0) and the Lagrange theorem:
∆ = |Φ′n(1/n)− Φ′n(−1/n)| ≤ sup
[−1/n,1/n]
|Φ′′n|(2/n).
Since (2.77) holds, it is clear that (2.76) cannot be true in x = 0. Hence, in the
present framework we cannot apply the verification theorem to our candidate.
In short, our candidate V˜n does not satisfy the assumptions of the verification
theorem. We now collect some remarks about this issue.
• [Importance of a rigorous procedure] When dealing with verification theorems
in control theory, one first builds a candidate and then checks if it really
satisfies all the assumptions of the theorem. Although this final passage is
usually omitted and considered as obvious, we underline that it should not be
underestimated. On the one hand, the proof presents, even in standard cases,
some non-trivial parts and may require further conditions on the coefficients
(see Proposition 2.11); on the other hand, we have provided an explicit example
where the candidate value function, built by starting from the verification
theorem, does not actually satisfy the assumptions of the theorem itself.
• [Singularities successfully overcome] We underline that our issue consists in ap-
plying the verification theorem to Vn, which is a problem with smooth penalty.
Indeed, the approximating procedure has worked and we have been able to
overcome the singularities in the penalty function.
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• [Research area: non-standard penalty function] In the literature, all the explicit
examples of stochastic impulsive problems have constant or linear penalty
functions. However, it is clear that many practical models need penalties
with a more complicated structure (for example, one can consider truncated
penalties, like in our case). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that a non-standard penalty function is considered, and we have seen that the
situation is not straightforward.
We are currently working on this open problem, according to the remarks above. In
particular, we focus on the properties required to penalty functions.
2.4.3 A way out by stronger conditions on the controls
We here show a way to circumvent the problem outlined in the previous section,
provided that stronger conditions on the admissible controls are required. More
precisely, if we force the retailer to keep the process X in the interval ]0,∆[, the
singularities of the penalty no longer belong to the set where the value function is
defined and the standard arguments can be applied. We now detail this procedure.
From now on, let us assume that the following condition is also required to
admissible controls u ∈ Ux (besides the ones in Definition 2.1), with x ∈ R:
Xx;ut ∈ ]0,∆[, ∀t ≥ 0. (2.78)
Practically, (2.78) forces the retailer to intervene (at least) every time his market
share hits 0 or 1; in other words, we do not admit situations where the retailer has no
customers or where he holds the monopoly of the market. Indeed, this assumption
is quite strong, but realistic and reasonable as well.
In this new framework, it makes sense to define the value function V only in the
interval ]0,∆[; explicitly, for each x ∈ ]0,∆[ we have
V (x)= sup
u∈Ux s.t.
Xx;u∈]0,∆[
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
XtΦ(Xt)− b
2
Φ(Xt)
2
)
dt−
∑
k
e−ρτk
(
c− λ
∆
(
X(τk)−−∆
))]
.
We underline that the second term in the intervention penalty is non-negative by
(2.78). The candidate V˜ is now defined as follows.
Definition 2.27. For each x ∈ ]0,∆[, we set
V˜ (x) =
{
ϕA1,A2(x), in ]¯
x, x¯[,
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c+ λ/∆(x−∆), in ]0,∆[\]
¯
x, x¯[,
where ϕA1,A2 is as in (2.20) and the five parameters (A1, A2, ¯
x, x¯, x∗) satisfy the
conditions (2.74)-(2.75).
As in Section 2.3.3, the system in (2.74)-(2.75) is not tractable analitically; hence,
we have to assume that a solution actually exists.
Assumption 2.28. We assume that a solution to (2.74)-(2.75) exists. Moreover,
we assume that there exist x˜1, x˜2, with
¯
x < x˜1 < x
∗ < x˜2 < x¯, such that ϕ′′A1,A2 < 0
in ]x˜1, x˜2[ and ϕ
′′
A1,A2
> 0 in ]
¯
x, x˜1[∪ ]x˜2, x¯[. Finally, we assume
¯
x < xˆ < x¯, where
we have set xˆ = xv − (ρλ)/(2α∆).
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As anticipated, now the penalty has no singularities in the set where V is defined,
so that apply the standard theory and argue as in Section 2.3.
Lemma 2.29. Let (2.78) and Assumption 2.28 hold and let V˜ be as in Definition
2.27. Then, for every x ∈ ]0,∆[ we have
MV˜ (x) = ϕA1,A2(x∗)− c+
λ
∆
(x−∆).
In particular, we have
{MV˜ − V˜ < 0} = ]
¯
x, x¯[, {MV˜ − V˜ = 0} = ]0,∆[ \ ]
¯
x, x¯[.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one in Lemma 2.18, with some modifications due
to the presence of the variable term in the penalty. First of all, let us study the
monotonicity of V˜ :
- V˜ is strictly increasing in ]0,
¯
x[ and ]x¯,∆[ by definition;
- V˜ is strictly increasing in ]
¯
x, x∗[ (by (2.75) we have ϕ′A1,A2(¯
x), ϕ′A1,A2(x
∗) ≥
0 and by Assumption 2.28 the function ϕ′A1,A2 is first increasing and then
decreasing in ]
¯
x, x∗[, so that V˜ ′ = ϕ′A1,A2 > 0 in ]¯
x, x∗[) and strictly decreasing
in ]x∗, x¯[ (by similar arguments).
It follows that sup]0,∆[ V˜ ∈ {V˜ (x∗), V˜ (∆−)} and that inf ]0,∆[ V˜ ∈ {V˜ (0+), V˜ (x¯)}.
By (2.75) it is immediate to see that V˜ (x∗) > V˜ (∆−) and that V˜ (0+) < V˜ (x¯), so
that we finally have
max
y∈]0,∆[
V˜ (y) = V˜ (x∗) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗), inf
y∈]0,∆[
V˜ (y) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c− λ.
As a consequence, for every x ∈ ]0,∆[ we have
MV˜ (x) = max
δ :x+δ∈]0,∆[
{V˜ (x+ δ)− c+ λ/∆(x−∆)} = ϕA1,A2(x∗)− c+ λ/∆(x−∆).
By the definition of V˜ , we have
MV˜ (x)− V˜ (x) = 0, in ]0,∆[\]
¯
x, x¯[.
Moreover, as ϕA1,A2(¯
x) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗) − c + λ/∆(
¯
x −∆) by (2.75) and ϕA1,A2(¯x) =
min[
¯
x,x¯] ϕA1,A2 by the previous arguments, we have
MV˜ (x)− V˜ (x) = ϕA1,A2(x∗)− c+ λ/∆(x−∆)− ϕA1,A2(x)
=
(
ϕA1,A2(¯
x)− ϕA1,A2(x)
)− λ/∆(
¯
x− x) < 0, in ]
¯
x, x¯[,
which concludes the proof.
Proposition 2.30. Let (2.78) and Assumption 2.28 hold. Then, for every x ∈]0,∆[
an optimal control u∗(x) for the problem in Section 2.2 exists and is given by (2.44).
Moreover, V˜ coincides with the value function: foe every x ∈ R we have
V˜ (x) = V (x) = J(x;u∗(x)).
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Proof. First of all, the condition in (2.78) does not change anything in the proof
of the verification theorem, which still holds. Hence, we can use exactly the same
arguments as the ones in Proposition 2.11, with minor modifications.
The only difference, due to the presence of the variable part in the penalty, is in
the proof of
AV˜ (x)− ρV˜ (x) +R(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈]0,∆[\]
¯
x, x¯[.
We prove the claim for x ∈ [x¯,∆[, the case x ∈ ]0,
¯
x] being similar. Since for
x ∈ [x¯,∆[ we have V˜ (x) = ϕA1,A2(x∗)− c + λ/∆(x−∆) by the definition of V˜ (x),
the inequality reads
−λµ
∆
− ρ
(
ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c+ λ
∆
(x−∆)
)
+R(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯,∆[.
As ϕA1,A2(x¯) = ϕA1,A2(x
∗)− c+ λ/∆(x¯−∆) by (2.75), we can rewrite as
−λµ
∆
− ρ
(
ϕA1,A2(x¯) +
λ
∆
(x− x¯)
)
+R(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯,∆[.
The function x 7→ R(x) − ρλ/∆ is decreasing in [x¯,∆[ by Assumption 2.28 (imme-
diate check on the derivative); then, it is enough to prove the claim in x = x¯:
−λµ
∆
− ρϕA1,A2(x¯) +R(x¯) ≤ 0.
Since AϕA1,A2(x¯)− ρϕA1,A2(x¯) + f(x¯) = 0 and f(x¯) = R(x¯), we can rewrite as
−λµ
∆
− σ
2
2
ϕ′′A1,A2(x¯) + µϕ
′
A1,A2(x¯) ≤ 0;
as ϕ′A1,A2(x¯) = λ/∆ by (2.75), we finally have
−σ
2
2
ϕ′′A1,A2(x¯) ≤ 0,
which is true since ϕ′′A1,A2(x¯) ≥ 0 by Assumption 2.28.
In short, if we impose the condition in (2.78) to admissible controls and if As-
sumption 2.28 holds, we can bypass the problem related to the singularities of Φ
and characterize the value function and the optimal control.

Chapter 3
Non-zero-sum stochastic
differential games with impulse
controls
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we provide a general framework for non-zero-sum stochastic games
with impulse controls. Within this setting, we investigate the notion of Nash equi-
librium through the corresponding quasi-variational inequalities. To the best of our
knowledge, this class of games has not been addressed in the literature yet.
The theory of optimal stopping games dates back to the seventies: two players
are present and each one decides when to intervene and stop the game. In the zero-
sum case such problem has been studied in [21], whereas the non-zero-sum case was
treated in [4]. To our knowledge, the only explicit application of the techniques in
[4] is a very recent paper: see [13]. Conversely, if we consider games with iterate
interventions by means of stopping times, i.e. with impulsive controls, the references
in the literature are very few and exclusively related to the zero-sum case, see [14].
The goal of this chapter, as anticipated, is to address the non-zero-sum impulsive
case: more precisely, we provide a rigorous framework for such problems, introduce
Nash equilibria, define a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities (QVI) and
prove a verification theorem. We anticipate that the QVI problem in [14] can here
be obtained as a particular case. Finally, a practical example will be provided.
More in detail, we consider problems where two players can affect a continuous-
time stochastic process X by discrete-time interventions. Each intervention, which
consists in shifting X to a new state, corresponds to a cost for the intervening player
and to a gain for the opponent. When none of the players intervenes, we assume X
to diffuse according to a standard SDE. In our model, the action of player i ∈ {1, 2}
is determined by the couple ϕi = (Ai, ξi), where Ai is a subset of Rn and ξi is a
continuous function: player i intervenes if and only if the controlled process exits
from Ai and, when this happens, he shifts the process from the state x to the state
ξi(x). Let S be a fixed subset of Rn and let x ∈ S be the starting state of the game;
the goal of player i is to maximize his payoff J i, defined as follows: for each ϕ1, ϕ2
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and i ∈ {1, 2} we set
J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds+
∑
1≤k≤Mi : τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,kφi
(
X(τi,k)− , δi,k
)
+
∑
1≤k≤Mj : τj,k<τS
e−ρiτj,kψi
(
X(τj,k)− , δj,k
)
+ e−ρiτShi
(
X(τS)−
)
1{τS<+∞}
]
, (3.1)
where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i, the exit time from S is denoted by τS , the variable τi,k is
the k-th intervention time of player i and δi,k is the corresponding impulse (so that
ui = {(τi,k, δi,k)}1≤k≤Mi is the impulse control collecting player i’s intervention).
The Nash equilibria for problem (3.1) are defined in the usual way.
Let V1(x) and V2(x) denote the value of the game with starting state x ∈ R, in
the case where a Nash equilibrium exists. We consider the following QVI problem,
where Mi and Hi are suitable operators:
Vi = hi, in ∂S,
MjVj − Vj ≤ 0, in S,
HiVi − Vi = 0, in {MjVj − Vj = 0},
max
{AVi − ρiVi + fi,MiVi − Vi} = 0, in {MjVj − Vj < 0}.
(3.2)
The main result of this chapter is the Verification Theorem 3.8: if two functions
Vi, with i ∈ {1, 2}, are a solution to (3.2), have polynomial growth and satisfy the
regularity condition
Vi ∈ C2(Dj \ ∂Di) ∩ C1(Dj) ∩ C(S), (3.3)
where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i and Dj = {MjVj −Vj < 0}, then they coincide with the
value functions of the game and a characterization of the Nash strategy is possible.
Practically, one first tries to solve the last equation in (3.2), then sets the pa-
rameters so as to meet the regularity conditions in (3.3) (it will be clear during the
chapter that this corresponds to a system of algebraic equations) and finally applies
the verification theorem. In general, if the regularity conditions are too strong, the
system may have more equations than parameters, so that there is (almost) no pos-
sibility to apply the verification theorem. In our opinion, this is the main weakness
in [4]: indeed, we have found only one explicit application of [4], see [13], and relaxed
conditions are needed. In our case, a practical example will show that the system
is formally solvable. In short, an important contribution in this chapter consists in
(3.3): it is the right condition for our problem, in the sense that it allows to prove
the verification theorem but it also makes possible to practically apply this theorem.
As anticipated, besides developing a general theory for this class of problems, we
show how to apply the verification theorem to a practical example. We consider a
problem where two countries can affect the exchange rate between their currencies.
The countries have different goals and we investigate the existence of Nash equilibria
for this problem, which can be modelled in the form (3.1).
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we give a rigorous formal-
ization to the problem in (3.1), define the equation of the QVI problem and prove
the verification theorem. In Section 3.3 we apply the general theorem to the specific
example outlined above.
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3.2 Non-zero-sum impulsive games
In this section we consider a general class of two-player non-zero-sum stochastic
differential games with impulse controls: after a rigorous formalization (Section
3.2.1), we define a suitable differential problem for the value functions of such games
(Section 3.2.2) and prove a verification theorem (Section 3.2.3).
3.2.1 Formulation of the problem
Let (Ω, F , {Fs}s∈[0,∞[, P) be a filtered probability space and let {Ws}s∈[0,∞[ be a
k-dimensional {Fs}s-adapted Brownian motion; let S be an open subset of Rd. For
every t ∈ [0,∞[ and y ∈ S we denote by Y t,y a solution to the problem
dY t,ys = b(Y
t,y
s )ds+ σ(Y
t,y
s )dWs, s ∈ [t,∞[, (3.4)
with initial condition Y t,yt = y, where b : Rd → Rd and σ : Rd → Rd×k are given
continuous functions. We will later provide precise conditions ensuring that the
process Y t,y is well-defined.
Two players, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, are present. Equation (3.4) models the under-
lying process when none of the players intervenes; conversely, if player i intervenes
with impulse δ ∈ Zi, the process is shifted from the present state x to the new state
Γi(x, δ), where Γi : Rd ×Zi → S is a continuous function and Zi is a fixed subset of
Rli , with li ∈ N. Each intervention corresponds to a cost for the intervening player
and to a gain for the opponent, both depending on the state x and the impulse δ.
The action of the players is modelled by discrete-time controls: an impulse con-
trol for player i is a sequence
ui = {(τi,k, δi,k)}1≤k≤Mi , (3.5)
where Mi ∈ N ∪ {∞}, {τi,k}k are non-decreasing stopping times (the intervention
times) and {δi,k}k are Zi-valued Fτi,k -measurable random variables (the correspond-
ing impulses).
As usual with multiple-control games, we assume that the behaviour of the play-
ers, modelled by impulse controls, is driven by strategies. In this paper, the definition
is as follows.
Definition 3.1. A strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a couple ϕi = (Ai, ξi), where Ai
is a fixed subset of Rd and ξi is a continuous function from Rd to Zi.
Strategies determine the action of the players in the following sense. Once the
couples ϕi = (Ai, ξi) and a starting point x ∈ S have been chosen, a couple of
impulse controls, which we denote ui(x;ϕ1, ϕ2), is uniquely defined by the following
procedure:
- player i intervenes if and only if the process exits from Ai,
in which case the impulse is given by ξi(y), where y is the state;
- a contemporary intervention is not possible: if both the players want
to act, player 1 has the priority and player 2 does not intervene;
- the game ends when the process exits from S.
(3.6)
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In the following definition we provide a rigorous formalization of the controls asso-
ciated to a couple of strategies and the corresponding controlled process, which we
denote by Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2 .
Definition 3.2. Let x ∈ S and let ϕi = (Ai, ξi) be a strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let τ˜0 = 0, x0 = x, X˜
0 = Y τ˜0,x0 , αS0 = ∞ and consider the conventions inf ∅ = ∞
and [∞,∞[= ∅; for every k ∈ N we define, by induction,
αOk = inf{s > τ˜k−1 : X˜k−1s /∈ O}, [exit time from O ⊆ Rd]
τ˜k = (α
A1
k ∧ αA2k ∧ αSk )1{τ˜k−1<αSk−1} + τ˜k−11{τ˜k−1=αSk−1}, [intervention time]
mk = 1{αA1k ≤α
A2
k }
+ 21{αA2k <α
A1
k }
, [index of the player interv. at τ˜k]
δ˜k = ξmk
(
X˜k−1τ˜k
)
1{τ˜k<∞}, [impulse]
xk = Γ
mk
(
X˜k−1τ˜k , δ˜k
)
1{τ˜k<∞}, [starting point for the next step]
X˜k = X˜k−11[0,τ˜k[ + Y
τ˜k,xk1[τ˜k,∞[. [contr. process up to the k-th interv.]
Let k¯ ∈ N ∪ {∞} be the index of the last significant intervention, and let Mi ∈
N ∪ {∞} be the number of interventions of player i:
k¯ := sup
{
k ∈ N : Px(τ˜k = αSk ) < 1 and Px(τ˜k =∞) < 1
}
,
Mi :=
∑
1≤k≤k¯ 1{mk=i}(k).
For i ∈ {1, 2} and 1 ≤ k ≤ Mi, let η(i, k) = min{l ∈ N :
∑
1≤h≤l 1{mh=i} = k}
(index of the k-th intervention of player i) and let
τi,k := τ˜η(i,k), δi,k := δ˜η(i,k). (3.7)
Finally, the controls ui(x, ϕ1, ϕ2), i ∈ {1, 2}, the controlled process Xx,ϕ1,ϕ2 and
the exit time from S are defined by (with the convention inf ∅ =∞)
ui(x, ϕ1, ϕ2) := {(τi,k, δi,k)}1≤k≤Mi ,
Xx,ϕ1,ϕ2 := X˜ k¯,
τx;ϕ1,ϕ2S = inf{s > 0 : Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2s /∈ S}.
To shorten the notations, we will simply write X and τS . Notice that player 1
has priority in case of contemporary intervention (i.e. if αA1k = α
A2
k ). In the following
lemma we give a rigorous formulation to the properties outlined in (3.6).
Lemma 3.3. Let x ∈ S and let ϕi = (Ai, ξi) be a strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2}.
- The process X admits the following representation (with convention [∞,∞[=∅):
Xs =
k¯−1∑
k=0
Y τ˜k,xks 1[τ˜k,τ˜k+1[(s) + Y
τ˜k¯,xk¯
s 1[τ˜k¯,∞[(s), (3.8)
- The process X is right-continuous. In detail, X is continuous and satisfies
Equation (3.4) in [0,∞[ \ {τi,k : τi,k < ∞}, whereas X is discontinuous in
{τi,k : τi,k <∞}, where we have
Xτi,k = Γ
i
(
X(τi,k)− , δi,k
)
, δi,k = ξi
(
X(τi,k)−
)
, X(τi,k)− ∈ ∂Ai. (3.9)
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- The process X never exits from the set A1 ∩A2.
Proof. We just prove the first property in (3.9), the other ones being immediate.
Let i ∈ {1, 2}, 1 ≤ k ≤Mi with τi,k <∞ and set σ = η(i, k), with η as in Definition
3.2. By (3.7), (3.8) and Definition 3.2, we have
Xτi,k = Xτ˜σ = Y
τ˜σ ,xσ
τ˜σ
= xσ = Γ
i
(
X˜σ−1τ˜σ , δ˜σ
)
= Γi
(
X˜σ−1
(τ˜σ)− , δ˜σ
)
= Γi
(
X(τ˜σ)− , δ˜σ
)
= Γi
(
X(τi,k)− , δi,k
)
,
which concludes the proof (we have used the continuity of the process X˜σ−1 in
[τ˜σ−1,∞[ and the fact that X˜σ−1 ≡ X in [0, τ˜σ[).
Each player aims at maximizing his payoff, consisting in four discounted terms: a
running payoff, the costs due to the player’s own interventions, the gains due to the
opponent’s interventions and a terminal payoff. More precisely, for each i ∈ {1, 2}
we consider ρi > 0 (the discount rate) and continuous functions fi : Rd → R
(the running payoff), hi : Rd → R (the terminal payoff) and φi : Rd × Zi → R,
ψi : Rd × Zj → R (the intervention penalties/gains), where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i;
the payoff of player i is defined as follows.
Definition 3.4. Let x ∈ S and let (ϕ1, ϕ2) be a couple of strategies. For each
i ∈ {1, 2}, provided that the right-hand side exists and is finite, we set
J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds+
∑
1≤k≤Mi : τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,kφi
(
X(τi,k)− , δi,k
)
+
∑
1≤k≤Mj : τj,k<τS
e−ρiτj,kψi
(
X(τj,k)− , δj,k
)
+ e−ρiτShi
(
X(τS)−
)
1{τS<+∞}
]
, (3.10)
where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i and {(τi,k, δi,k)}1≤k≤Mi is the impulse controls of player
i associated to the strategies ϕ1, ϕ2.
As usual in control theory, the subscript in the expectation recalls the starting
point. Notice that we do not consider stopping times which equal τS : indeed, since
τS is the final time, we would pay exercise penalties without changing anything.
In order to have a good definition in (3.10), we now define the set of admissible
strategies in x ∈ S.
Definition 3.5. Let x∈S and ϕi=(Ai, ξi) be a strategy for player i∈{1,2}. We use
the notations of Definition 3.2 and say that the couple (ϕ1, ϕ2) is x-admissible if:
1. for every k ∈ N ∪ {0}, the process Y τ˜k,xk exists and is uniquely defined;
2. for i ∈ {1, 2}, the following variables are in L1(Ω):∫ τS
0
e−ρis|fi|(Xs)ds, e−ρiτS |hi|(X(τS)−),∑
τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,k |φi|(X(τi,k)− , δi,k),
∑
τi,k<τS
e−ρiτi,k |ψi|(X(τi,k)− , δi,k);
(3.11)
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3. for each k ∈ N, the process ‖X‖∞ = supt≥0 |Xt| is in Lk(Ω):
Ex[‖X‖k∞] <∞; (3.12)
4. if τi,k = τi,k+1 for some i ∈ {1, 2} and 1 ≤ k ≤Mi, then τi,k = τi,k+1 = τS;
5. if there exists limk τi,k =: η for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then η = τS.
We denote by Ax the set of the x-admissible couples.
Thanks to the first and the second conditions in Definition 3.5, the controls
ui(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) and the payoffs J
i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) are well-defined. The third condition will
be used in the proof of the verification theorem. As for the fourth and the fifth
conditions, they prevent each player to exercise twice at the same time and to
accumulate the interventions before τS .
We conclude the section with the definition of Nash equilibria.
Definition 3.6. Given x ∈ S, we say that a couple (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Ax is a Nash equilib-
rium of the game if
J1(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2), ∀ϕ1 s.t. (ϕ1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Ax,
J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) ≥ J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ2), ∀ϕ2 s.t. (ϕ∗1, ϕ2) ∈ Ax.
Finally, the value functions of the game are defined as follows: if x ∈ S and a Nash
equilibrium (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Ax exists, we set Vi(x) = J i(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
3.2.2 The quasi-variational inequality problem
We now introduce the differential problem satisfied by the value functions of our
games: this will be the key-point of the verification theorem in the next section.
Let us consider an impulsive game as in Section 3.2.1. Assume that the corre-
sponding value functions V1, V2 are defined for each x ∈ S and that the following
property is satisfied: for i ∈ {1, 2} there exists a function δi from S to Zi such that
{δi(x)} = arg max
δ∈Zi
{
Vi(Γ
i(x, δ)) + φi(x, δ)
}
, (3.13)
for each x ∈ S. We define the four intervention operators by
MiVi(x) = Vi
(
Γi(x, δi(x))
)
+ φi
(
x, δi(x)
)
,
HiVi(x) = Vi
(
Γj(x, δj(x))
)
+ ψi
(
x, δj(x)
)
,
(3.14)
for x ∈ S and i, j∈{1, 2}, with i 6=j. Notice thatMiVi=maxδ{Vi(Γi(·, δ))+φi(·, δ)}.
The functions in (3.13) and (3.14) have an immediate practical interpretation.
Let x be the current state of the process; if player i (resp. player j) intervenes with
impulse δ, the present value of the game for player i can be written as Vi(Γ
i(x, δ)) +
φi(x, δ) (resp. Vi(Γ
j(x, δ)) + ψi(x, δ)): we have considered the intervention cost
(resp. gain) and the value in the new state. Hence, δi(x) is the impulse that player
i would use in case of intervention. Similarly, MiVi(x) (resp. HiVi(x)) represents
the value of the game for player i under the additional assumption that player
i (resp. player j) immediately intervenes. Notice that, as a consequence, player i
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should intervene (with impulse δi(x), as already seen) if and only ifMiVi(x) = Vi(x):
we have an heuristic formulation for the Nash equilibria, provided that an explicit
expression for Vi is available. Indeed, the verification theorem will give a rigorous
proof to this argument. However, in order to practically apply this idea, we first
need to characterize the value functions Vi.
Assume V1, V2 ∈ C2(S) (weaker conditions will be given later) and define
AVi = b · ∇Vi + 1
2
tr
(
σσtD2Vi
)
,
where b, σ are as in (3.4), σt denotes the transpose of σ and ∇Vi, D2Vi are the
gradient and the Hessian matrix of Vi. We are interested in the following quasi-
variational inequalities (QVI) for V1, V2, where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j:
Vi = hi, in ∂S, (3.15a)
MjVj − Vj ≤ 0, in S, (3.15b)
HiVi − Vi = 0, in {MjVj − Vj = 0}, (3.15c)
max
{AVi − ρiVi + fi,MiVi − Vi} = 0, in {MjVj − Vj < 0}. (3.15d)
Indeed, there is a small abuse of notation in (3.15a), as Vi is not defined in ∂S (the
domain is the open set S): we mean limy→x Vi(y) = hi(x), for each x ∈ ∂S.
We now heuristically explain why the conditions in (3.15a)-(3.15d) actually rep-
resent the right differential problem for Vi; once more, the verification theorem will
provide a rigorous proof to this claim. First of all, the terminal condition is obvious.
Moreover, as MjVj represents the value of the game under an additional assump-
tion, we also expectMjVj − Vj ≤ 0: indeed, this is a standard condition in impulse
control theory. Now, if player j intervenes (i.e.MjVj −Vj = 0), by the definition of
Nash equilibrium we expect that player i does not lose anything: this is modelled by
HiVi − Vi = 0. On the contrary, if player j does not intervene (i.e.MjVj − Vj < 0),
then Vi behaves according to the PDE of a standard one-player impulse problem,
that is max
{AVi−ρiVi+fi,MiVi−Vi} = 0. In short, the latter condition says that
AVi − ρiVi + fi ≤ 0, with equality in case of non-intervention (i.e. MiVi − Vi < 0).
We remark that the functions Vi can be unbounded. Indeed, this is the typical
case when the penalties depend on the impulse: when the state diverges to infinity,
one of the player has to pay a bigger and bigger cost to move the process to the con-
tinuation region, which corresponds to a strictly decreasing value function (whereas
the value of the game is strictly increasing for the competitor, who gains from the
opponent’s intervention). As a comparison, we recall that in one-player impulsive
problems the value function is usually bounded from above. Finally, we notice that
the operator AVi appears only in the region {MjVj − Vj < 0}; as a consequence,
the function Vi needs to be of class C
2 only in such region (indeed, this assumption
can be slightly relaxed, as we will see). Again, we remark the difference with the
one-player case, where the value function is asked to be twice differentiable almost
everywhere in S, see [32, Thm. 6.2].
A verification theorem will be provided in the next section. Here, as a preliminary
check on the problem we propose, we show that we are indeed generalizing the
sufficient condition provided in [14], where the zero-sum case is considered. To do
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so, we prove that, if we assume
f := f1 = −f2, φ := φ1 = −ψ2, ψ := ψ1 = −φ2, h := h1 = −h2,
Z := Z1 = Z2, Γ := Γ
1 = Γ2, V := V1 = −V2,
(3.16)
then the problem in (3.15) collapses into the one considered in [14]. To shorten
the equations, we assume ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 (this is possible since in [14] a finite-horizon
problem is considered). First of all, we define
M˜V (x) = sup
δ∈Z
{
V (Γ(x, δ)) + φ(x, δ)
}
,
H˜V (x) = inf
δ∈Z
{
V (Γ(x, δ)) + ψ(x, δ)
}
,
for each x ∈ S. It is easy to see that, under the conditions in (3.16), we have
M1V1 = M˜V, M2V2 = −H˜V, H1V1 = H˜V, H2V2 = −M˜V,
so that problem (3.15) writes
V = h, in ∂S, (3.17a)
M˜V ≤ V ≤ H˜V, in S, (3.17b)
AV + f ≤ 0, in {V = M˜V }, (3.17c)
AV + f = 0, in {M˜V < V < H˜V }, (3.17d)
AV + f ≥ 0, in {V = H˜V }. (3.17e)
Simple computations, reported below, show that problem (3.17) is equivalent to
V = h, in ∂S, (3.18a)
M˜V − V ≤ 0, in S, (3.18b)
min{max{AV + f,M˜V − V }, H˜V − V } = 0, in S, (3.18c)
which is exactly Cosso’s problem, as anticipated. We conclude this section by proving
the equivalence of (3.17) and (3.18).
Lemma 3.7. Problems (3.17) and (3.18) are equivalent.
Proof. Step 1. We prove that (3.17) implies (3.18). The only property to be proved
is (3.18c). We consider three cases.
First, assume V = M˜V . Since AV + f ≤ 0 and M˜V − V = 0, we have
max{AV + f,M˜V − V } = 0, which implies (3.18c) since H˜V − V ≥ 0. Then,
assume M˜V < V < H˜V . Since AV + f = 0 and M˜V − V < 0, we have max{AV +
f,M˜V −V } = 0, which implies (3.18c) since H˜V −V > 0. Finally, assume V = H˜V .
Since AV + f ≥ 0 and M˜V − V ≤ 0, we have max{AV + f,M˜V − V } ≥ 0, which
implies (3.18c) since H˜V − V = 0.
Step 2. We prove that (3.18) implies (3.17). The only properties to be proved
are (3.17c), (3.17d) and (3.17e). We assume M˜V < H˜V (the case M˜V = H˜V being
immediate) and consider three cases.
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First, assume V = M˜V . Since H˜V − V > 0, from (3.18c) it follows that
max{AV + f, 0} = 0, which implies AV + f ≤ 0. Then, assume M˜V < V < H˜V .
Since min{max{α, β}, γ} ∈ {α, β, γ} for every α, β, γ ∈ R, and since M˜V −V < 0 <
H˜V − V , from (3.18c) it follows that AV + f = 0. Finally, assume V = H˜V . From
(3.18c) it follows that max{AV + f,M˜V −V } ≥ 0, which implies AV + f ≥ 0 since
M˜V − V < 0.
3.2.3 A verification theorem
We finally prove a verification theorem for the problems formalized in Section 3.2.1.
Theorem 3.8 (Verification theorem). In the assumptions of Sections 3.2.1, let
i ∈ {1, 2} and let Vi be a function from S to R. Assume that (3.13) holds and set
Di={MiVi−Vi < 0}, with MiVi as in (3.14). Moreover, for i∈{1, 2} assume that:
- Vi is a solution to (3.15);
- Vi ∈ C2(Dj \ ∂Di) ∩ C1(Dj) ∩ C(S) and has polynomial growth;
- ∂Di is a Lipschitz surface and Vi has locally bounded derivatives near ∂Di.
Finally, let x ∈ S and assume that (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Ax, where
ϕ∗i = (Di, δi),
with i ∈ {1, 2}, the set Di as above and the function δi as in (3.13). Then,
(ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) is a Nash equilibrium and Vi(x) = J i(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Remark 3.9. Basically, we are saying that the Nash strategy is characterized as
follows: player i intervenes if and only if the controlled process exits from the region
{MiVi−Vi < 0} (equivalently, if and only ifMiVi(x) = Vi(x), where x is the current
state); when this happens, the impulse is δi(x).
Remark 3.10. In the case of such (candidate) optimal strategies, we notice that
the properties in Lemma 3.3 read as follows (indeed, the notations are a bit heavy,
but in the proof it is fundamental to have explicit indexes in every parameter):
(M1V1 − V1)
(
X
x;ϕ∗1,ϕ2
s
)
< 0, (3.19a)
(M2V2 − V2)
(
X
x;ϕ1,ϕ∗2
s
)
< 0, (3.19b)
δ
x;ϕ∗1,ϕ2
1,k = δ1
(
X
x;ϕ∗1,ϕ2(
τ
x;ϕ∗1,ϕ2
1,k
)−), (3.19c)
δ
x;ϕ1,ϕ∗2
2,k = δ2
(
X
x;ϕ1,ϕ∗2(
τ
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2
2,k
)−), (3.19d)
(M1V1 − V1)
(
X
x;ϕ∗1,ϕ2(
τ
x;ϕ∗1,ϕ2
1,k
)−) = 0, (3.19e)
(M2V2 − V2)
(
X
x;ϕ1,ϕ∗2(
τ
x;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2
2,k
)−) = 0, (3.19f)
for every ϕ1, ϕ2 strategies such that (ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2), (ϕ
∗
1, ϕ2) ∈ Ax, every s ∈ [0,∞[ and
every τ
x;ϕ1,ϕ∗2
i,k , τ
x;ϕ∗1,ϕ2
i,k <∞.
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Proof. By Definition 3.6, we have to prove that
Vi(x) = J
i(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2), V1(x) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2), V2(x) ≥ J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ2),
for every i ∈ {1, 2} and (ϕ1, ϕ2) strategies such that (ϕ1, ϕ∗2) ∈ Ax and (ϕ∗1, ϕ2) ∈ Ax.
We show the results for V1 and J
1, the arguments for V2 and J
2 being symmetric.
Step 1: V1(x) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2). Let ϕ1 be a strategy for player 1 such that
(ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2) ∈ Ax. In this step, the shortened notations have the following meaning:
X = Xx;ϕ1,ϕ
∗
2 , τi,k = τ
x;ϕ1,ϕ∗2
i,k , δi,k = δ
x;ϕ1,ϕ∗2
i,k .
Thanks to the regularity assumptions and by standard approximation arguments, it
is not restrictive to assume V1 ∈ C2(D2)∩C(S): see [32, Thm. 3.1]. For each r > 0
and n ∈ N, we set
τr,n = τS ∧ τr ∧ n,
where τr = inf{s > 0 : Xs /∈ B(0, r)} is the exit time from the ball with radius
r. We apply Itoˆ’s formula to the function (t,Xt) 7→ e−ρ1tV1(Xt), integrate in the
interval [0, τr,n] and take expectations (the initial point and the stochastic integral
are integrable, so that the other terms are integrable too by equality): we get
V1(x)=Ex
[
−
∫ τr,n
0
e−ρ1s(AV1−ρ1V1)(Xs)ds−
∑
τ1,k<τr,n
e−ρ1τ1,k
(
V1
(
Xτ1,k
)−V1(X(τ1,k)−))
−
∑
τ2,k<τr,n
e−ρ1τ2,k
(
V1
(
Xτ2,k
)− V1(X(τ2,k)−))+ e−ρ1τr,nV1(Xτr,n)].
(3.20)
We now estimate each term in the right-hand side of (3.20). As for the first term,
since (M2V2 − V2)(Xs) < 0 by (3.19b), from (3.15d) it follows that
(AV1 − ρ1V1)(Xs) ≤ −f1(Xs), (3.21)
for all s ∈ [0, τS ]. Let us now consider the second term: by (3.15b) and the definition
of M1V1 in (3.14), for every stopping time τ1,k < τS we have
V1
(
X(τ1,k)−
) ≥M1V1(X(τ1,k)−)
= sup
δ∈Z1
{
V1
(
Γ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ
))
+ φ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ
)}
≥ V1
(
Γ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
))
+ φ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
)
= V1
(
Xτ1,k
)
+ φ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
)
. (3.22)
As for the third term, let us consider any stopping time τ2,k < τS . By (3.19f) we
have (M2V2 − V2)
(
X(τ2,k)−
)
= 0; hence, the condition in (3.15c), the definition of
H1V1 in (3.14) and the expression of δ2,k in (3.19d) imply that
V1
(
X(τ2,k)−
)
= H1V1
(
X(τ2,k)−
)
= V1
(
Γ2
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2
(
X(τ2,k)−)
))
+ ψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2
(
X(τ2,k)−)
)
= V1
(
Γ2
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
))
+ ψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
)
= V1
(
Xτ2,k
)
+ ψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
)
. (3.23)
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By (3.20) and the estimates in (3.21)-(3.23) it follows that
V1(x) ≥ Ex
[ ∫ τr,n
0
e−ρ1sf1(Xs)ds+
∑
τ1,k<τr,n
e−ρ1τ1,kφ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
)
+
∑
τ2,k<τr,n
e−ρ1τ2,kψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
)
+ e−ρ1τr,nV1(Xτr,n)
]
.
Thanks to the conditions in (3.11), (3.12) and the polynomial growth of V1, we can
use the dominated convergence theorem and pass to the limit, first as r → ∞ and
then as n→∞. In particular, for the fourth term we notice that
V1(Xτr,n) ≤ C(1 + |Xτr,n |k) ≤ C(1 + ‖X‖k∞) ∈ L1(Ω), (3.24)
for suitable constants C > 0 and k ∈ N; the corresponding limit immediately follows
by the continuity of V1 in the case τS < ∞ and by (3.24) itself in the case τS = ∞
(as a direct consequence of (3.12), we have ‖X‖k∞ <∞ a.s.). Hence, we finally get
V1(x) ≥ Ex
[ ∫ τS
0
e−ρ1sf1(Xs)ds+
∑
τ1,k<τS
e−ρ1τ1,kφ1
(
X(τ1,k)− , δ1,k
)
+
∑
τ2,k<τS
e−ρ1τ2,kψ1
(
X(τ2,k)− , δ2,k
)
+ e−ρ1τSh1(X(τS)−)1{τS<+∞}
]
= J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2).
Step 2: V1(x) = J
1(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2). We argue as in Step 1, but here all the inequalities
are equalities by the properties of ϕ∗1.
3.3 An example: optimal interventions on the exchange
rate
In this section we provide a detailed application of the Verification Theorem 3.8 by
considering a practical problem: we look for the Nash equilibria in the case where
two countries intervene to adjust the exchange rate between their currencies.
3.3.1 The problem
Let X denote the exchange rate between two currencies. The central banks of the
corresponding countries (denoted as players, from now on) have different targets for
the rate: player 1 needs a high value for X in order to gain, whereas the goal of
player 2 is to have a low rate. More precisely, if x denotes the current value of the
rate, we assume that the payoff of the two players is given by
f1(x) = (x− s1)3, f2(x) = (s2 − x)3, s1 < s2,
where s1, s2 are fixed constants.
Each player can influence the rate according to its own preferences and intervene
to shift X from state x to state x + δ, with δ ∈ R. When none of the players
intervenes, we assume that X is modelled by a (scaled) Brownian motion. In short,
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if x denotes the initial state and ui = {(τi,k, δi,k)}k≥1 collects the intervention times
and the corresponding impulses of player i (with i ∈ {1, 2}), we have
Xx;u1,u2s = x+ σWs +
∑
k : τ1,k≤s
δ1,k +
∑
k : τ2,k≤s
δ2,k,
for s ≥ 0, where W is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion and σ > 0 is
a fixed parameter. To shorten the notation, we will simply write Xs. Finally, as
player 2 aims at lowering the level, we can assume that his impulses are negative:
δ2,k < 0, for every k ∈ N. For the same reason, we require δ1,k > 0, for every k ∈ N.
Affecting the exchange rate clearly implies a penalty to be paid by the intervening
player and it is reasonable to assume that there is a corresponding gain for the
opponent. In our model the intervention penalty consists in a fixed cost and in a
variable cost, assumed to be proportional to the absolute value of the impulse. In
other words, if φi denotes the intervention penalty for player i and ψj denotes the
corresponding gain for player j, we have
φi(δ) = −ψj(δ) = −(c+ λ|δ|),
where c, λ > 0 are fixed constants and δ ∈ R is the impulse corresponding to the
intervention of player i. Finally, we assume the discount rate, denoted by ρ, to be
the same for both the players.
This problem clearly belongs to the class described in Section 3.2, with
d = 1, S = R, Γi(x, δ) = x+ δ, ρi = ρ, Z1 =]0,∞[, Z2 =]−∞, 0[,
and with fi, φi, ψi as above. In short, if ϕi = (Ai, ξi) denotes the strategy of player
i, we deal with the following functions:
J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) :=Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(Xs−s1)3ds−
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ1,k(c+λ|δ1,k|)+
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ2,k(c+λ|δ2,k|)
]
,
J2(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) :=Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(s2−Xs)3ds−
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ2,k(c+λ|δ2,k|)+
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ1,k(c+λ|δ1,k|)
]
,
where {(τi,k, δi,k)}k≥1 denotes the impulse controls of player i associated to the
strategies ϕ1, ϕ2. As already outlined, the players have different goals: we are going
to investigate if a Nash equilibrium for such a problem exists. Indeed, since s1 < s2
both the players gain in the interval [s1, s2], so that it seems that there is room for
a Nash configuration. If a Nash equilibrium exists, we denote by V1(x), V2(x) the
corresponding value of the game with starting state x ∈ R.
3.3.2 Looking for candidates for the value functions
Our goal is to use the Verification Theorem 3.8. Hence, we now try to find a solution
to the problem in (3.15), in order to get a couple of candidates V˜1, V˜2 for V1, V2.
We start from the equations in the QVI problem (3.15), which we recall for the
reader’s convenience (S = R in this problem):
HiV˜i − V˜i = 0, in {Mj V˜j − V˜j = 0},
max
{AV˜i − ρV˜i + fi,MiV˜i − V˜i} = 0, in {Mj V˜j − V˜j < 0},
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for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, with i 6= j; this suggests the following representation for V˜i:
V˜i(x) =

MiV˜i(x), in {MiV˜i − V˜i = 0},
ϕi(x), in {MiV˜i − V˜i < 0,Mj V˜j − V˜j < 0},
HiV˜i(x), in {Mj V˜j − V˜j = 0},
for i ∈ {1, 2} and x ∈ R, where ϕi is a solution to
Aϕi − ρϕi + fi = σ
2
2
ϕ′′i − ρϕi + fi = 0.
Notice that an explicit formula for ϕi is present: for each x ∈ R, we have
ϕ1(x) = ϕ
A11,A12
1 (x) = A11e
θx +A12e
−θx + k3(x− s1)3 + k1(x− s1),
ϕ2(x) = ϕ
A21,A22
2 (x) = A21e
θx +A22e
−θx + k3(s2 − x)3 + k1(s2 − x),
where Aij are real parameters and we have set
θ =
√
2ρ
σ2
, k3 =
1
ρ
, k1 =
3σ2
ρ2
.
In order to go on, we need to guess an expression for the intervention regions. As the
goal of player 1 is to keep a high rate, it is reasonable to assume that his intervention
region is in the form ] − ∞, x¯1]. For a similar reason, we expect the intervention
region of player 2 to be in the form [x¯2,+∞[. Since s1 < s2, we guess that x¯1 < x¯2;
as a consequence, the real line is heuristically divided into three intervals:
]−∞, x¯1] = {M1V˜1 − V˜1 = 0}, where player 1 intervenes,
]x¯1, x¯2[= {M1V˜1 − V˜1 < 0} ∩ {M2V˜2 − V˜2 < 0}, where no one intervenes,
[x¯2,+∞[= {M2V˜2 − V˜2 = 0}, where player 2 intervenes.
By the representation above, this leads to the following expression for V˜1 and V˜2:
V˜1(x) =

M1V˜1(x), if x ∈ ]−∞, x¯1],
ϕ1(x), if x ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[,
H1V˜1(x), if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞[,
V˜2(x) =

H2V˜2(x), if x ∈ ]−∞, x¯1],
ϕ2(x), if x ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[,
M2V˜2(x), if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞[.
Let us now investigate the form of MiV˜i and HiV˜i. Recall that the impulses of
player 1 (resp. player 2) are positive (resp. negative); then, we have
M1V˜1(x) = sup
δ≥0
{V˜1(x+ δ)− c− λδ} = sup
y≥x
{V˜1(y)− c− λ(y − x)},
M2V˜2(x) = sup
δ≤0
{V˜2(x+ δ)− c− λ(−δ)} = sup
y≤x
{V˜2(y)− c− λ(x− y)}.
It is reasonable to assume that the maximum point of the function y 7→ V˜1(y)− λy
(resp. y 7→ V˜2(y) + λy) exists, is unique and belongs to the common continuation
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region ]x¯1, x¯2[, where we have V˜1 = ϕ1 (resp. V˜2 = ϕ2). As a consequence, if we
denote by x∗i the maximum point of ϕi in ]x¯1, x¯2[, that is
ϕ1(x
∗
1) = max
y∈]x¯1,x¯2[
{ϕ1(y)− λy}, i.e. ϕ′1(x∗1) = λ, ϕ′′1(x∗1) ≤ 0, x¯1<x∗1<x¯2,
ϕ2(x
∗
2) = max
y∈]x¯1,x¯2[
{ϕ2(y) + λy}, i.e. ϕ′2(x∗2) = −λ, ϕ′′2(x∗2) ≤ 0, x¯1<x∗2<x¯2,
the functions MiV˜i, HiV˜i have the following (heuristic, at the moment) expression:
M1V˜1(x) = ϕ1(x∗1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x), M2V˜2(x) = ϕ2(x∗2)− c− λ(x− x∗2),
H1V˜1(x) = ϕ1(x∗2) + c+ λ(x− x∗2), H2V˜2(x) = ϕ2(x∗1) + c+ λ(x∗1 − x).
As for the parameters involved in V˜1, V˜2, they must be chosen so as to satisfy the
regularity assumptions in the verification theorem, which here write
V˜1 ∈ C2
(
]−∞, x¯1[ ∪ ]x¯1, x¯2[
) ∩ C1( ]−∞, x¯2[ ) ∩ C(R),
V˜2 ∈ C2
(
]x¯1, x¯2[ ∪ ]x¯2,+∞[
) ∩ C1( ]x¯1,+∞[ ) ∩ C(R).
Since V˜1 and V˜2 are, by definition, smooth in ] − ∞, x¯1[ ∪ ]x¯1, x¯2[ ∪ ]x¯2,+∞[, we
have to set the parameters so that V˜i is continuous in x¯1, x¯2 and differentiable in x¯i
(we underline that V˜1 and V˜2 may be not differentiable in, respectively, x¯2 and x¯1).
Finally, to summarize all the previous arguments, our candidates for the value
functions are defined as follows.
Definition 3.11. For every x ∈ R, we set
V˜1(x) =

ϕ1(x
∗
1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x), if x ∈ ]−∞, x¯1],
ϕ1(x), if x ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[,
ϕ1(x
∗
2) + c+ λ(x− x∗2), if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞[,
V˜2(x) =

ϕ2(x
∗
1) + c+ λ(x
∗
1 − x), if x ∈ ]−∞, x¯1],
ϕ2(x), if x ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[,
ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x− x∗2), if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞[,
where ϕ1 = ϕ
A11,A12
1 , ϕ2 = ϕ
A21,A22
2 and the eight parameters involved
(A11, A12, A21, A22, x¯1, x¯2, x
∗
1, x
∗
2)
satisfy the order conditions
x¯1 < x
∗
1 < x¯2, x¯1 < x
∗
2 < x¯2, (3.25)
and the following conditions:
ϕ′1(x∗1) = λ and ϕ′′1(x∗1) ≤ 0, (optimality of x∗1)
ϕ′1(x¯1) = λ, (C1-pasting in x¯1)
ϕ1(x¯1) = ϕ1(x
∗
1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x¯1), (C0-pasting in x¯1)
ϕ1(x¯2) = ϕ1(x
∗
2) + c+ λ(x¯2 − x∗2), (C0-pasting in x¯2)
(3.26)

ϕ′2(x∗2) = −λ and ϕ′′2(x∗2) ≤ 0, (optimality of x∗2)
ϕ′2(x¯2) = −λ, (C1-pasting in x¯2)
ϕ2(x¯1) = ϕ2(x
∗
1) + c+ λ(x
∗
1 − x¯1), (C0-pasting in x¯1)
ϕ2(x¯2) = ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x¯2 − x∗2). (C0-pasting in x¯2)
(3.27)
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In order to have a well-posed definition, we need to show that the equations in
(3.25)-(3.26)-(3.27) actually admit a solution. To solve such a system is clearly very
complicated and existence results are not easy to achieve. Hence, we first try to
simplify the equations.
We notice that the running costs fi are symmetric with respect to (s1 + s2)/2;
indeed, the global structure of the problem seems to satisfy such a property. This
suggests us to consider candidates with the following property: the couples (x∗1, x∗2),
(x¯1, x¯2), (ϕ1, ϕ2) are symmetric with respect to (s1 + s2)/2, that is
x∗1 = s1 + s2 − x∗2, x¯1 = s1 + s2 − x¯2, ϕ1(x) = ϕ2(s1 + s2 − x), (3.28)
for each x ∈ R. Notice that the last condition in (3.28) is clearly equivalent to
A11 = A22e
−(s1+s2), A12 = A21e(s1+s2). (3.29)
As x¯1 < x¯2, we remark that x¯1 < (s1 + s2)/2 < x¯2. It is easy to see that, under
condition (3.28), the systems in (3.26) and (3.27) are independent and equivalent. In
other words, the 4-uple (A11, A12, x¯1, x
∗
1) solves (3.26) if and only if (A21, A22, x¯2, x
∗
2),
defined by (3.28)-(3.29), is a solution to (3.27). Hence, we just need to solve one of
the two systems of equations. We decide to focus on (3.27), which now reads
ϕ′2(x∗2) = −λ and ϕ′′2(x∗2) ≤ 0,
ϕ′2(x¯2) = −λ,
ϕ2(s1 + s2 − x¯2) = ϕ2(s1 + s2 − x∗2) + c+ λ(x¯2 − x∗2),
ϕ2(x¯2) = ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x¯2 − x∗2),
(3.30)
where ϕ2 = ϕ
A21,A22
2 . We now have a system of four equations in four variables
(instead of the eight variables of the starting conditions). Also recall the order
condition (3.25), which now reads
|x∗2 − (s1 + s2)/2| < x¯2 − (s1 + s2)/2. (3.31)
As System (3.30)-(3.31) cannot be treated analytically, we need to assume that a
solution actually exists.
Assumption 3.12. We assume that a solution to (3.30)-(3.31) exists. Moreover,
we assume that there exists x˜ ∈]x∗2, x¯2[ such that ϕ′′2 < 0 in ]x¯1, x˜[ and ϕ′′2 > 0 in
]x˜, x¯2[. Finally, we assume x¯2 < s2 −
√
λρ/3.
We remark that the conditions on ϕ′′2 (we are going to use them in the next
section) are, heuristically, always satisfied by the solutions to (3.30). Indeed, as x∗2
is a local maximum, ϕ2 must be concave in a neighbourhood of x
∗
2; moreover, as we
need a C1-pasting in x¯2 with a straight line with slope −λ, a change of concavity
is needed in ]x∗2, x¯2[. Moreover, notice that we do not require the solution to be
unique, as this would be a direct consequence of the verification theorem.
We summarize the previous arguments in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.13. Let Assumption (3.12) hold. Then the functions V˜1, V˜2 in Def-
inition 3.11 are well-defined. More precisely, let (A21, A22, x
∗
2, x¯2) be a solution to
(3.30)-(3.31); then, there exists a solution
(A11, A12, A21, A22, x¯1, x¯2, x
∗
1, x
∗
2)
to equations (3.25)-(3.26)-(3.27), which is given by (3.28)-(3.29).
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3.3.3 Application of the verification theorem
We now apply the Verification Theorem 3.8 and prove that the candidates V˜1, V˜2
in Definition 3.11 actually coincide with the value functions V1, V2 of the problem
described in Section 3.3.1. We refer the reader to Section 3.2.2 for the definition of
the functions δ1, δ2, used in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.14. Let V˜1, V˜2 be as in Definition 3.11. Then, for every x ∈ R we have
δ1(x) =
{
x∗1 − x, in ]−∞, x∗1],
0, in ]x∗1,+∞[,
δ2(x) =
{
0, in ]−∞, x∗2[,
x− x∗2, in [x∗2,+∞[.
(3.32)
Moreover, for every x ∈ R we have
M1V˜1(x)=
{
V˜1(x), in ]−∞, x¯1],
V˜1(x)−ξ1(x), in ]x¯1,+∞[,
M2V˜2(x)=
{
V˜2(x)−ξ2(x), in ]−∞, x¯2[,
V˜2(x), in [x¯2,+∞[,
where ξ1, ξ2 are strictly positive functions. In particular, we have
M1V˜1 − V˜1 ≤ 0, {M1V˜1 − V˜1 < 0} = ]x¯1,+∞[, {M1V˜1 − V˜1 = 0} = ]−∞, x¯1],
M2V˜2 − V˜2 ≤ 0, {M2V˜2 − V˜2 < 0} = ]−∞, x¯2[, {M2V˜2 − V˜2 = 0} = [x¯2,+∞[.
(3.33)
Proof. We here consider δ2 and M2V˜2, the arguments for δ1 and M1V˜1 being the
same. For every x ∈ R, we have
M2V˜2(x)=max
δ2≤0
{V˜2(x+δ2)−c−λ|δ2|}=max
y≤x
{V˜2(y)−c−λ(x−y)}=max
y≤x
{Γ2(y)}−c−λx,
where for each y ∈ R we have set
Γ2(y) = V˜2(y) + λy.
As we are interested in maxy≤x Γ2(y), we now study the monotonicity of Γ2. By the
definition of V˜2, we have Γ
′
2(x
∗
2) = Γ
′
2(x¯2) = 0; moreover, we notice that:
- Γ′2 = 0 in ]−∞, x¯1[, by the definition of V˜2;
- Γ′2 > 0 in ]x¯1, x∗2[, as Γ′2(x∗2) = 0 and Γ′2 is here decreasing (since, by Assump-
tion (3.12), we have Γ′′2 = ϕ′′2 < 0 in ]x¯1, x∗2[);
- Γ′2 < 0 in ]x∗2, x¯2[, as Γ′2(x∗2) = Γ′2(x¯2) = 0 and Γ′2 is here first decreasing and
then increasing (since, by Assumption (3.12), Γ′′2 = ϕ′′2 is negative in ]x∗2, x˜[
and positive in ]x˜, x¯2[);
- Γ′2 = 0 in ]x¯2,+∞[, by the definition of V˜2.
As a consequence, the function Γ2 has a unique global maximum point in x
∗
2, so that
max
y≤x
Γ2(y) =
{
Γ2(x), in ]−∞, x∗2],
Γ2(x
∗
2), in ]x
∗
2,+∞[;
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therefore, by the previous computations, we have
M2V˜2(x) =
{
V˜2(x)− c, in ]−∞, x∗2],
ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x− x∗2), in ]x∗2,+∞[,
as V˜2(x
∗
2)=ϕ2(x
∗
2), since x
∗
2 ∈]x¯1, x¯2[. By the definition of V˜2, this can be written as
M2V˜2(x) =
{
V˜2(x)− ξ2(x), in ]−∞, x¯2[,
V˜2(x), in [x¯2,+∞[,
where, for each x ∈]−∞, x¯2[, we have set
ξ2(x) =
{
c, in ]−∞, x∗2[,
ϕ2(x)− ϕ2(x∗2) + c+ λ(x− x∗2), in [x∗2, x¯2[,
To prove the positivity of ξ2, recall by (3.27) that ϕ2(x¯2) = ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c−λ(x¯2− x∗2);
then, if x ∈ [x∗2, x¯2[ we have that
ϕ2(x)− ϕ2(x∗2) + c+ λ(x− x∗2) = ϕ2(x)− ϕ2(x¯2)− λ(x¯2 − x) = Γ2(x)− Γ2(x¯2) > 0,
as Γ2 is decreasing in [x
∗
2, x¯2[. Finally, by the previous arguments it is clear that
arg max
δ2≤0
{V˜2(x+ δ2)− c− λ|δ2|} =
{
{0}, in ]−∞, x∗2[,
{x− x∗2}, in ]x∗2,+∞[,
which implies (3.32).
Proposition 3.15. A Nash equilibrium for the problem in Section 3.3.1 exists and
is given by the strategies (A∗1, ξ∗1), (A∗2, ξ∗2) defined by
A∗1 = ]−∞, x¯1], ξ∗1(y) = x∗1 − y,
A∗2 = [x¯2,+∞[, ξ∗2(y) = y − x∗2,
with y ∈ R and x∗i , x¯i (i ∈ {1, 2}) as in Definition 3.11. Moreover, the functions
V˜1, V˜2 in Definition 3.11 coincide with the value functions V1, V2:
V1 ≡ V˜1 and V2 ≡ V˜2.
Proof. We have to check that the candidates V˜1, V˜2 satisfy all the assumptions of
Theorem 3.8. We prove the claim for V˜2, the arguments for V˜1 being the same.
For the reader’s convenience, we briefly report the conditions we have to check:
(i) V˜2 ∈ C2(]x¯1,+∞[\{x¯2}) ∩ C1(]x¯1,+∞[) ∩ C(R) and has polynomial growth;
(ii) M2V˜2 − V˜2 ≤ 0;
(iii) in {M1V˜1 − V˜1 = 0} we have V˜2 = H2V˜2;
(iv) in {M1V˜1 − V˜1 < 0} we have max
{AV˜2 − ρV˜2 + f2,M2V˜2 − V˜2} = 0;
(v) the optimal strategies are x-admissible (see Definition 3.5) for every x ∈ R.
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Condition (i) and (ii). The first condition holds by the definition of V˜2, whereas
the second condition has been proved in (3.33).
Condition (iii). Let x ∈ {M1V˜1 − V˜1 = 0} =] − ∞, x¯1]. By the definition of
H2V˜2 in (3.14), by (3.32) and by the definition of V˜2 we have
H2V˜2(x) = V˜2(x+ δ1(x)) + c+ λ|δ1(x)| = V˜2(x∗1) + c+ λ(x∗1 − x) = V˜2(x),
where we have used that V˜2(x
∗
1) = ϕ2(x
∗
1), since x
∗
1 ∈]x¯1, x¯2[.
Condition (iv). We have to prove that
max
{AV˜2 − ρV˜2 + f2,M2V˜2 − V˜2} = 0, in {M1V˜1 − V˜1 < 0} =]x¯1,+∞[.
In ]x¯1, x¯2[ the claim is true, asM2V˜2− V˜2 < 0 by (3.33) and AV˜2− ρV˜2 + f2 = 0 by
definition (in ]x¯1, x¯2[ we have V˜2 = ϕ2, which is a solution to the ODE). In [x¯2,∞[
we already know by (3.33) thatM2V˜2− V˜2 = 0. Then, to conclude we have to check
that
AV˜2(x)− ρV˜2(x) + f2(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯2,∞[.
As V˜2(x) = ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x− x∗2) by the definition of V˜2(x), the inequality can be
written as
−ρ(ϕ2(x∗2)− c− λ(x− x∗2))+ f2(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯2,∞[.
Since ϕ2(x¯2) = ϕ2(x
∗
2)− c− λ(x¯2 − x∗2) by (3.27), we can rewrite the claim as
−ρ(ϕ2(x¯2)− λ(x− x¯2))+ f2(x) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ [x¯2,∞[.
By Assumption (3.12) the function x 7→ λρx+ f2(x) = λρx+ (s2−x)3 is decreasing
in [x¯2,+∞[ (immediate check on the derivative); then, it is enough to prove the
claim in x = x¯2:
−ρϕ2(x¯2) + f2(x¯2) ≤ 0.
Since Aϕ2(x¯2)− ρϕ2(x¯2) + f2(x¯2) = 0, we can rewrite as
−σ
2
2
ϕ′′2(x¯2) ≤ 0,
which is true since ϕ′′2(x¯2) ≥ 0 by Assumption 3.12.
Condition (v). Let x ∈ R. We have to show that all the conditions in Definition
3.5 are satisfied by the optimal strategies, which are basically described as follows:
player i intervenes when the controlled process X hits x¯i and shifts the process to
the state x∗i ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[. As an immediate consequence, we have
X ∈ ]x¯1, x¯2[ ∪{x};
hence, condition (3.12) holds. It is easy to check that all the other conditions of
Definition 3.5 are satisfied; the only non-trivial proof is the integrability of the
intervention costs: as it is quite technical, we postpone it to Lemma 3.16.
Lemma 3.16. Let x ∈ R. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let u∗i = {τ∗i,k, δ∗i,k}k be the controls
corresponding to the optimal strategies defined in Proposition 3.15. Then, for i ∈
{1, 2} we have
Ex
[∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k(c+ λ|δ∗i,k|)
]
<∞. (3.34)
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Proof. Recall the optimal strategies: when the process hits x¯i, player i shifts it to
x∗i . This suggests to re-write the times τ
∗
i,k as sums of independent exit times.
To start, let us assume that the initial state is either x∗1 or x∗2. First of all, we
re-label the indexes and write {τ∗i,k}i,k as {σj}j , with σj < σj+1 for every j ∈ N (this
is possible: see Definition 3.2). Denote by µi the exit time of the process x
∗
i + σW
from ]x¯1, x¯2[, where W is a real Brownian motion; then, each time σk can be written
as σk =
∑k
j=1 ζk, where the ζk are independent variables which are distributed either
as µ1 or as µ2.
We can now start with the estimates. As δ∗i,k ∈ {x¯2 − x∗2, x∗1 − x¯1}, we have
Ex
[ ∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k(c+λ|δ∗i,k|)
]
≤ (c+λmax{x¯2−x∗2, x∗1−x¯1})Ex
[ ∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k
]
.
By the definition of {σj}j and the decomposition of σj we have
Ex
[ ∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k
]
=Ex
[∑
j≥1
e−ρσj
]
=Ex
[∑
j≥1
e−ρ
∑j
l=1 ζl
]
=Ex
[∑
j≥1
∏
l=1,...,j
e−ρζl
]
.
For i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ N, let mi(j) be the cardinality of the set {1 ≤ l ≤ j : ζl ∼ µi}.
By the Fubini-Tonelli theorem and the independence of the variables ζj we get
Ex
[∑
j≥1
∏
l=1,...,j
e−ρζl
]
=
∑
j≥1
∏
l=1,...,j
Ex[e−ρζl ] =
∑
j≥1
Ex[e−ρµ1 ]m1(j)Ex[e−ρµ2 ]m2(j).
Since m1(j) +m2(j) = j, we finally have∑
j≥1
Ex[e−ρµ1 ]m1(j)Ex[e−ρµ2 ]m2(j) ≤
∑
j≥1
(
max
{
Ex[e−ρµ1 ],Ex
[
e−ρµ2 ]
})j
,
which is a converging geometric series. To sum up, we have shown that
Ex
[ ∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k≥1
e−ρτ
∗
i,k(c+ λ|δ∗i,k|)
]
<∞,
which clearly implies (3.34).
The general case with initial state x ∈ R can be treated similarly: we have
σj = η+
∑j
l=1 ζl, where η is the exit time of x+σW from [x¯1, x¯2], and the argument
can be easily adapted.
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